University of California, Hastings College of the Law

UC Hastings Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship

2014

Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty
Zachary S. Price
UC Hastings College of the Law, pricez@uchastings.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship
Recommended Citation
Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 671 (2014).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/faculty_scholarship/1449

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.

Enforcement Discretion and
Executive Duty
Zachary S. Price*
Recent Presidents have claimed wide-ranging authority to decline
enforcement of federal laws. The Obama Administration, for example, has
announcedpolicies of abstainingfrom investigation and prosecution of certain
federal marijuana crimes, postponing enforcement of key provisions of the
Affordable Care Act, and suspending enforcement of removal statutes against
certain undocumented immigrants. While these examples highlight how
exercises of executive enforcement discretion-the authority to turn a blind eye
to legal violations-may effectively reshape federal policy, prior scholarship
has offered no satisfactory account of the proper scope of, and constitutional
basis for, this putative executive authority. This Article fills that gap.
Through close examination of the Constitution's text, structure, and
normative underpinnings, as well as relevant historicalpractice, this Article
demonstrates that constitutional authority for enforcement discretion existsbut it is both limited and defeasible. Presidents may properly decline to
enforce civil and criminal prohibitions in particularcases, notwithstanding
their obligation under the Take Care Clause to ensure that "the Laws be
faithfully executed." Congress also may expand the scope of executive
enforcement discretion by authorizing broader nonenforcement. But absent
such congressional authorization, the President's nonenforcement authority
extends neither to prospective licensing of prohibited conduct nor to policybased nonenforcement of federal laws for entire categories of offenders.
Presuming such forms of executive discretion would collide with another
deeply rooted constitutional tradition:the principle that American Presidents,
*
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unlike English kings, lack authority to suspend statutes or grant
dispensations that prospectively excuse legal violations. This framework not
only clarifies the proper executive duty with respect to enforcement of federal
statutes but also points the way to proper resolution of other recurrent
separationof powers issues.
I.
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VI.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Enforcement discretion-the authority to turn a blind eye to
legal violations-is central to the operation of both the federal
criminal justice system and the administrative state. Yet its
constitutional underpinnings are surprisingly unclear. Courts and the
executive branch have described such discretion, particularly in the
criminal context, as a core executive authority.' But the Take Care
Clause-the constitutional provision most often invoked to support
this assertion-suggests the opposite: by providing that the President
"shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," it seems to
require the President to fully enforce all congressional enactments. 2
Meanwhile, numerous recent controversies have highlighted the
importance of the issue. Under President Obama, the executive
branch announced policies of abstaining from investigating and
prosecuting certain federal marijuana offenses in states where
possession of the drug is legal 3 and delaying for substantial periods
the enforcement of key provisions of the Affordable Care Act ("ACA"). 4
Earlier, the Administration adopted a controversial policy of declining
to seek removal of certain sympathetic undocumented immigrants
who entered the United States as young children.5 The Administration

1. See infra Part II.A for discussion of examples.
2.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
3.
Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Att'ys, Guidance
Regarding Marijuana Enforcement 3 (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Cole Memorandum],
availableat http://perma.cclX35Q-YJYS; Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen.,
to all U.S. Att'ys, Guidance Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize
Marijuana for Medical Use 1-2 (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter 2011 Cole Memorandum], available
at http://perma.cc/M5A9-6A8C; Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att'y Gen., to
Selected U.S. Att'ys, Investigations and Prosecutions in States Authorizing the Medical Use of
Marijuana 1-2 (Oct. 19, 2009), available at http://perma.cc/JEV5-E7AQ; see also Memorandum
from James M. Cole, Deputy Att'y Gen., to U.S. Att'ys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana Related
Financial Crimes (Feb. 14, 2013) [hereinafter 2013 Cole Financial Crimes Memorandum]
(extending policy to marijuana-related financial crimes).
4.
Letter from Gary Cohen, Dir., Ctr. for Consumer Info. & Ins. Oversight, Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., to State Ins. Comm'rs (Nov. 14, 2013), availableat http://perma.cc/T3VW-66DZ
(indicating that health plans "will not be considered to be out of compliance" with certain laws
under specified circumstances); I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (July 29, 2013)
(providing relief from penalties for employers who fail to provide insurance as required by
statute); see also Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg.
8543, 8569 (Feb. 12, 2014) (discussing additional transition relief provided to certain employers
under new regulations).
5.
Memorandum from Sec'y Janet Napolitano, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., to David
Aguilar, Acting Comm'r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, et al., Exercising Prosecutorial
Discretion with Respect to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children (June 15,
2012), available at http://perma.cc/DH5S-3NXN; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/USCS/PIA-
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also claimed statutory authority to waive key requirements of federal
welfare laws, the ACA, and the No Child Left Behind Act.6
Although President Obama's policies have sparked particular
controversy, his actions are not unique. In fact, the practice of
executive policymaking through nonenforcement stretches back across
recent administrations. One commentator accused President George
W. Bush, for example, of pursuing an agenda of "deregulation through
nonenforcement."7 The reasons for increasing executive reliance on
nonenforcement, moreover, may well be structural. In an era of
presidential administration and partisan gridlock, when the public
holds the President accountable for failures of national policy yet
Congress cannot be relied upon to develop legislative solutions,
executive officials are prone to adopt an expansive understanding of
their authorities. Nonenforcement may be a particularly attractive
policy tool. Since it benefits some and penalizes no one, statutory
nonenforcement may permit Presidents to effectively amend statutory
policies, at least for the duration of their presidencies, without
provoking focused political opposition. But executive nonenforcement
authority, if unbounded, could substantially reorder the Constitution's
separation of powers framework. By permitting Presidents to read
laws, both old and new, out of the Code for the duration of their
presidencies, unrestricted enforcement discretion could provide
Presidents with a sort of second veto-an authority to remake the law
on the ground without asking Congress to revise the law on the books.
Developing a clear understanding of the proper scope of executive
enforcement discretion and the executive branch's law-enforcement
duties is therefore imperative.
This Article undertakes that task. Based on close examination
of the Constitution's text, structure, and normative underpinnings, as
well as relevant historical practice, I argue that authority for
enforcement discretion exists-but it is both limited and defeasible.
Presidents may properly decline to enforce civil and criminal
045, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE DEFERRED ACTION FOR CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (DACA)

2-3 (2012), available at http://perma.cclU75H-MZP4.
6.
See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY 1 (2012) (authorizing waiver of certain
provisions of No Child Left Behind Act); OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., TANF-ACF-IM-2012-03, GUIDANCE CONCERNING WAIVER AND EXPENDITURE
AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION 1115 (2012), available at http://perma.ccfV777-P942 (authorizing
waiver of part of the Social Security Act); OFFICE OF CONSUMER INFO. & OVERSIGHT, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSURANCE STANDARDS GUIDANCE SERIES-INFORMATION
(2010), available at http://perma.cc/E426-PGAM (allowing waiver of portions of Affordable
Care Act).
7.
Daniel T. Deacon, Note, Deregulation Through Nonenforcement, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 795,
796 (2010).
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prohibitions in particular cases, notwithstanding the Take Care
Clause. But this authority is not as sweeping as recent exercises of it
might suggest. Without congressional action expanding executive
discretion, the President's nonenforcement authority extends neither
to prospective licensing of prohibited conduct nor to policy-based
nonenforcement of federal laws for entire categories of offenders.
These forms of discretion, where they exist, require an affirmative
delegation from Congress, because presuming them would conflict
with another deeply rooted constitutional tradition: the principle that
American Presidents, unlike English kings, lack authority to suspend
statutes or grant dispensations that prospectively excuse legal
violations. Moreover, even the Executive's baseline nonenforcement
authority is defeasible: Congress may restrict it by mandating
enforcement in specified circumstances.
In the absence of more specific congressional guidance, then,
two countervailing presumptions should structure the law of federal
enforcement discretion. Executive officials should presume, first, that
they hold discretion to decline enforcement in particular cases, but
second, that they lack discretion to categorically suspend enforcement
or prospectively exclude defendants from the scope of statutory
prohibitions. These two presumptions strike a balance that best
resolves a deep conflict within the constitutional scheme of separated
legislative and executive powers.
On the one hand, some degree of enforcement discretion is a
natural incident of the core executive function of applying general
laws to particular cases. Indeed, a central normative reason for
separating legislative and executive functions, as articulated by
Montesquieu, the Federalist Papers, and other foundational sources,
is to create a safety valve that protects citizens from overzealous
enforcement of general prohibitions. 8 The Constitution's text can
accommodate this understanding of the executive function, even if it
does not compel it. The requirement of "faithful[ ]" execution in the
Take Care Clause invites inquiry into the proper scope and rigor of
law enforcement that a "faithful" executive agent should perform.
Other constitutional provisions, particularly the Bill of Attainder and
Pardon Clauses, also may suggest executive authority to tailor general
laws to particular cases.9

8.
See infra notes 111-12 and accompanying text (discussing Montesquieu's rationale for
the separation of the executive and legislative branches).
9.
See infra notes 95-107 and accompanying text (noting the Bill of Attainder, Take Care,
and Pardon Clauses support idea of executive discretion).
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On the other hand, equally strong textual, structural, and
normative considerations dictate congressional primacy in substantive
policymaking. If the core executive function is to apply general laws to
particular cases, the central legislative task is to formulate general
laws and policies for the executive and judicial branches to implement.
The executive branch thus exceeds its proper role, and enters the
legislature's domain, if without proper congressional authorization it
uses enforcement discretion to categorically suspend enforcement or to
license particular violations. This understanding, once again, has deep
historical roots. English monarchs claimed "suspending" and
"dispensing" powers-the authority to license illegal conduct either
across the board or for particular individuals. Parliament repudiated
these prerogatives in the Glorious Revolution of 1689, and compelling
textual, structural, and normative considerations suggest that the
Constitution entrenches a similar principle of legislative supremacy.' 0
Adding further support to these conclusions, early historical
practice appears to conform substantially to this Article's two
proposed presumptions. Whereas the federal criminal justice system
and the modern administrative state today presume substantial
nonenforcement of statutory prohibitions, the opposite was true of the
early federal law-enforcement structure. Nevertheless, federal
prosecutors and other executive officials claimed from the beginning
authority to decline enforcement of federal statutes in particular
cases-an important indication that the executive role has always
been understood to entail such authority. At the same time, there are
important indications that key early federal officials understood that
their duty generally was to prosecute provable violations that came to
their attention. Hence, although early federal prosecutors declined to
prosecute many cases based on equitable, case-specific considerations,
they generally appear not to have done so on a categorical or
prospective basis. In addition, all three branches appear to have
viewed executive enforcement discretion as subject to congressional
override.
Today, in contrast, substantial discretion is inevitable in many
regulatory contexts. Given the breadth of modern statutory
prohibitions and the limitations on available resources for
enforcement, federal officials must necessarily leave many statutory
violations unpunished. Treating this new reality of inevitable
nonenforcement as establishing a new constitutional norm of
unbounded executive discretion, however, would be a mistake. A law10.

See infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (describing the monarchy's power of

suspension and its subsequent repudiation).
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enforcement system predicated on unrestricted enforcement discretion
would defy the text, history, and normative underpinnings of the
Constitution. The other two branches, moreover, most likely have not
acquiesced in such discretion to a degree that should alter proper
constitutional interpretation.
These conclusions have two key implications for modern
executive conduct. First, the framework developed here undermines
claims that the President holds unrestricted discretion to decline
enforcement of statutes in all regulatory contexts. Wide-ranging
enforcement discretion may be inevitable in criminal justice and
certain other areas where, realistically, resource limitations preclude
enforcing all existing prohibitions. But the discretion exercised by
executive officials in those contexts provides no support for
presidential authority to decline enforcement with respect to any other
given civil regulatory regime, such as the ACA. Where broader
discretion is neither a practical inevitability nor expressly authorized
by statute, executive officials hold discretion only to make case-specific
exceptions to enforcement.
Second, even when exercising discretion in contexts like
criminal justice, the proper understanding of executive duty should
inform executive officials' decisionmaking. To the extent executive
officials base nonenforcement decisions on case-specific considerations,
their conduct falls comfortably within a long-standing view of the
executive function. In establishing more general policies, however,
executive officials should understand their task as a matter of priority
setting, not policymaking. To be sure, this distinction will be more a
matter of mindset and attitude than bright-line determination; the
line between a priority and a policy will be unclear in many cases.
Nevertheless, the constitutional principle of congressional primacy in
lawmaking requires executive officials to focus on effectuating
statutory policies rather than undermining them through
nonenforcement.
The framework developed here also sheds light on several
recurrent separation of powers disputes. It first suggests that the
growing practice of executive waivers of statutory requirements-a
subject of increasing political and scholarly attention-is not strictly
impermissible but does require explicit statutory authorization.
Without a clear statutory basis, an executive waiver of statutory
requirements is a presumptively impermissible suspension of federal
law. Second, the framework reinforces arguments that judges should
narrowly construe criminal statutes in order to cabin executive
discretion. Finally, it illuminates the long-standing debate over the
constitutionality of independent prosecutors. Specifically, the
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framework suggests that, because of the rise of discretionary law
enforcement, the President may be required to supervise prosecutorial
decisionmaking today, even if such supervision was not required at
the Founding.
The analysis presented here fills an important gap in the
literature. While scholars have debated at length the executive
branch's responsibility to enforce statutes the President considers
unconstitutional (an issue addressed only in passing here)," until
recently the analytically distinct issue of policy-based nonenforcement
attracted only a few relatively brief and impressionistic treatments.12
More recently, in the most thorough treatment to date, Professors
John Yoo and Robert Delahunty address the scope of the President's
duty under the Take Care Clause, with particular focus on President
Obama's immigration policy.' 3 But while these authors correctly
emphasize the historical repudiation of the power to suspend and
dispense with statutory mandates, they give insufficient weight to
countervailing considerations that support a presumption of case-bycase enforcement discretion. At the same time, they neglect entirely
the history of federal law-enforcement practice. Thus, despite
acknowledging the possibility of congressional intent to permit
equitable exceptions to enforcement in at least some statutory
11.

See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, PRESIDENTIAL DEFIANCE OF "UNCONSTITUTIONAL"

LAWS 21 (1998) (arguing that the President lacks authority to refuse to enforce unconstitutional
laws); Aziz Z. Huq, Enforcing (But Not Defending) 'Unconstitutional'Laws, 98 VA. L. REV. 1001,
1007 (2012) (proposing that the executive branch only decline to enforce unconstitutional laws
within certain categories); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of CongressionalActs, 61 DUKE
L.J. 1183, 1186-87 (2012) (arguing that the executive branch should enforce laws it believes are
unconstitutional); Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive's Duty to Disregard
Unconstitutional Laws, 96 GEO. L.J. 1613, 1616 (2008) (arguing that the Constitution requires
the President not to enforce unconstitutional statutes).
12. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The President's Completion Power, 115
YALE L.J. 2280, 2311 (2006) (identifying and analyzing a presidential "completion power");
Arthur S. Miller, The President and Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 VAND. L. REV. 389, 394
(1987) (discussing the role of politics in the President's enforcement of constitutionally
ambiguous laws); Peter L. Strauss, The President and Choices Not To Enforce, 63 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 110-11 (2000) (examining the role of resource constraints, "a
contemporary sense of the important," and other factors in executive enforcement practices). A
few articles have analyzed the related question of the proper scope of judicial review of agency
inaction. See, e.g., Mary M. Cheh, When Congress Commands a Thing To Be Done: An Essay on
Marbury v. Madison, Executive Inaction, and the Duty of the Courts to Enforce the Law, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 253, 272-85 (2003) (discussing modern courts' review of agency inaction); Ruth
Colker, Administrative ProsecutorialIndiscretion, 63 TUL. L. REV. 877, 888-99 (1989) (detailing
federal courts' review of discretionary agency decisions); Cass R. Sunstein, Reviewing Agency
Inaction After Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 653, 669-71 (1985) (discussing judicial
review of agency inaction).
13. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration's
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 781, 783-84 (2013).
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contexts, Yoo and Delahunty propose too rigid a conception of the
President's law-enforcement obligations.
An important recent article by David Barron and Todd Rakoff
explores the practice of statutory waivers. But despite reaching
conclusions broadly consistent with the framework developed here,
Barron and Rakoff do not explore in detail the contours of executive
discretion where no statute expressly authorizes waiver.14 Similarly, a
recent analysis of the President's proper role in overseeing the
executive branch's enforcement decisions gives only brief attention to
the President's baseline nonenforcement authority.15 A forthcoming
article on "presidential inaction" gives more focused attention to the
issue and again reaches conclusions broadly similar to those presented
here.16 That article, however, concentrates on functional reasons for
enhancing separation of powers constraints on presidential
nonenforcement; it does not consider the full range of textual,
normative, and historical considerations that properly inform the
scope of executive enforcement discretion.' 7
A distinct body of work addresses prosecutorial discretion and
the related problem of overcriminalization. But this vast literature
has generally focused only on normative issues and the prospects for
tailoring various judicial doctrines to improve accountability or correct
perceived abuses of prosecutorial discretion.' 8 The underlying
14. See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
265, 267 (2013) (discussing Congress's delegation of waiver authority to agencies). For another
more critical appraisal of this practice, see R. Craig Kitchen, Negative Lawmaking Delegations:
Constitutional Structure and Delegations to the Executive of DiscretionaryAuthority to Amend,
Waive, and Cancel Statutory Text, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 526 (2013).
15. See Kate Andrias, The President'sEnforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031, 1111-15
(2013) (asserting that "policy disagreement cannot be the sole reason for nonenforcement").

16.

See Jeffrey A. Love & Arpit K. Garg, Presidential Inaction and the Separation of

Powers, 112 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 15), available at
http://perma.ccdBJ2Z-5DPN (identifying as "problematic" on separation of powers grounds "a
President's determination, on policy grounds, that a specific law should no longer be enforced"
(footnote omitted)).
17. Id. (manuscript at 5) (describing the theory of separation of powers as "at its heart a
functional story" and arguing that this theory "must be updated to account for the possibility of
presidential inaction").
18. For recent examples in this genre, see, for example, Hadar Aviram & Daniel L.

Portman, Inequitable Enforcement: Introducing the Concept of Equity Into ConstitutionalReview
of Law Enforcement, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 413, 418-19 (2009) (proposing adjustments to Fourth
Amendment and equal protection analysis to address "inequitable" law enforcement decisions);

Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not To Prosecute,
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1660 (2010) (questioning prosecutors' competence to make
nonenforcement decisions); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Public Choice Theory and Overcriminalization,36
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 715, 716-21 (2013) (describing problem of "overcriminalization" and
evaluating various doctrinal responses); Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 801-06 (2012) (advocating public disclosure of prosecutorial
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constitutional framework for assessing the proper scope of
enforcement discretion and the executive's law-enforcement duty has
remained comparatively unexplored.' 9
This Article remedies this gap in the literature by exploring the
constitutional framework for executive enforcement discretion in both
civil and criminal contexts. It concentrates on statutes regulating
private party conduct, saving for another day questions relating to
internal government mandates. 20 It also concentrates on the question
of executive branch responsibility rather than questions of judicial
review. As explained below, the executive branch may have
enforcement duties that are not judicially enforceable. 21 The Article
leaves to future work a complete analysis of how extensively the
judiciary should review enforcement decisions.
The analysis here proceeds as follows. Part II briefly identifies
and describes the issue this Article addresses: whether and to what
degree enforcement discretion is a constitutional authority of the
executive branch. Part III describes the two relevant constitutional
principles-legislative supremacy and executive judgment-that must
inform any evaluation of the President's law-enforcement duty. Part
III also proposes a framework, based on the twin presumptions
identified earlier, for reconciling the two principles. Part IV offers a
brief account of the history of federal law enforcement. It explains
that, while early practice appears to conform substantially to the dualpresumption framework, much modern practice does not. Part IV then
explains why this evolution in practice should not alter the baseline
constitutional understanding of executive duty.
enforcement policies); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Ham Sandwich Nation: Due Process When
Everything Is a Crime, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 102, 103-04 (2013) (lamenting excessive
discretion conferred on prosecutors by the breadth of criminal prohibitions); Daniel C. Richman,
Federal Criminal Law, CongressionalDelegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV.
757, 789-805 (1999) (discussing means of congressional influence over prosecutorial discretion);
Stephen F. Smith, Overcoming Overcriminalization,102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLoGY 537, 544-65
(2012) (discussing federal courts' unnecessarily broad construction of criminal statutes).
19. Rachel Barkow has discussed separation of powers in the criminal context, but without
focused treatment of executive duty. See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the
CriminalLaw, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1002-09 (2006). While Rebecca Krauss recently traced the
conceptual origins of prosecutorial discretion as a separation of powers issue, she did not
consider the full range of normative and historical issues considered in this Article. See Rebecca
Krauss, The Theory of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Federal Law: Origins and Development, 6
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 22-28 (2009); see also John H. Langbein, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion in Germany, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 439, 443-46 (1974) (suggesting origins of prosecutorial
discretion in development of plea bargaining as a solution to procedural complexity in trials).
20. See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (separate opinion of
Kavanaugh, J.) (concluding that prosecutorial discretion does not permit nonenforcement of "a
law mandating that [an agency] take certain non-prosecutorial action").
21. See infra text accompanying note 340.
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Part V illustrates the framework's implications by briefly
analyzing several contemporary controversies, including disputes over
nonenforcement of ACA provisions, marijuana laws, and immigration
requirements. Part VI concludes by reflecting on the lessons of the
analysis here for constitutional interpretation in general.
II. THE PUZZLE OF ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

A. The Practiceof Discretion
Both the federal criminal justice system and the modern
administrative state depend critically on executive discretion over
investigations and prosecutions. Federal criminal prohibitions were
sparse and interstitial in the antebellum years, leaving to states the
primary role in criminal law enforcement. 22 But since the Civil War,
and especially since the crime explosion of the 1960s and 1970s, the
breadth and depth of federal criminal law have expanded
dramatically. 23 Today, federal criminal law covers a wide range of
conduct, far more than could ever realistically be punished. 24 Federal
statutes, moreover, often prohibit the same (or closely similar) crimes
many times over, allowing punishment of a single transaction under
multiple overlapping or lesser-included prohibitions. 25 Potential
sentences are frequently severe, particularly if offenders are convicted
of multiple offenses. 26
This legal structure presumes, and indeed depends on,
prosecutorial charging discretion. In one scholar's words,
As Congress well understands when it enacts federal criminal proscriptions, both
prosecutorial and sentencing discretion are inevitable because of the broad reach of
these proscriptions and the severity of authorized punishments. Resource constraints as
well as prudence dictate the conclusion that the federal criminal law cannot be applied
27
in its full rigor.

22.

For an account of early criminal enactments, see DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS,

COURTS, AND CRIMINALS 1801-1829, at 7-8, 30-35 (1985).

23. See William J. Stuntz, The PathologicalPolitics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 517-19, 525 (2001) (discussing increase in breadth and depth of criminal law).
24. See id. at 519 ("[Defendants who commit ... a single crime can be treated as though
they committed many different crimes... .").
25. See Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum: Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of
Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1423 (2008) (discussing the "great breadth" of federal criminal
law).
26. See id.; Stuntz, supra note 23, at 518 (noting that often criminals can be charged with
multiple crimes of varying severity).
27. Stith, supranote 25, at 1423 (footnotes omitted).
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With limited resources and broad charging options, federal
prosecutors must choose how to allocate investigative and
prosecutorial resources; they must prioritize some offenses at the
expense of others. Once they uncover a crime, moreover, they often
may choose between a range of charging options. Their choice of
charges may have important consequences for the offender's likely
sentence and thus for his or her willingness to forgo trial by entering a
plea agreement. What is more, because states continue to hold
primary law-enforcement responsibility within our federal system,
federal prosecutors often can ignore the offense altogether, thus
leaving the decision whether to prosecute with state officials. 28
So entrenched is the expectation of discretion within this
system that it may drive the expansion of substantive prohibitions in
the first place, in a sort of vicious cycle. Because legislators expect
prosecutors to exercise discretion over which offenders and offenses to
prosecute, Congress has little disincentive for passing ever-broader
criminal prohibitions. Quite the opposite, a tough-on-crime electorate
may create incentives to expand substantive criminal law, while
prosecutorial discretion mitigates the costs of such legislation because
Congress may anticipate that prosecutors will not in fact prosecute
individuals within the scope of the law whom the public would not
consider culpable. 29 The end result of this "pathological" political
structure is ever-increasing prosecutorial discretion: "[L]aw enforcers,
not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long."30
The administrative state, too, is shot through with discretion.
Early in the twentieth century, the Supreme Court held that Congress
violated the constitutional separation of powers by delegating broad
legislative authority to administrative agencies. 31 But the Court later
enabled the New Deal administrative state by curtailing this
nondelegation doctrine. Under modern case law, Congress can
delegate policymaking discretion so long as it provides some
"intelligible principle" to guide the agency's action-and the
"intelligible principle" can be as general as advancing the public

28. See id. ("[M]ost conduct that violates federal law also violates state law.").
29. For the classic statement of this view, see Stuntz, supra note 23, at 546-49. See also
wILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 2-591 (2011) (discussing
rise of official discretion as an organizing feature of criminal justice).
30. Stuntz, supra note 23, at 509; see also Zachary S. Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of
Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885, 911 (2004) (offering similar account of political dynamics of
criminal law).
31. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-38 (1935)
("[C]ongress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered
discretion to make whatever laws he thinks may be needed. . . .").
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interest in some substantive area. 32 Accordingly, agencies today
routinely establish policy and even issue binding regulations pursuant
to statutes that provide only vague and highly general guidance
regarding Congress's desired policy. Even after the agency has
established its policy or issued regulations, moreover, it often faces the
same mismatch between enforcement resources and the scope of
prohibitions that characterizes the federal criminal justice system.
Thus, agencies, too, often exercise broad discretion with respect to
enforcement of the statutes and regulations they administer. 33
In this environment, not surprisingly, courts and executivebranch lawyers have come to see prosecutorial discretion as a central
constitutional function of the executive branch. Courts, indeed, have
disclaimed virtually any authority to review executive charging
decisions. According to the Supreme Court, "[T]he Executive Branch
has exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to
prosecute a case." 34 In one much-cited opinion, the Fifth Circuit
described prosecutorial discretion as "absolute" and "required in all
cases."35 Other courts likewise have held that they "will not interfere
with the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion unless it is
abused to such an extent as to be arbitrary and capricious and
violative of due process." 3 6 Even when the law provides for a judicial
role, courts have been reluctant to exercise it. For example, although
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require leave of the court to

32.
See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (detailing prior
examples of what qualifies as an "intelligible principle").
33. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (holding that "an agency's
decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision
generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion").
34. Nixon v. United States, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974). Selection of defendants for
prosecution based on impermissible criteria such as race or the exercise of protected rights may
give rise to a defense of selective or vindictive prosecution, but in deference to the Executive's
prosecutorial discretion, the Supreme Court has given these defenses extremely narrow scope.
See, e.g., Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265 (2006) (requiring proof of the absence of probable
cause in § 1983 suits before suspending the presumption of regularity that is granted to charging
decisions); United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) (requiring "clear evidence" of
discrimination to overcome the presumption that the prosecutor has not violated the Equal
Protection Clause); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (noting selective
prosecution claims require proof of both "discriminatory effect" and "discriminatory purpose");
United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384 (1982) (noting that "mere opportunity for
vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule").
35. United States v. Smith, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967); see also United States v. Cox,
342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (holding that "as an incident of the constitutional separation of
powers ... the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers of the
attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions").
36. United States v. Welch, 572 F.2d 1359, 1360 (9th Cir. 1978).
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dismiss an indictment, information, or criminal complaint, 37 courts
have interpreted this rule narrowly, in part because of constitutional
concerns. 38
In the civil context, courts have indicated that, at least
theoretically, Congress could regulate executive enforcement
discretion. In Heckler v. Chaney, the Supreme Court held that
"Congress may limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it
wishes, either by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise
circumscribing an agency's power to discriminate among issues or
cases it will pursue." 39 The Court also cited with approval the D.C.
Circuit's decision in Adams v. Richardson, which held that courts may
enjoin an agency from complete nonenforcement of a statute the
agency is charged with administering. 40 Nevertheless, the Court in
Heckler emphasized "the general unsuitability for judicial review of
agency decisions to refuse enforcement." 4 1 The Court accordingly
adopted a strong presumption against construing statutes as
providing for such review. 42 In a more recent decision addressing
immigration enforcement, the Supreme Court emphasized the
importance of prosecutorial discretion in that context. Such discretion,
the Court observed, "embraces immediate human concerns,"
permitting officials to decline immigration enforcement based on "[t]he
equities of an individual case" or because of international relations
concerns. 43
For its part, the executive branch also claims constitutional
authority to exercise discretion in both criminal and civil enforcement.
The Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"), the component of the

37. FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 48(a).
38. See, e.g., In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the main
purpose of FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a) is "to protect a defendant from the government's harassing him
by repeatedly filing charges and then dismissing them before they are adjudicated"); United
States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 513 (5th Cir. 1975) ("[Rule 48(a)] was not promulgated to shift
absolute power from the Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a power to
check power."); United States v. Ammidown, 497 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that Rule
48(a)'s purpose is not to transfer a prosecutor's discretion to the courts but to allow the courts to
guard "against abuse of prosecutorial discretion").
39. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 833 (1985).
40. See Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1161-62 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (per
curiam) ("[T]he agency discretion exception to the general rule that agency action is reviewable
under the Administrative Procedure Act . .. is a narrow one.
); Heckler, 470 U.S. at 821 n.4
(explaining that judicial review might be available if, as in Adams, an "agency has 'consciously
and expressly adopted a general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its
statutory responsibilities" (quoting Adams)).
41. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 831.
42. Id. at 832.
43. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
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Department of Justice charged with issuing binding legal opinions for
the executive branch,44 has described prosecutorial discretion as an
"exclusive authority" of the executive branch. 45 Although some of its
opinions have been more measured, 46 one OLC opinion describes this
authority as one with which "neither the Judicial nor Legislative
Branches may directly interfere . .. by directing the Executive to

prosecute particular individuals." 47

B. Discretion Without Limit?
Given that substantial discretionary nonenforcement is
inevitable in so many areas of modern federal law, and considering
that courts have almost totally abdicated review over such exercises of
discretion, it may not be surprising that executive officials have
sought to deploy their discretion in a manner consistent with their
policy preferences. Recent presidential administrations, indeed, have
repeatedly relied on enforcement discretion as a tool of policymaking.

44.

28 C.F.R. § 0.25 (2013).

45. Congress. Subpoenas of Dep't of Justice Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252, 264
(1984) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974); Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454,
457 (1869)); see also, e.g., The Availability of Crime Victims' Rights Under the Crime Victims'
Rights Act of 2004, 2010 WL 6743535 (O.L.C.), at *11 (Dec. 17, 2010) (interpreting victim rights
statute in keeping with "our country's long-standing tradition of governmental control of
prosecutions"); Swift Justice Authorization Act, 2002 WL 34482989 (O.L.C.), at *10 (Apr. 8, 2002)
("The President's constitutional duty to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,' U.S.
Const. art. II, § 3, similarly vests him with a broad range of prosecutorial discretion with which
Congress may not interfere."); Waiver of Claims for Damages Arising out of Cooperative Space
Activity, 19 Op. O.L.C. 140, 155 (1995) (describing "a decision not to pursue a certain class of
claims" as "an executive decision that is generally within the prerogative of the President");
Congress. Requests for Info. from Inspectors Gen. Concerning Open Criminal Investigations, 13
Op. O.L.C. 77, 79 (1989) ("[N]either the judicial nor legislative branches may directly interfere
with the prosecutorial discretion of the executive branch by directing it to prosecute particular
individuals."); Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Exec. Branch Official Who Has
Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 126 (1984) ("Although prosecutorial
discretion may be regulated to a certain extent by Congress and in some instances by the
Constitution, the decision not to prosecute an individual may not be controlled because it is
fundamental to the Executive's prerogative."); Application of Conflict of Interest Rules to the
Conduct of Gov't Litig. by Private Att'ys, 4B Op. O.L.C. 434, 438 (1980) ("[O]n the constitutional
level, we have long asserted that the making of litigation judgments (variously described as
prosecutorial discretion or litigation management) is a function at the core of the President's
Article II duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed .... .").
46. See, e.g., Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Exec. Branch Official Who Has
Asserted a Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 102 (1984) (suggesting that constitutional
issue may arise only when law leaves no "discretion to the Executive to determine whether a
violation of the law has occurred").
47. Congress. Subpoenas of Dep't of Justice Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252, 264
(1984).
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For example, the U.S. Department of Justice recently
announced that it would generally abstain from enforcing federal
marijuana laws in certain types of cases in states where the drug is
legal. 4 8 The Department of Health and Human Services announced
that it would give existing health insurance plans an additional ten
months beyond the statutory deadline before imposing penalties for
failing to comply with certain requirements of the ACA. 4 9 Similarly,
the Treasury Department announced that it would postpone for a year
the enforcement of statutory penalties for employers who fail to offer
health insurance coverage to their employees.50 In 2012, the
Department of Homeland Security announced a policy, expressly
predicated on "prosecutorial discretion," of declining to enforce
removal statutes and employment prohibitions against certain
undocumented immigrants who entered the United States as young
children.5 ' The George W. Bush Administration apparently
underenforced certain environmental, product safety, and civil rights
laws as a matter of policy; in one case the Environmental Protection
Agency stopped enforcing certain air pollution restrictions after the
D.C. Circuit declared its regulatory standards too permissive. 52 Critics
also accused the Clinton and Bush Administrations of neglecting
enforcement of gun safety laws, 53 and the Reagan Administration of
deliberately failing to enforce antitrust statutes.54
While all these instances of nonenforcement provoked
controversy, structural forces may well explain why recent Presidents
48.
49.

See supra notes 3-4.
See Letter to Ins. Comm'rs, supra note 4 ("Under this transitional policy, health

insurance coverage . . . that is renewed between January 1, 2014, and October 1, 2014 . . . will

not be considered to be out of compliance with the market reforms . . . .").
50. I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, supra note 4. As this Article was going to press, the Treasury
Department issued regulations that further extend this deadline for certain employers. See
Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg. 8543, 8569 (Feb.
12, 2014).
51. See Memorandum from Sec'y Napolitano, supra note 5 ("By this memorandum, I am
setting forth how, in our prosecutorial discretion, the Department of Homeland Secuirty (DHS)
should enforce the Nation's immigration laws against certain young people .... .").
52. See Deacon, supra note 7, at 808-16 ("What the D.C. Circuit struck down as a clear
violation of statutory authority could simply be transformed into an enforcement policy and
insulated from judicial scrutiny."); Love & Garg, supra note 16, at 17-18, 21-23 (discussing
environmental and civil rights examples). See infra Part V.B.2.c for further discussion of the
Clean Air Act enforcement policy.
53. AMERICANS FOR GUN SAFETY FOUNDATION, THE ENFORCEMENT GAP 2-5 (2003).
54. See Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective:
Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 948 (1987) ("The
enforcement record of the Reagan Administration directly corresponds with its repeated
assertion that virtually all business activity except horizontal price fixing is good for the
American consumer and good for the economy.").
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have so frequently resorted to nonenforcement rather than seeking a
change in law. In an era of partisan polarization and legislative
gridlock, Presidents often cannot count on Congress to develop
legislative solutions to perceived problems, or even to negotiate over
such solutions in good faith.55 Nevertheless, the public increasingly
holds the President accountable for all failures of national policy. 5 6
Reliance on all forms of executive authority, without resort to
Congress, thus becomes a nearly irresistible temptation for modern
Presidents.
Nonenforcement, moreover, may be a particularly attractive
means of rewarding favored constituencies. To be sure, a
nonenforcement decision may not provide the same legal security as a
change in the underlying law. A future administration might reverse
the decision and pursue enforcement (subject to any applicable
limitations period or due process protection arising from the past
promise of nonenforcement). But the rewards to parties spared legal
penalties or the associated burdens of legal compliance may
nevertheless be substantial. At the same time, nonenforcement may
seem to penalize no one. Because the public interest in law
enforcement is often diffuse, nonenforcement policies may be less
likely to prompt the sort of focused, motivated opposition that more
affirmative forms of regulation typically provoke. 5 7
Nor are courts likely to reverse any executive nonenforcement
decision. Given their characterization of enforcement discretion as an
executive prerogative, courts appear quite unlikely to compel
enforcement against the President's wishes, even assuming a party
with standing to bring a justiciable challenge may be found.
Furthermore, given the widespread reliance of both the criminal
justice system and the modern administrative state on enforcement
discretion, an executive decision not to enforce a particular statutory
mandate may well appear relatively unremarkable to the public at
large.
And yet nonenforcement carries dangers. For all the same
reasons that make it an attractive policy tool-its circumvention of
55. See, e.g., Barron & Rakoff, supra note 14, at 306 ("With Congress
stalemated ... policymaking necessarily occurs, if at all, through the exercise of administrative

discretion."); Richard H. Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of Hyperpolarized
Democracy in America, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 277, 280-81 (2011) ("Politics is a partisan warfare:
that is our world.").
56. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2310-11
(2001) ("The American public harbors high and rising expectations about what a President
should be able to accomplish.").
57. For a specific illustration of this danger, see the discussion infra Part V.B.2.c of Clean
Air Act enforcement under President George W. Bush.
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Congress, the limited political constraints on its use, the unlikelihood
of judicial reversal-enforcement discretion may also be insidious. If
President Obama may postpone enforcement of the ACA's insurance
requirements and employer mandate, could a subsequent President
ignore the ACA altogether? Could a President lawfully decline to
enforce federal drug laws, or capital gains or estate tax requirements?
Might a President even do so as a matter of announced policy, thus
sparing noncompliant parties any legal risk, at least for the duration
of his or her presidency? Construed so broadly, executive enforcement
discretion could become a form of second veto-a power to read
existing statutes, whenever enacted, out of the Code for the duration
of the President's term in office. Developing a proper understanding of
the scope of enforcement discretion and the executive's lawenforcement duty is critical to evaluating recent practices and
restoring a sound conception of the separation of powers. In fact,
although enforcement discretion is a valid executive authority, one
with deep historical and normative roots in our constitutional
tradition, it is subject to important limits-limits that the executive
branch must recognize, even if courts are unlikely to enforce them.
III. THE PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
Identifying the constitutional framework for enforcement
discretion requires taking a step back from modern practice, which
makes pervasive exercises of discretion inevitable, and returning to
first principles. What constitutional principles govern the executive
role in enforcing federal law? The constitutional structure carries a
central tension on this point. On the one hand, the Constitution
obligates the President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed."58 At least insofar as "the Laws" are acts of Congress, this
take care duty implies a principle of legislative supremacy in
lawmaking: the President's duty is to ensure execution of Congress's
laws, not to make up the law on his own. On the other hand, the very
separation of executive and legislative powers under our
constitutional scheme, as well as the specific assignment of exclusive
responsibility for law enforcement to the executive branch, implies
that the President is more than a congressional handmaiden. The
constitutional scheme, in other words, implies some independent
executive authority to assess whether and to what degree any given
law applies in any given factual circumstance.

58.

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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The analysis that follows in this Part explores this structural
tension and the proper means of resolving it. Section A discusses the
President's duty under the Take Care Clause, and Section B discusses
the executive function within the separation of powers. Section C then
describes how these two principles may be reconciled by applying two
countervailing presumptions: (1) a presumption against presidential
authority to license legal violations or categorically abstain from
enforcement, and (2) a presumption in favor of presidential authority
to decline enforcement for case-specific reasons of justice or equity.
Finally, Section D addresses the question of defeasibility: it explains
that, as a general matter, both these presumptions are subject to
statutory modification or override, leaving to Congress ultimate
authority over the scope of discretion exercised by the executive.
A. PresidentialSubordinationto Law
The first key constitutional principle relevant to assessing
executive claims of enforcement discretion is legislative supremacy.
Under our constitutional scheme, Congress's role is to enact laws. The
President's role, in turn, is to execute those laws; he cannot make up
the law on his own.
This scheme affords the President no general authority to
nullify laws he does not like by failing to implement them. On the
contrary, the plain text of the Take Care Clause requires the
President to ensure "faithful[ ]" execution of laws that Congress
enacts. The overall architecture of the Constitution, moreover,
underscores Congress's primacy in lawmaking. The President's
prescribed role in the legislative process is to sign or veto bills that
both houses of Congress vote to approve.59 Congress may even override
the President's veto and enact laws that the President opposes. 60 The
Constitution also requires the President to "recommend to
[Congress's] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient"; on "extraordinary Occasions," he may even call
Congress into session to consider legislation. 61 The Constitution thus
defines the President's role in lawmaking and obligates him to
recommend legislation when he considers it necessary. With respect to
enacted laws, however, his sole duty is to take care that the laws in
effect are executed.

59.
60.
61.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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Allowing the President to disregard duly enacted laws with
which he disagrees would upend this scheme by giving the President a
form of second veto over laws, whenever enacted, that he does not
wish to see enforced during his presidency. Further, such broad
nonenforcement authority would permit the President, with his single
national constituency, to determine whether existing laws should
remain national policy during his presidency. It would thus contradict
the refined constitutional mandates regarding state-by-state
geographic allocation of representatives and senators. All in all, as the
Supreme Court has put it,
In the framework of our Constitution, the President's power to see that the laws are
faithfully executed refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution limits
his functions in the lawmaking process to the recommending of laws he thinks wise and
the vetoing of laws he thinks bad.62

Background normative expectations make the President's duty
to enforce congressional statutes even clearer. From a modern
perspective, the principle of legislative supremacy reflected in the
Take Care Clause is straightforward and intuitive, but it also
implicates a long history of struggle in England and the United States
over executive power. English monarchs historically claimed authority
not only to veto bills presented to them for approval but also to
suspend (either permanently or temporarily) the operation of existing
statutes, or grant dispensations prospectively excusing particular
individuals from compliance.63 In an era when Parliament met
infrequently and the monarch in any event was considered the
62. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); see
also id. at 655 (Jackson, J., concurring) ("With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men
have discovered no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be
under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.").
63. See Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM U. L. REV. 259, 278-79
(2009) ("Two of the Crown's asserted prerogatives had empowered kings to suspend the operation
of statutes and to grant individuals the dispensation of not being bound by statutes."). These
prerogatives were subject to evolving, and sometimes disputed, limitations. Outside of the
emergency context, in which the suspending power was considered virtually unlimited, it
appeared established by the seventeenth century that the royal dispensing and suspending
powers generally applied only to statutes, not common law, and that they applied only to laws
barring malum prohibitum, not laws covering malum in se. See CORINNE COMSTOCK WESTON &
JANELLE RENFROW GREENBERG, SUBJECTS & SOVEREIGNS 25, 29 (1981)

(explaining the

limitations to a monarch's dispensing and suspending powers); Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and
Strategies: Parliament'sAttack upon the Royal Dispensing Power 1597-689, 29 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 197, 198-99 (1985) ('There were limits upon the crown's powers."). Some also believed that
the suspending and dispensing powers did not apply to qualifications for office, although this
issue became a specific point of controversy. See Dennis Dixon, Godden v. Hales RevisitedJames II and the DispensingPower, 27 J. LEGAL HIST. 129, 142 (2006) ("By the early seventeenth
century, it was well established that acts of parliament could disable individuals from holding
office, and that these prohibitions could be beyond the reach of the dispensing power.").
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ultimate source of all law, suspensions and dispensations were useful
and broadly accepted lubricants for the legal system. They enabled the
monarch to moderate statutory mandates when changed
circumstances or a shift in royal policy so required. 64 In the
seventeenth century, however, as intense religious and political
controversies during England's civil wars unraveled traditions of
deference to the monarch, royal suspensions and dispensations
became a source of acute conflict between Parliament and the
Crown.65
The issue came to a head during the reign of King James II.
King James enraged Protestants in Parliament by using his
suspending and dispensing powers to exempt officials from statutory
restrictions on office holding by Catholics and Protestant dissenters.
In important test litigation, the King had to stack the King's Bench by
replacing half its judges to obtain a ruling upholding his dispensing
authority.66 When the Archbishop of Canterbury and other high
church officials were prosecuted for seditious libel for denying the
validity of the King's suspending power, the jury acquitted them in the
celebrated Case of the Seven Bishops in 1688.67 Finally, in the Glorious
Revolution of 1689, William III and Mary II replaced King James on
the throne. As part of the new constitutional settlement, the monarch
was henceforth denied suspending and dispensing powers. The very
first two articles of the English Bill of Rights of 1689 state that "the
pretended power of suspending of laws, or the execution of laws, by
regal authority, without consent of parliament, is illegal," and that
"the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of
laws, by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of
late, is illegal." 68

64. See WESTON & GREENBERG, supra note 63, at 29 ("The dispensing power was, then, a
valuable instrument of legal flexibility . . . .").
65. See Reinstein, supra note 63, at 279-81 ("It is difficult to see how the suspending and
dispensing prerogatives could exist in a system of parliamentary supremacy."); WESTON &
GREENBERG, supra note 63, at 1-7 (discussing emergence of the "theory of parliamentary
sovereignty" and the "conviction that the community but not the king constituted the human
source of law and political authority").
66. Godden v. Hales, (1686) 11 How. St. Tr. 1166 (K.B.); see also Reinstein, supra note 63,
at 279-80 ("A stacked King's Bench upheld James II's use of the dispensing power on a doctrine
of royal supremacy over the laws . . . .").
67. (1688) 12 How. St. Tr. 183 (K.B.); see also Reinstein, supra note 63, at 279-80 (stating
the facts of the Case of the Seven Bishops and recounting that "the jury acquitted the bishops to
general national acclaim").
68. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of
the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689). For general background on the
declaration, see STEVE PINCUS, 1688: THE FIRST MODERN REVOLUTION 292-93 (2009).
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The repudiation of royal authority to suspend or dispense with
statutes was thus a central achievement of the English Revolution. As
such, it formed an important backdrop to the American constitutional
enterprise. 69 Drawing from this English model, several states during
the American revolutionary period adopted constitutions including
prohibitions on executive suspension of laws. 70 Indeed, even today a
number of state constitutions retain such provisions.71

69. On the role of the Glorious Revolution in American constitutional understanding, see
generally SEAN WILENTZ, THE RISE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 4-6 (2005) ("The radicalism of the
seventeenth century belongs to the genealogy of American democracy."); JACK N. RAKOVE,
ORIGINAL MEANINGS 20 (1996) ("[T]he vocabulary of American constitutional thinking was
profoundly shaped by the great disputes between the Stuart monarchs and their opponents (in
Parliament and out) which reached a momentous climax in the Glorious Revolution of 168889.").

70. See generally Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What
Individual Rights Are Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1451, 1534-35 (2012) (reporting that six state constitutions had such provisions in 1787,
and two more adopted them by 1791).
71. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 21 ("no power of suspending laws shall be exercised except by
the legislature"); ARK. CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No power of suspending or setting aside the law or
laws of the State, shall ever be exercised, except by the General Assembly."); DEL. CONST. art. I,
§ 10 ("No power of suspending laws shall be exercised but by authority of the General
Assembly."); IND. CONST. art. I, § 26 ("The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except
by the authority of the General Assembly."); KY. CONST. § 15 ("No power to suspend laws shall be
exercised unless by the General Assembly or its authority."); LA. CONST. art. III, § 20 ("Only the
legislature may suspend a law . . . ."); MAINE CONST. art. I, § 13 ("The laws shall not be
suspended but by the Legislature or its authority."); MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XX ('The power of
suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the
legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the
legislature shall expressly provide for."); MD. CONST., Decl. of Rights, art. 9 ("That no power of
suspending Laws or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature, ought to
be exercised, or allowed."); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("All power of suspending laws or the execution
of laws by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people, is injurious to
their rights and shall not be exercised."); N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, art. XXIX ('The power of
suspending the laws, or the execution of them, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature,
or by authority derived therefrom, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature
shall expressly provide for."); OHIO CONST. art. I, § 18 ("No power of suspending laws shall ever
be exercised, except by the General Assembly."); ORE. CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The operation of the
laws shall never be suspended, except by the Authority of the Legislative Assembly."); PA.
CONST. art. I, § 12 ("No power of suspending laws shall be exercised unless by the Legislature or
by its authority."); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 7 ('The power to suspend the laws shall be exercised only
by the General Assembly or by its authority in particular cases expressly provided for by it.");
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 21 ("No power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the
Legislature or its authority."); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 28 ("No power of suspending laws in this
State shall be exercised except by the Legislature."); VT. CONST. art. XV ("The power of
suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought never to be exercised but by the Legislature, or
by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases, as this constitution, or the
Legislature shall provide for.").
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At the Constitutional Convention, the delegates unanimously
rejected a proposal to grant the President suspending authority. 72
Some scholars have even suggested that the Framers intended the
Take Care Clause to codify the repudiation of royal suspending and
dispensing prerogatives. 73 At the Philadelphia Convention, early
drafts of the Constitution would have conferred explicit lawenforcement power on the President. 74 The final version of the
Constitution, however, omits any such provision and instead includes
the Take Care Clause, which by its terms imposes a law-enforcement
duty rather than an affirmative authority.75 The evolution of the Take
Care Clause from a power-granting to a duty-imposing provision
underscores that the Framers intended Congress to have
policymaking supremacy.76 What is more, although there appears to

72.
1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 103-04 (Max Farrand ed.,
1966). See generally RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN 140 (2009) (describing debate over
the executive veto).
73. See, e.g., MAY, supra note 11, at 16 ("[The Take Care Clause] is a succinct and allinclusive command through which the Founders sought to prevent the executive from resorting
to any of the panoply of devices employed by English kings to evade the will of Parliament.");
Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 13, at 803 ("join[ing] [the] view" of scholars who argue the Take
Care Clause has the purpose of precluding presidential suspending or dispensing powers);
Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 726
n.113 ("[The Take Care Clause] supposedly was the Constitution's analogue to the English and
state constitution prohibitions on dispensing and suspending the laws."); Robert J. Reinstein, An

Early View of Executive Powers and Privilege:The Trial of Smith and Ogden, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 309, 320-21 n.50 (1975) ("It seems reasonable to conclude that the abolition of the
suspending power, in section 1 of the [English] Bill of Rights, is mirrored in our Constitution's
[Take Care Clause]."); Reinstein, supra note 63, at 280 ("The prohibition on the suspending and
dispensing powers was encoded in Article II's [Take Care Clause].").
74. The Virginia Plan described the President as having "a general authority to execute the
National laws," and a later proposal by James Madison would have granted him the "power to
carry into effect the national laws." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra
note 72, at 21; 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 38 (1900).
75. The Committee on Detail-a body charged with harmonizing the agreed-upon
provisions into a well-written whole-initially made this change. See generally Lawrence Lessig
& Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 66-65 (1994)
(discussing drafting history of Take Care Clause). The language of the Take Care Clause closely
resembles comparable provisions in the state constitutions of New York, Pennsylvania, and
Vermont at the time. N.Y. CONST. of 1777 art. XIX; PA. CONST. of 1776, § 20; VT. CONST. of 1777,
ch. 3, § 28. The "take care" formulation, though peculiar to modern ears, appears to have been
common in royal instructions to colonial governors and other royal power-granting instruments,
as well as in instructions issued by the Continental and Confederate Congresses. See Roger G.

Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution's "Executive Vesting Clause"-Evidence from
Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 1, 14-15 & n.59 (2009) ("[T]he
framers of the 1780 Massachusetts and 1784 New Hampshire constitutions largely
copied ... from the language of royal commissions; and the instructions drafted by the
Continental and Confederation Congresses resembled in form the former royal instruction.").
76. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 66-68 (recounting drafting history).
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be no contemporaneous evidence indicating that the Framers intended
the Take Care Clause to abrogate executive suspending or dispensing
powers,77 one key member of the Constitutional Convention later
indicated that the clause was meant to carry this implication.78
On the other hand, the First Congress failed to include in the
Bill of Rights any express prohibition on executive suspensions of law,
despite proposals from several state ratifying conventions that the
Constitution be amended to include such a provision.79 Yet any
negative inference from Congress's failure to act on these proposals
seems weak. It seems more likely that James Madison and other
members of the First Congress failed to include an antisuspension
provision in the Bill of Rights precisely because they thought the
Constitution already made it clear enough that the President lacked
such powers.s0 During ratification debates, even the Constitution's
Anti-Federalist opponents did not claim the President would hold
suspending and dispensing powers.81 As one scholar observes, "Given
the common Anti-Federalist strategy of claiming that the presidency
'would be a kingship in everything but name,' this silence is
overwhelming in its implications." 82
In any event, in the decades after ratification, courts invoked
the absence of suspending and dispensing powers as a virtual truism.
The 1806 case United States v. Smith is illustrative. In Smith, the
prosecution alleged that the defendant had launched a private
military expedition against a foreign nation with which the United
77.
See Prakash, supra note 73, at 726 n.113 ("While the [Take Care Clause] prohibits the
suspending or dispensing of the law . . . there appears to be no evidence explicitly linking the
clause (or its antecedents) to this purpose.").
78. 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 829, 878 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967)
(describing clause as providing that the President holds "authority, not to make, or alter, or
dispense with the laws, but to execute and act the laws").
79. See generally MAY, supranote 11, at 23-26 (discussing the Founders' failure to prohibit
a presidential suspension power in the Bill of Rights of 1791).
80. For evidence in support of this conclusion, see id. at 25-26.
81. Id. at 26--29.
82,

Id. at 28 (quoting FORREST MCDONALD, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 193 (1994)). The

only explicit mention of a suspending power in the Constitution is in the Habeas Suspension
Clause, which provides that "[tihe Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended,
unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9, cl. 2. The placement of this provision in Article I of the Constitution is generally
understood to signify that suspension of habeas rights requires legislation by Congress, a
conclusion that appears consistent with the Framers' hostility to an executive suspending power.
For background on this clause and the Framers' understanding of it, see generally Amanda L.
Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 1016-17
(2012) ("By its very design, the [Suspension Clause] holds out the specific lever by which the
Constitution can adapt in times of emergency to give the Executive expanded powers to detain
persons within protection outside the criminal process.").
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States was at peace, in violation of a criminal statute prohibiting such
military adventurism. 83 The defendant, claiming that the President
had secretly authorized his conduct, sought to compel testimony from
the President and other senior officials. 84 But Justice Patterson,
presiding over the trial as Circuit Justice, deemed the proffered
testimony irrelevant. 85 In his view, even assuming the defendant's
allegations were true, the President had no such authority to
authorize statutory violations.86
In support of his holding, Justice Patterson invoked both the
general normative principle of legislative supremacy and the specific
absence of any presidential dispensing power. Though acknowledging
that the President might terminate an after-the-fact prosecution or
grant a pardon even in a case of presumed guilt, Justice Patterson
deemed such actions "very different from a power to dispense with the
law."87 "The law," he observed, "like the beneficent author of our
existence, is no respecter of persons; it is inflexible and even-handed,
and should not be subservient to any improper consideration or
views." 8 Granting the President discretion to exempt particular
individuals from general statutory prohibitions, in other words, would
conflict with the basic commitment to the rule of law in the United
States, "which we have been always led to consider as a government
not of men, but of laws, of which the constitution is the basis." 89
Justice Patterson expanded on the same theme later in the
opinion and linked it to principles of legislative supremacy:
The president of the United States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its
execution, and still less can he authorize a person to do what the law forbids. If he could,
it would render the execution of the laws dependent on his will and pleasure; which is a
doctrine that has not been set up, and will not meet with any supporters in our
government. In this particular, the law is paramount. Who has dominion over it? None
but the legislature; and even they are not without their limitation in our republic. 90

Justice Patterson, in short, held that the President had no license to
ignore the statute, because doing so would be contrary both to his
constitutional obligation to execute Congress's laws and to the basic
constitutional principle that, in a republic, laws apply uniformly,

83. 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1201 (C.C.N.Y. 1806). For general background on this case, see
Reinstein, supra note 73, at 309-10.
84. 27 F. Cas. at 1228.
85. Id. at 1231.
86. Id. at 1230.
87. Id. at 1229-30.
88. Id. at 1229.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1230.
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without regard to persons, and are not "dependent on [the] will and
pleasure" of government officials.91
The full Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in its
famous 1838 decision Kendall v. United States.92 There, the Court
addressed an asserted presidential authority to disregard a statutory
duty to pay certain sums to a contractor for the postal service. 93 The
Court pithily rejected the President's claim: "To contend that the
obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully
executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel
construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible." 94 The
Court, moreover, linked its conclusion to the presumed absence of any
suspending or dispensing power in the Constitution. According to the
Court, recognizing executive authority to disregard the payment
obligation in Kendall
would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no countenance for its
support in any part of the constitution; and is asserting a principle, which, if carried out
in its results, to all cases falling within it, would be clothing the President with a power
entirely to control the legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of
justice.95

More recently, as noted earlier, the Court has continued to
insist that the President lacks independent lawmaking authority
within the constitutional scheme.96 Historical tradition and
subsequent precedent suggest, therefore, that the Constitution
prohibits the President from categorically suspending enforcement of
federal statutes or prospectively licensing legal violations.
B. Executive Enforcement Discretion
Congressional supremacy in lawmaking, nevertheless, is not
the whole story. While the congressional scheme dictates that the
President must execute the laws that Congress enacts, it does not
require that this function be performed robotically. On the contrary,
the very separation of legislative and executive functions implies that
91. Id.
92. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
93. Id. at 612.
94. Id. at 613.
95. Id.
96. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952); see also Office of Pers. Mgmt. v. Richmond,
496 U.S. 414, 435 (1990) ('The Executive Branch does not have the dispensing power on its
own ... and should not be granted such a power by judicial authorization." (citing Kendall, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) at 613) (internal citation omitted)); see also supra Part III.A (discussing the
holding of Steel Seizure and arguing that allowing the President too broad a nonenforcement
power would effectively place him in the position of making law based on his policy preferences).
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enforcing the laws may be a matter of judgment, a task of applying
particular factual
general laws appropriately-"faithfully"-in
and historical
normative
deep
has
circumstances. This understanding
roots, too, and is thus equally central to understanding the President's
law-enforcement duty. Other recent accounts of executive enforcement
discretion, however, have failed to recognize this principle and
accordingly have proposed overly rigid conceptions of executive duty.97
Just as much as it implies congressional supremacy in
lawmaking, the Constitution's separation of powers supports, or is at
least consistent with, a division of labor between the legislative and
executive branches: Congress enacts general laws, and the executive
branch, along with the judiciary, applies them in particular
circumstances. As the Supreme Court observed in one early case, "It is
the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules for
the government of society; the application of those rules to individuals
in society would seem to be the duty of other departments." 98 This
executive task of applying law to fact necessarily entails some degree
of judgment. Unless the division of legislative and executive functions
is pure formalism, the establishment of an executive branch
independent from the legislature must signify a measure of
discretionary executive control over enforcement.
At least one other constitutional provision reinforces this
inference: the clause in Article I providing that "[n]o Bill of
Attainder. . . shall be passed." 99 Historically, bills of attainder were

parliamentary mandates of punishment for particular individuals.100
By precluding laws that impose punishment without executive or
judicial action, the Bill of Attainder Clause ensures that punitive
legislation will carry some degree of generality, leaving to the
Executive identification of individual violators for punishment.
The Take Care Clause itself may also support an inference of
executive enforcement discretion. As a general matter, as we have
seen, this clause codifies a principle of executive subordination to law.
Nevertheless, the Clause's qualified language-requiring the
President to ensure "faithful[ ]" execution of the laws-invites inquiry
into background normative expectations about proper performance of
97. See, e.g., Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 13, at 799-800 (positing that the Take Care
Clause requires the President to enforce the laws "without failure" and "exactly").
98. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
99. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3.
100. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846-47
(1984) (defining a bill of attainder as "'a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial
trial"' (quoting Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977)).
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the executive function. To be sure, the term "faithfully," particularly
in eighteenth-century usage, seems principally to suggest that the
President must ensure execution of existing laws in good faith, a
meaning consistent with the Clause's core purpose of ensuring
congressional supremacy. 0 1 Yet the word also implies that executing
laws "faithfully" could be different from executing them strictly. 102
The term, in other words, evokes a notion of "faithful agency,"
in which the agent's proper discharge of his or her duties may depend
on an implicit understanding of the principal's expectations as much
as on any explicit directives. What exactly would Congress, or the
public, consider a faithful performance of the President's duties?
Parallel language in the President's constitutionally required oath of
office reinforces this suggestion. By requiring Presidents to swear that
they will "faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States"' 0 -without
even specifying any precise object of this
"faithful[ness] "-the Constitution suggests that proper performance of
the executive function may require adherence to notions of justice,
equity, and the public interest, even at the expense of complete
enforcement of each and every statutory mandate.
Finally, the Pardon Clause may also imply some degree of
enforcement discretion, at least in the criminal context. This clause
grants the President the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment."104 In both the modern and historic understanding, a
"pardon" excuses an offender's crime, while a "reprieve" delays
imposition of an adjudicated punishment. 05 The executive branch and
Supreme Court have construed the Pardon Clause to permit not only
these specific forms of clemency but also commutations (reductions in
punishment), amnesties (general pardons for a category of offenders),
and remissions of fines or penalties.106 The Supreme Court, moreover,
101.

See 1 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)

(defining "faithfully" to mean "[w]ith strict observance of promises, vows, covenants or duties;
without failure of performance; honestly; exactly," as in "[t]he treaty or contract was faithfully
executed").
102. Cf. Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution,63 STAN. L. REV. 1005,
1034-35 (2011) (arguing that the adverb "faithfully" imports into the Take Care Clause
limitations on available means of enforcement contained in other constitutional provisions, such
as the Fourth Amendment).
103. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8.
104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

105. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561, 570
nn.38 & 40, 580 (2001).
106. See id. at 570 nn.39-42 (collecting cases recognizing such other forms of clemency as
valid exercises of the President's authority under the Pardon Clause).
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has endorsed the executive practice of issuing pardons even for
unadjudicated offenses.10 7 The Pardon Clause thus permits the
President to bar punishment for any completed criminal offense,
whether or not the offender has undergone trial and conviction.
To some degree, the Pardon Clause cuts both ways. The
express provision of pardoning authority might imply that the
President should rely on this back-end clemency power, and not any
front-end discretion over enforcement, to exempt offenders from
criminal prohibitions. Clemency is different from nonenforcement in
important ways. At least until the statute of limitations runs out, the
executive branch generally can revisit a decision to decline
investigation or prosecution. A pardon, in contrast, is final and
binding.108 Similarly, while nonenforcement may occur quietly or even
surreptitiously, executive clemency requires an overt presidential
act,109 and pardons are often politically controversial.110 Thus,
contrary to one D.C. Circuit judge's recent suggestion that
unrestricted prosecutorial discretion follows ineluctably from the
pardon power," the Pardon Clause might in fact suggest that no
discretion over enforcement should be presumed absent a specific
exercise of pardon authority. That said, the Pardon Clause does at
least suggest that some authority to moderate the rigor of the law by
excusing particular violations is an appropriate component of the
executive function. To that degree, at least, the clause reinforces other
107. See Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1866) (indicating that the President's
pardon power "may be exercised at any time after its commission, either before legal proceedings
are taken, or during their pendency, or after conviction and judgment").
108. See id. ("[W]hen the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed
the offence.").
109. A pardon, to be sure, need not be publicly announced, but of course, it has no effect if
kept secret from courts and other officials. See United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 16061 (1833) (describing a pardon as "the private, though official act of the executive magistrate,
delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended").
110. Two famous examples of such categorical pardons are President Andrew Johnson's
pardoning of confederate sympathizers and President Jimmy Carter's amnesty for Vietnam-era
draft evaders. Both policies caused considerable political controversy. See generally Todd David

Peterson, CongressionalPower over Pardon & Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of
PresidentialPrerogative,38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1225, 1240-47 (2003) (providing background
on both examples). More generally, commentators have suggested that the political unpopularity
of pardons in a tough-on-crime culture explains steady decreases in use of the federal pardon

power. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of
Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1348-49 (2008) (discussing decline in executive clemency during
period dominated by "tough-on-crime politics"); Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons,Politics, and

Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President'sDuty to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483,
1494-1500 (2000) (discussing reasons for decline in pardons, including the "politics of crime
control").
111. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 263-64 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.).
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textual and structural indications that the President may exercise
some degree of judgment over proper enforcement of federal laws.
In addition to these particular textual and structural
inferences, deeply rooted normative expectations about separation of
powers support a presumption of presidential discretion to decline
enforcement in particular cases. As modern scholars have observed,
the separation of legislative and executive functions may protect
individual liberty by requiring at least two independent decision
points before individuals suffer legal sanctions: First, Congress must
enact a valid prohibition through the constitutional process of
bicameral passage and presentment to the President. Second, the
executive branch must pursue an enforcement action against an
individual defendant. 112 Interposing an independent executive
decisionmaker between the legislature and the individual thus may
help prevent unjustified or undeserved legal punishment. Even if
legislators want to punish particular individuals or legislate with
particular targets in mind, the separation of executive and legislative
functions ensures an opportunity for executive officials to
independently evaluate the factual and moral merits of each
particular case before prosecuting any particular alleged violation. Of
course, discretion also carries dangers of favoritism, discrimination,
and arbitrariness, but on this account, the executive branch's
independent political accountability helps ensure evenhanded and
appropriate enforcement decisions.
This understanding of the executive role is not a modern
construct; it has deep roots in our constitutional tradition. In the
ratification debates, proponents of the Constitution articulated the
separation of powers rationale for executive discretion in their
defenses of the President's pardon power. In the Federalist No. 74,
112. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 19, at 1017 ("Under the scheme established by the
Constitution, each branch must agree before criminal power can be exercised against an
individual. Congress must criminalize the conduct, the executive must decide to prosecute, and
the judiciary (judges and juries) must agree to convict." (footnotes omitted)); Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1536-38 & n.102 (1991)
(advocating liberty-protective understanding of separation of powers). Courts have also
acknowledged this principle. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008) ("The
Framers' inherent distrust of governmental power was the driving force behind the
constitutional plan that allocated powers among three independent branches. This design serves
not only to make Government accountable but also to secure individual liberty."); Metro. Wash.
Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991)
("The ultimate purpose of this separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the
governed."); In re United States, 345 F.3d 450, 454 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Paradoxically, the plenary
prosecutorial power of the executive branch safeguards liberty, for, in conjunction with the
plenary legislative power of Congress, it assures that no one can be convicted of a crime without
the concurrence of all three branches .... ).
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Alexander Hamilton observed, "The criminal code of every country
partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access to
exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a
countenance too sanguinary and cruel."" 3 Even the most refined
statutory code, in other words, requires some safety valve in
application for exceptional cases. As future Supreme Court Justice
James Iredell put it during the North Carolina ratification debates, "It
is impossible for any general law to foresee and provide for all possible
cases that may arise; and therefore an inflexible adherence to it, in
every instance, might frequently be the cause of very great
injustice."114
Framing-era views of separation of powers more generally
reflect the same understanding. In a famous passage quoted by James
Madison in the Federalist No. 47, Montesquieu asserted that
separation of legislative and executive functions is vital to preventing
"tyrannical" enforcement of tyrannical laws: "When the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same body of
magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise,
lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to
execute them in a tyrannical manner."115 Blackstone made the same
point in quite similar language: "In all tyrannical governments the
supreme magistracy, or the right of making and enforcing the laws, is
vested in one and the same man," with the consequence that "there
can be no public liberty," because "[t]he magistrate may enact
tyrannical laws, and execute them in a tyrannical manner.""t6
These assertions, which are echoed in other key Framing-era
sources,117 presume that enforcement discretion is a proper aspect of
the executive function. Were the President obliged to enforce all
congressional statutes to the hilt, the separation of executive and
113. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 364 (Alexander Hamilton) (Lawrence Goldman ed., Oxford
University Press 2008).
114. 4 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 111 (Jonathan Elliot. ed., 1836), available at http://perma.cc/Q6YDMW7D.
115. 1 MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 163 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent
trans., 1914) (1748), quoted in THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 241 (James Madison).
116. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *146-47.
117. An important example is James Wilson's 1790-1792 Lectures on Law. Wilson, a key
member of the Constitutional Convention and a future Supreme Court Justice, echoed
Montesquieu:
Let us suppose the legislative and executive powers united in the same person: can
liberty or security be expected? No.... May [such a magistrate] not then-and, if he
may, will he not then . . . enact tyrannical laws to furnish himself with an opportunity
of executing them in a tyrannical manner?
1 WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supranote 78, at 298.
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legislative functions would do nothing to moderate tyrannical laws.
The separation of legislative and executive functions helps prevent
tyranny precisely because a discretionary decision by executive
officers intervenes between the enactment of the prohibition and its
application to any particular individual.
Early in the country's history, future Chief Justice John
Marshall articulated this view of separation of powers even more
directly. Marshall's statement related to the political firestorm in 1799
over President John Adams's decision to extradite a sailor named
Jonathan Robbins (also known as Thomas Nash) who allegedly
participated in a mutiny on a British vessel but claimed to be a U.S.
citizen. 18 Adams's decision was controversial not only because of
Robbins's claimed American citizenship but also because the President
had earlier terminated the prosecution of another allegedly mutinous
sailor by directing the local federal prosecutor to enter a writ of nolle
prosequi dismissing the sailor's indictment. 119 In congressional floor
debates, Marshall, who was then serving in the House as a
Representative of Virginia, defended both the extradition of Robbins
and the decision not to prosecute the other sailor.120 He argued,
It is not the privilege, it is the sad duty of courts to administer criminal judgment. It is a
duty to be performed at the demand of the nation, and with which the nation has a right
to dispense. If judgment of death is to be pronounced, it must be at the prosecution of
the nation, and the nation may at will stop that prosecution. In this respect the
President expresses constitutionally the will of the nation; and may rightfully, as was
done in the case at Trenton, enter a nolle prosequi, or direct that the criminal be
prosecuted no farther. This is no interference with judicial decisions, nor any invasion of
the province of a court. It is the exercise of an indubitable and a Constitutional
power. 12 1

Elsewhere in the speech, Marshall further observed that, in contrast
to a private lawsuit "instituted by an individual," "a public prosecution
carried on in the name of the United States can, without impropriety,
be dismissed at the will of the Government." 122
Marshall thus articulated, in strikingly modern terms, the
normative theory that the President, as the constitutional
representative of "the nation," may decide which criminal violations to

118. For general background, see Ruth Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of
Jonathan Robbins, 100 YALE L.J. 229, 235-38 (1990) (describing the Robbins affair and the
resulting "legal and political contretemps").
119. See id. at 278 (describing the circumstances surrounding the writ of nolle prosequi on
William Brigstock's murder charges, including informal negotiations over extradition). For
further discussion of writs of nolle prosequi, see infra Part IV.A.2.a.
120. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596 (1800).

121. Id. at 615.
122. Id. at 609.
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pursue and which to ignore. Even more clearly than Madison,
Montesquieu, or Blackstone, Marshall asserted that the executive
function entails exercising independent judgment regarding whether
the "will of the nation" requires prosecution of a particular defendant
who violated Congress's general enactments. Marshall, moreover,
went beyond a merely normative argument for executive enforcement
discretion; he described discretion instead as an "indubitable" and
"Constitutional" authority of the President.
As a partisan intervention in a contentious political debate,
Marshall's assertions should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt.123
Nevertheless, Marshall's statement, in conjunction with the more
general statements in the Federalist Papers and other foundational
texts, illustrates the deep historic roots of the modern intuition that
some degree of discretion in enforcement is essential to the just
operation of criminal justice and the administrative state. This
normative understanding supports presuming that the President may
"faithfully" execute federal laws by applying them in a manner
sensitive to individual circumstances, even if that means declining
enforcement of statutory prohibitions in particular cases because
executive officials believe punishment is factually or morally
unwarranted.
In light of this background, the more rigid conception of
executive law-enforcement duty advanced by some scholars takes the
principle of legislative supremacy too far. Yoo and Delahunty, for
example, argue that "the Constitution's Take Care Clause imposes on
the President a duty to enforce all constitutionally valid acts of
Congress in all situations and cases." 124 In their view, congressional
failure to provide adequate resources for full enforcement may excuse
a breach of this duty.125 Yoo and Delahunty also concede that, at least
in the immigration context, some degree of case-by-case
nonenforcement may be "tolerable" on the assumption that it "furthers
congressional policy" or "represents what Congress itself would have
decided in [the particular] case." 1 26 In principle, however, Yoo and
Delahunty maintain that even "equitable exceptions from statutory

123. There is no record of the principal floor speech opposing Marshall's position, but the
debate otherwise appears to have focused principally on the President's power over foreign
affairs and treaty interpretation, not prosecutorial discretion. See Wedgwood, supra note 118, at
335-36 & n.407 (stating that Albert Gallatin's opposing speech is not reported in the Annals of
Congress but summarizing the main points of his speech based on information gleaned from
Gallatin's personal papers).
124. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 13, at 784 (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 845-51.
126. Id. at 842-43.
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law that were not themselves based on another statute or on treaty
law" are "breaches of duty" and "not valid exercises of Article II
authority." 127
To support this position, Yoo and Delahunty rely principally on
the text of the Take Care Clause and the historical repudiation of
executive suspending and dispensing powers. 128 Yet their argument
exaggerates the specificity of the constitutional text and overreads the
Constitution's historical background, neglecting the contrary evidence
that the executive function necessarily entails-and has always been
expected to entail-some authority to moderate the rigors of the law
through prudent enforcement. Nor do Yoo and Delahunty offer any
account of early law-enforcement practice, although, as we shall see
later, early practice undermines any originalist argument that the
Framers did not expect executive officials to exercise enforcement
discretion. 129 The Constitution does not require the President to be a
robot. Some degree of executive discretion is as much a part of the
constitutional scheme as is the President's subordination to enacted
laws.
C. Dual Presumptions
Two constitutional principles, then, are relevant to the scope of
executive enforcement discretion and the President's law-enforcement
duty. On the one hand, Congress is supreme in lawmaking. On the
other, the executive function of applying law to fact appropriately
entails some degree of enforcement discretion. How can these
conflicting principles be reconciled?
With respect to any particular statutory scheme, these two
countervailing principles support two presumptions. First, the textual,
normative, and historical considerations that justify some degree of
enforcement discretion dictate a presumption that the Executive may
"faithfully" execute federal laws while still declining enforcement in
particular cases where executive officials believe punishment is either
factually or morally unwarranted. Yet this presumptive discretion is
subject to important limits, which take the form of a second,
countervailing presumption. Notwithstanding their case-by-case
discretion, executive officials lack inherent authority either to
prospectively license statutory violations or to categorically suspend
enforcement of statutes for policy reasons.
127. Id. at 842.
128. Id. at 798-808.
129. See infra Part IVA.
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These dual presumptions give force to both constitutional
principles discussed in the previous two Sections without overriding
either. Presuming discretion to decline enforcement in particular cases
for reasons of justice or equity gives force to the principle that the
executive function should not be robotic because the separation of
lawmaking and enforcement powers is intended to preserve liberty. If
nonenforcement authority were unbounded, it would become an
authority to remake the law, in violation of the principle of legislative
supremacy. Presuming, however, that executive enforcement
discretion extends only to case-specific considerations harmonizes
such discretion with the principle of legislative supremacy by barring
two especially direct infringements on the legislative function.
Prospective nonenforcement-that is, an announced promise of
declining enforcement of a law in the future-is a particular offense to
legislative supremacy because it undermines the deterrent effect of
the law. Similarly, categorical nonenforcement for policy reasons
usurps Congress's function of embodying national policy in law; it
effectively curtails the statute that Congress enacted, replacing it with
a narrower prohibition. What is more, these two forms of executive
action most closely approximate the two forms of executive power that
the historical background suggests the Framers sought specifically to
prohibit: prospective licensing resembles the royal dispensing power,
while categorical nonenforcement resembles an executive suspension
of statutory law. By presuming that executive discretion does not
extend to these particular forms of nonenforcement, the legal
framework preserves congressional primacy in lawmaking while
simultaneously allowing executive discretion in enforcement.
To be sure, even a firm policy or promise of nonenforcement
may not provide the same legal security as a change in the underlying
statutory law. In principle, a future President (or even the same one)
might resume statutory enforcement. In that sense, at least, even
categorical or prospective nonenforcement may not constitute a true
suspension or dispensation, as historically defined. Yet this difference
is often more apparent than real. As a practical matter, the
government is unlikely to punish violations that it itself invited with
an announced policy. 130 It seems inconceivable, for example, that the
government will later seek to collect employer penalties for
noncompliance with the ACA's employer mandate despite having

130. Cf. Madison Consultants v. FDIC, 710 F.2d 57, 59 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983) (observing that the
Securities and Exchange Commission "has rarely taken action" after issuing a so-called no-action
letter indicating that a planned course of action is lawful).
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announced that "no [such] payments will be assessed for 2014."131
Enforcement under such circumstances might even violate due
process.132 Furthermore, during the period of nonenforcement,
limitations periods may run, memories may fade, and evidence may
disappear, creating legal or practical obstacles to future punishment of
past violations.
More fundamentally, even if enforcement suspension is only
temporary, it still strips the law of practical effect for a certain period,
thus violating the principle of legislative supremacy in
policymaking.133 The Take Care Clause, after all, requires faithful
execution of "the Laws" on an ongoing basis, 134 and the English Bill of
Rights prohibited executive officials from suspending not only "laws"
but also "the execution of laws." 35
The boundary between case-specific and prospective or
categorical nonenforcement may not be clear in all cases. In the
modern environment of broad statutory regulations and limited
enforcement resources, some degree of policy-based priority setting by
enforcement officials is inevitable in many contexts. In Part V below, I
address the practical challenges faced by contemporary lawenforcement officials and explain how this framework may inform the
proper understanding of executive duty in the modern context. In Part
IV, moreover, I suggest, based on an examination of early federal law131. I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, supra note 4. For further discussion of this policy, see infra Part
V.A.2.
132. See, e.g., In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 263 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.)
(noting this possibility); cf. United States v. Pelletier, 898 F.2d 297, 302 (2d Cir. 1990) ("[D]ue
process requires that the government adhere to the terms of any plea bargain or immunity
agreement it makes.").
133. Cf. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 14, at 274 (observing that an "affirmative policy" of
nonenforcement "renders the underlying legal requirement effectively void for all cases within
the ambit of the policy for as long as the policy remains in effect").
134. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
135. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of
the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689). See also MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. XX
("The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but
by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as
the legislature shall expressly provide for." (emphasis added)); MD. CONST. art. 9 ("That no power
of suspending Laws or the execution of Laws, unless by, or derived from the Legislature, ought to
be exercised, or allowed." (emphasis added)); N.C. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("All power of suspending
laws or the execution of laws by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the
people, is injurious to their rights and shall not be exercised." (emphasis added)); N.H. CONST.,
Bill of Rights, art. XXIX ("The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of them, ought
never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived therefrom, to be exercised in
such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for." (emphasis added)); VT.
CONsT. art. XV ('"The power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought never to be
exercised but by the Legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such
particular cases, as this constitution, or the Legislature shall provide for." (emphasis added)).
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enforcement practice, that these two countervailing presumptions may
provide, and at one time did provide, a coherent and normatively
attractive framework for law enforcement.
Before turning to that history, however, this Article considers
to what degree Congress is free to adjust or override the two
presumptions. Is there any constitutional obstacle to Congress
authorizing executive suspending and dispensing powers or,
conversely, curtailing executive discretion?
D. Defeasibility
In fact, the dual presumptions that shape executive
enforcement discretion are both broadly defeasible. While the
Executive must retain some icore authority to decline enforcement of
penalties against parties whom the executive branch judges to be
factually innocent, Congress otherwise holds broad authority to
regulate executive enforcement discretion. In particular, Congress is
free to enact enforcement guidelines or even statutory mandates
requiring enforcement in specified circumstances. Likewise, the
separation of powers permits Congress to authorize at least some
forms of executive
suspending
or dispensing
authority,
notwithstanding the constitutional presumption against them.
1. Expanding Discretion
Some have suggested that the constitutional considerations
counseling against an executive suspending or dispensing power are
so strong as to even preclude Congress from specifically authorizing a
presidential suspending or dispensing authority by statute.13 6 More
specifically, some have questioned the permissibility of legislative
provisions allowing executive officials to waive statutory
requirements-a form of effective suspending power that is
increasingly common in federal legislation. 137 In fact, however, such
legislation has been commonplace throughout American history, and it
raises none of the concerns that support a presumption against
136. See, e.g., Philip Hamburger, Are Health Care Waivers Unconstitutional?,
http://perma.cc/ZTA5-7S5Y (nationalreview.com, archived Feb. 10, 2014) ("[O]nce a law has
passed-and therefore is binding-how can the executive branch relieve some Americans of their
obligation to obey it?").
137. See, e.g., Kitchen, supra note 14, at 527-31 (discussing the position of negative
lawmaking delegations within the modern administrative state and contending "that many
waiver delegations unconstitutionally allow the Executive to undo legislative compromise"). For
a normative and constitutional defense of this practice, see Barron & Rakoff, supra note 14, at
267.
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executive suspending or dispensing authority in the absence of
congressional authorization.
To begin with, the text and drafting history of the Constitution
are consistent with allowing Congress to authorize executive
suspending and dispensing powers. As we have seen, although the
Take Care Clause codifies a general principle of legislative supremacy,
the Framers declined to include a more specific antisuspension
provision in the Constitution, despite calls from some state ratifying
conventions to do so.' 3 8 In contrast, several state constitutions to this
day expressly repudiate any executive suspending power, 139 and
several did so at the time of the Founding.140 The absence of such
explicit language in the Federal Constitution thus may suggest
greater flexibility. What is more, although at least one state court has
construed its state constitution to preclude legislative delegation of
the suspending power, 14 1 the antisuspension provisions in many state
constitutions expressly contemplate such delegations. 142 Accordingly,
138. See supra notes 73-75 and surrounding text.
139. See supra note 71.
140. See, e.g., VA. CONST. art. I, § 7 and Bill of Rights cl. 28 (1776) (providing that "all power
of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the
representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised" and that
the state governor "shall not, under any presence, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of
any law, statute or custom of England").
141. See Opinion of the Justices, 345 So. 2d 1354, 1356-57 (Ala. 1977) (interpreting state
constitutional provision providing "[t]hat no power of suspending laws shall be exercised except
by the Legislature" to signify that "[t]he legislature cannot authorize suspension of law by
another agency, even where the legislature itself has the power to suspend the law").
142. See, e.g., DEL. CONST. art. I, § 10 (permitting suspension "by authority" of legislature);
IND. CONST. art. I, § 26 (same); KY. CONST. § 15 (same); MAINE CONST. art. I, § 13 (same); MASS.
CONST. pt. I, art. XX (permitting suspension "by authority derived from [the legislature], to be
exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for"); MD.
CONST., Decl. of Rights, art. 9 (barring suspension "unless by, or derived from the Legislature"
(emphasis added)); N.H. CONST., Bill of Rights, art. XXIX (allowing suspension "by authority
derived" from the legislature); PA. CONST. art. I, § 12 (permitting suspension "by [legislature's]
authority"); ORE. CONST. art. I, § 22 (same); S.C. CONST. art. I, § 7 (same); S.D. CONST. art. VI,
§ 21 (same); VT. CONsT. art. XV (permitting suspension "by authority derived from" the
legislature); see also, e.g., Nicolette v. Caruso, 315 F. Supp. 2d 710, 726 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (holding
that challenged action "not constitute suspension of legislation because that action is authorized
by the legislature"); Young v. Fetterolf, 182 A. 676, 679-80 (Pa. 1936) (rejecting challenge under
state antisuspension provision to law delegating suspension power to municipalities);
Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong v. Collins, 709 S.W.2d 437, 442 (Ky. 1986) (noting legislature's
authority to delegate suspending power to courts); State v. Karmil Merch. Corp., 186 A.2d 352,
368 (Me. 1962) (holding "[t]here is no suspension of the laws in violation of our Constitution"
where law authorized municipalities to establish exemptions); Mass. Bay Transp. Auth. Advisory
Bd. v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 417 N.E.2d 7, 13 (Mass. 1981) (noting governor could not
suspend law "in the absence of legislative authority"); Martin v. Oregon R. & Nay. Co., 113 P. 16,
19-20 (Or. 1910) (interpreting state constitutional provision to "permit the operation of laws to
be suspended by an officer or tribunal of this state, when so authorized by an act of the
legislative assembly"), rev'd on othergrounds, Or. R.R. & Navigation Co. v. Martin, 229 U.S. 606
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the Federal Constitution's silence on the issue readily permits the
conclusion that the laws the President must execute include laws
authorizing executive suspensions or dispensations.
Such laws, moreover, have been common throughout the
nation's history. To be sure, the significant constitutional debate
triggered by one such law in 1807,143 and hostility that some Members
of Congress expressed towards the law, provides important evidence
that Americans in the early Republic felt that the suspending power
was potentially dangerous and should not be presumed to reside in the
executive branch. Nevertheless, the ultimate outcome of the debate-a
vote in favor of the legislation by wide margins-supports the
constitutionality of laws allowing executive suspension of their
provisions. 144 As the bill's defenders pointed out, a presidential
suspending power authorized by statute is entirely consistent with
principles of legislative supremacy. Congressional "authorization by
law to exercise a discretionary suspension of a law" arguably raises
none of the historical concerns regarding the suspending power. Any
suspension of the law under such a statute is based on statutory
authority and not some extralegal executive prerogative.145 For this
reason, several years after the 1807 debate, the Supreme Court
rejected constitutional challenges to a law allowing executive
suspension of the statutory repeal of an earlier law. 146 The Court has
since upheld other statutory suspension provisions. 147
Other early statutes also authorized dispensing powers. These
provisions authorized the President to waive statutory prohibitions for

(1913); cf. Opinion of the Justices, 52 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Mass. 1944) (noting suspension by
governor was not possible where legislature failed "to provide for the particular case" as required
by state constitution's antisuspension provision).
143. Act of Apr. 22, 1808, ch. 52, 2 Stat. 490.
144. 18 ANNALS OF CONG. 2246 (1808) (recording vote of 60-36 in the House); see also id. at
2204 (referring to "the great majority, who are friendly to this bill, who, by adopting it, sanction
the constitutionality of the grant of fresh authority to [the President]"); id. at 2229 (stressing
that the President would lack suspending power without enactment of the bill); id. at 2118
(statement by opponent of bill declaring that "it is unconstitutional to vest the President with
power to suspend a law"); id. at 2125 (statement by opponent calling bill "the most antirepublican doctrine ever advocated on the floor of this House"); id. at 2129 (statement by
supporter of bill conceding that passing it would mean "throw[ing] a monstrous and unusual
power into the hands of the President").
145. Id. at 2202, 2232.
146. Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 388 (1813) ("I[W]e
can see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the
act . . ,either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.").
147. See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 680-94 (1892) (collecting
historical examples of suspension provisions and upholding law allowing presidential
reactivation of tariffs).
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particular parties without suspending their effect in other cases.148
This form of authority, too, is now common, as administrative
licensing regimes and other statutory waiver provisions often enable
executive officials to authorize licensed parties to engage in conduct
that would otherwise be prohibited. While constitutional requirements
of due process and equal protection may prevent executive officials
from exercising these powers arbitrarily, long-standing practice and
precedent supports their overall permissibility.
Some have argued, in contrast, that the Supreme Court's
invalidation of a presidential line-item veto in Clinton v. City of New
York149 supports a contrary view.o50 The statute at issue in Clinton
authorized the President to cancel certain spending measures in
appropriations statutes, provided he followed specified procedures and
did so within a prescribed timeframe after enactment.11 Reasoning
that "[tihere is no provision in the Constitution that authorizes the
President to enact, to amend, or to repeal statutes," the Supreme
Court concluded that this statutory scheme violated the constitutional
requirement that bills become law only though the prescribed
procedure of bicameralism and presentment.15 2 Insofar as Clinton
implies that any statutory waiver authority is unconstitutional, its
holding conflicts with both long-standing practice and earlier
precedents and interprets the constitutional text too rigidly. But the
Court's opinion need not be understood so broadly.
The Clinton Court itself emphasized that the line-item veto
enabled the President to unilaterally "change the text of duly enacted
statutes," a characterization that may not be applicable to all
statutory waiver provisions.153 Moreover, the Court distinguished
prior cases upholding suspension provisions by emphasizing that the
statute did not require the President to act based on any change in
circumstances or as a means of effectuating congressional policy.
Rather, the law allowed the President to strike the spending item
based solely on his own contemporaneous policy judgment.154 At least
148. See Act of Mar. 26, 1974, 1 Stat. 400 (imposing thirty-day embargo on all shipping but
allowing clearances of ships "under the immediate directions of the President of the United
States"); Act of Apr. 25, 1808, ch. 47, §§ 6, 11, 2 Stat. 499, 500-01, (authorizing President to
waive embargo restrictions); Act of Mar. 12, 1808, ch. 33, § 7, 2 Stat. 473, 475 (broadening scope
of waiver provision).
149. 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
150. See, e.g., Kitchen, supra note 14, at 531-34 (questioning why the reasoning behind
Clinton's holding has not been extended beyond the issue of line -item vetoes).
151. Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436-37.
152. Id. at 438.
153. Id. at 446-47.
154. Id. at 443-44.
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insofar as a waiver statute lacks these features, Clinton should not
alter the conclusion that statutory delegation of a suspending or
dispensing power to the President is constitutionally permissible.155
On balance, then, the Constitution supports only a
presumption against executive suspending and dispensing powers, not
a hard-and-fast prohibition. Particular forms of statutory waiver
authority may present constitutional difficulties, as the Supreme
Court's invalidation of the line-item veto suggests. But as a general
matter, such legislation appears permissible, provided the
congressional authorization is sufficiently clear to overcome the
constitutional presumption.
2. Restricting Discretion
Statutes regulating or abrogating enforcement discretion are
also generally permissible. Like legislation authorizing executive
suspending or dispensing powers, such statutes are themselves laws
that the President must execute under the Take Care Clause, even if
they limit the President's own authority. Although some judicial and
executive branch opinions cast doubt on this conclusion, and although
some early statements (such as the floor speech by John Marshall
quoted earlier) characterize enforcement discretion as a preclusive
executive prerogative, the weight of authority supports allowing
substantial congressional regulation.
In one limited sense, it is true that executive enforcement
discretion must be indefeasible. The executive function must entail
some authority to decline prosecution of an individual whom the
executive branch determines to be factually innocent. As one OLC
opinion puts it, "Congress may not direct the Executive to prosecute a
particular individual without leaving any discretion to the Executive
to determine whether a violation of the law has occurred."156 Such
legislation would elide entirely the separation of legislative and
executive functions, effectively arrogating to Congress the executive
judgment of whether a punishable legal violation occurred. Moreover,
as OLC has observed, such a law would violate "many of the policies
upon which the Constitution's prohibition against bills of attainder
was based." 57 Strictly speaking, a law that compels prosecution but
155. For more thorough considerations of reasons to construe Clinton narrowly, see Barron
& Rakoff, supra note 14, at 313-15.
156. Prosecution for Contempt of Congress of an Exec. Branch Official Who Has Asserted a
Claim of Exec. Privilege, 8 Op. O.L.C. 101, 102 (1984).
157. Congress. Subpoenas of Dep't of Justice Investigative Files, 8 Op. O.L.C. 252, 265
(1984).
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allows for judicial process would not be a bill of attainder, as historic
bills of attainder mandated punishment without allowing for such
process. 15 8 Nevertheless, insofar as the prohibition of bills of attainder
reflects a principle that the legislature should not make case-specific
punishment decisions, such legislation would surely violate it (and
thus might well violate due process, even if it does not violate the
specific prohibition on bills of attainder). 15 9 In all events, it seems
doubtful that the executive branch could "faithfully" execute a law by
enforcing it against someone the executive branch believes to be
innocent.
Short of such extreme legislation, however, there is ample room
for congressional regulation. Contrary suggestions in a recent
separate opinion by Judge Kavanaugh on the D.C. Circuit are thus
overstated. According to Judge Kavanaugh, "In light of the President's
Article II prosecutorial discretion, Congress may not mandate that the
President prosecute a certain kind of offense or offender."160 In fact,
Congress may enact statutory guidelines for enforcement discretion,
or it might even specify conditions under which prosecution would be
mandatory, provided the executive branch believed a provable legal
violation occurred. In at least one early statute, Congress did just
that-it ousted prosecutors' discretion to decline prosecution of
violations brought to their attention by informants.161 Although there
appear to be no reported judicial opinions addressing the operation of
this statute or the scope of the duty it imposed on prosecutors, its
enactment suggests that neither the First Congress nor President
Washington saw any constitutional difficulty in a statutory mandate
of enforcement for all reported violations of a particular statute.
In addition, at least two early executive-branch legal opinions
recognize the permissibility of limitations on executive enforcement
discretion. In 1837, the Attorney General opinion Indulgences on
Custom-House Bonds162 described the applicable statutory scheme as
158. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846-47
(1984) (defining a bill of attainder as "a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a judicial
trial" (quoting Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977))).
159. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) ("It is the peculiar province
of the legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the application of those
rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other departments."); cf. Nathan S.
Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672,
1805 (2012) (arguing that penalties imposed by legislative decree" rather than "enactment and
enforcement of a general and prospective rule" may violate due process).
160. In re Aiken County, 725 F.3d 255, 263 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (Kavanaugh, J.).
161. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. XV, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209.

162. 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 247 (1837).
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affording no discretion to either the collector of customs or the district
attorney to avoid initiating suits to recover unpaid balances on certain
customs bonds. 163 In the Attorney General's view, it was "obvious that
the [statutory text] was intended to take away all discretion from the
collector, and to compel him, in every case where default shall have
been made in the payment of a duty bond, instantly to deliver such
bond to the district attorney." 164 Likewise, "The district attorney, on
receiving the bond, is undoubtedly bound, as a general rule, forthwith
to commence a suit"; the attorney's "degree of diligence" could properly
be moderated only "by the system of procedure in force in his district,
and by other circumstances, which may sometimes justify more or less
delay in the actual commencement of suit."1 65 Indeed, the Attorney
General held that "if, by means of any unauthorized delay in the
institution of the suit, the debt, or any part of it, should be lost, [the
district attorney] would be personally responsible." 166
Based on the overall statutory architecture, the Attorney
General concluded that the Treasury Secretary could oversee a district
attorney's conduct of litigation and exercise a somewhat greater
degree of discretion.167 Even the Treasury Secretary, however, could
exercise such discretion only in the manner "most likely to effectuate
the great end of the law-the most speedy and certain collection of the
debt."s6 8 The Attorney General thus described the statutory scheme as
affording only quite limited discretion to the executive branch as a
whole, and none at all to the federal prosecutor charged with bringing
suit, without suggesting any constitutional difficulty with this
arrangement.
Future Chief Justice Roger Taney's celebrated opinion on the
Jewels of the Princess of Orange supports the same conclusion. 69
Though often cited as authority for an executive prerogative of
enforcement discretion,170 the opinion's conclusions were in fact quite
limited. The opinion addressed "whether the President may lawfully
direct the district attorney to discontinue" an action seeking forfeiture
of certain jewels brought into the United States in violation of federal
163. Id. at 249.
164. Id. at 248.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 249.
168. Id.
169. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482 (1831).
170. See, e.g., Waiver of Claims for Damages Arising Out of Cooperative Space Activity, 19
Op. O.L.C. 140, 155 n.28 (1995) (citing Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att'y Gen. 482,
491-92 (1831)).
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revenue laws.171 The jewels turned out to be the stolen property of a
Dutch Princess, so the Secretary of State asked whether the action
might be terminated and the jewels returned to the Netherlands. 172 In
a word, Taney answered yes.173 He reasoned that the jewels were not
properly subject to forfeiture, as their true owner, the Princess of
Orange, had done no wrong. He thus concluded that the President
must have authority to terminate the enforcement proceedings.174
As support for his result, Taney observed that "where an
offence has been actually committed, and the penalty of the law
unquestionably incurred," the President could block or terminate any
prosecution by granting a pardon. 75 Taney then observed,
It would be a singular anomaly in our law, if the power is given thus to put an end to a
prosecution against one admitted to be guilty, and yet there should be no power vested
anywhere to save a party admitted to be innocent, from a harassing and expensive
litigation with the United States, and which, from the distance of its witnesses and the
difficulty of collecting his proofs, may often be oppressive and ruinous to him. 176

In Taney's view, "the power to interpose" in such a case was
"evidently embraced by that clause of the constitution which makes it
his duty 'to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.' "177 Taney
thus recognized some executive authority, rooted in the pardon power
and the Take Care Clause, to decline prosecution of an offender whom
the executive branch determines to be factually innocent of the alleged
offense. Yet he indicated that even this authority is potentially subject
to legislative limits. According to Taney, federal government attorneys
have control over suits on behalf of the United States "except in so far
as [their] powers may be restrained by particular acts of Congress." 78
For its part, the Supreme Court also embraced a limited view
of executive authority until comparatively recently. In its 1868
decision in the Confiscation Cases-another supposed canonical
authority for the constitutional requirement of prosecutorial
discretion-the Supreme Court acknowledged congressional authority
to modify the default presumption of prosecutorial discretion. 79 The
issue in the case was whether the district attorney could dismiss a
civil forfeiture suit despite a statutory qui tam provision allowing
171. 2 Op. Att'y Gen. at 483.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 485.
174. Id. at 484-85.
175. Id. at 485-86.
176. Id. at 486.
177. Id. (quoting the Take Care Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II,
178. Id.

179. 74 U.S. 454, 457 (1861).

§ 3).
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prosecution by private parties.180 The Court held that dismissal was
permitted because the informant had no vested rights in the property
to be confiscated by the United States.' 8 ' As one general principle
supporting its conclusion, the Court invoked the presumption of
executive control over prosecutorial decisions. But in so doing, the
Court expressly acknowledged that this principle is only a
presumption:
Public prosecutions, until they come before the court to which they are returnable, are
within the exclusive direction of the district attorney, and even after they are entered in
court, they are so far under his control that he may enter a nolle prosequi at any time
before the jury is empanelled for the trial of the case, except in cases where it is

otherwise provided in some act of Congress.182

Thus, in one of the canonical statements of executive authority over
prosecution, the Court acknowledged congressional authority to
override the executive branch's presumptive discretion to dismiss
particular charges.
In 1911, the Court approved of a statutory scheme designed to
do just that. In United States v. Morgan, the Court considered a
statutory regime that imposed a duty on the district attorney to
"institute appropriate proceedings" if the Department of Agriculture
determined administratively that the suspect had illegally shipped
adulterated or misbranded goods in interstate commerce.183 Although
the issue squarely before the Court was jurisdictional,184 the Court
observed, without any sense of constitutional difficulty, that the
statute "creat[ed] a condition where the district attorney is compelled
to prosecute without delay."185 In fact, although today we might
interpret the qualifier "appropriate" in the statutory provision as
carrying an implication of prosecutorial discretion, the Court seemed
to presume the opposite. Citing the district attorney's general
statutory duty to prosecute all federal offenders, 86 the Court implied

180. Id. at 454-55.
181. Id. at 462. Though the decision is often cited as authority for the proposition that the
executive branch must control litigation in the name of the United States, see, e.g., Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 139-40 (1976) (so citing case), the Court's actual holding is more limited.
Although the statute included a qui tam provision, the suit at issue was brought by the district
attorney, not the informant, so the question whether the district attorney could intervene to
control a privately initiated suit was not presented. See Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. at 458
(stating that "the suit was instituted by the district attorney").
182. Id. at 457 (emphasis added).
183. 222 U.S. 274, 279-80 (1911).
184. The Court held specifically that prior administrative notice was not a prerequisite to
criminal prosecution. See id. at 281-82.
185. Id. at 281.
186. Id.
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that the prosecutor would have had a duty to press charges even if the
Department of Agriculture failed to report a violation.187
The Court's opinion in Morgan is striking in the degree to
which it presumes that law enforcement in general is automatic, not
discretionary. As we shall soon see, 188 by 1911 federal criminal justice
was already deep into its love affair with discretion. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court seems not yet to have recognized-much less
constitutionalized-this development. The Court's holding in Morgan,
never overruled by later precedent, casts doubt on the view that later
decisions characterizing prosecutorial discretion as a core executive
function should be understood to preclude congressional regulation of
that executive authority. Indeed, in keeping with Morgan, the D.C.
Circuit held just this past year that a particular civil regulatory
statute conferred no "prosecutorial discretion" on the Food and Drug
Administration to decline enforcement of import restrictions on
certain drugs.189 Like the presumption against executive suspending
and dispensing powers, the presumption in favor of case-by-case
enforcement discretion is only a default rule; Congress can modify or
abrogate it with respect to any particular statutory regime.
IV. THE FRAMEWORK IN ACTION

Two countervailing presumptions thus structure executive
powers of law enforcement: a presumption in favor of case-by-case
prosecutorial discretion and a presumption against across-the-board
nonenforcement or prospective licensing of prohibited conduct. Like
magnetic force fields organizing metal filings, these dual
presumptions should channel executive decisionmaking and
determine the President's responsibilities under the Take Care Clause
while nonetheless preserving substantial flexibility for Congress to
shift executive decisionmaking one way or the other by altering the
President's default authorities.
How well does historical practice conform to this constitutional
framework? Practice, as much as judicial precedent, is often an
important determinant of constitutional meaning with respect to

187. Id. ("If, for any reason, the executive department failed to report violations of this law,
its neglect would leave untouched the duty of the district attorney to prosecute 'all delinquents
for crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the United States.' "). The Court also
suggested that grand juries could properly be self-informing and that the government would be
obligated to proceed in any cases where the grand jury returned an indictment, even if the
government had not sought it. Id.
188. See infra Part IVB.
189. Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 7-10 (D.C. Cir. 2013).

2014]

ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

717

separation of powers. At least insofar as constitutional provisions are
ambiguous, practice may reflect a "gloss" on the text that has received
popular approval through the political process and forms a baseline
understanding of interbranch roles on which both Congress and the
President may rely. 190 Yet in this case, practice has evolved
significantly over time. Over the course of American history, the basic
trajectory of federal law has been towards increasing executive
discretion, in both criminal and administrative law. Federal law at the
beginning was generally sparse and interstitial, and the federal lawenforcement apparatus was organized around an expectation of
complete (or as complete as possible) enforcement of enacted
prohibitions. Today, quite the opposite is true. Federal law is a vast
leviathan, sprawled on top of equally extensive state regulation.
Enforcement discretion thus plays an essential role in moderating the
rigors of the law on the books to produce a socially tolerable law on the
ground.
While a complete history of this evolution would go well beyond
the scope of this Article, focusing on the two poles of the
transformation-the earliest years of the Republic and the most recent
few decades-may help clarify the constitutional underpinnings of
enforcement discretion. Early practice, of course, is often considered
especially probative of constitutional meaning. 191 Here, early practice
is particularly telling because it provides a key counterpoint to
modern practice. While enforcement discretion is a central organizing
principle of today's criminal justice system and administrative state,
190. See, e.g., Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003) (referring to the
"historical gloss" on executive power). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARv. L. REV. 411 (2012) (critically
examining proper role of historical practice in interpreting separation of powers).
191. Numerous opinions and commentaries suggest that early historical practice may
establish constitutional understandings that acquire binding normative force over time. See, e.g.,
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163 (1926) (relying on consistent practice from 1789 to 1863
to determine President's constitutional removal authority); David J. Barron & Martin S.

Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 941, 951 (2008) (relying on early practice in analysis of constitutional war powers); cf.
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 637 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Respect for laws
derived from the customary operation of the Executive and Legislative Branches gives some
assurance of stability in time of crisis.").
Those who subscribe to originalist theories of interpretation often cite early practice as
evidence of original constitutional meaning (which they of course consider binding for all time).
See, e.g., Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution's
Secret DraftingHistory, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1164-65 (2003). Some have also suggested that early
practice may "liquidate" the meaning of facially ambiguous constitutional provisions,
establishing an understanding that is controlling thereafter. See, e.g., William Baude,
Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power, 122 YALE L.J. 1738, 1811-12 (2013); Caleb
Nelson, Originalismand Interpretive Conventions, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 525-29 (2003).
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the same was not true to anywhere near the same extent in the early
Republic. On the contrary, the early law-enforcement structure in
many ways created incentives for maximum enforcement. Early
practice thus provides a perspective on the interbranch division of
responsibility that is relatively unclouded by the pervasive delegations
of the modern era. At the least, this early practice demonstrates how
the dual-presumption framework proposed here could provide a
workable model of governance.
Section A below describes early law-enforcement practice in
greater detail. Section B then provides a brief account of the transition
to modern practice, with its broad and extensive prohibitions and
systematic reliance on prosecutorial discretion. Section B also explains
why this subsequent historical evolution should not require a change
in constitutional understanding.
A. Early Federal Law Enforcement
During the early decades of the Republic, the federal lawenforcement structure was designed in important ways to encourage
maximum enforcement of federal prohibitions. Nevertheless, federal
prosecutors routinely exercised discretion to decline enforcement in
particular cases. At the same time, there are important indications
that key early executive officials believed the proper scope of such
discretion to be limited, at least ideally, to case-specific considerations.
1. Law-Enforcement Architecture
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the initial structure of
federal law enforcement.192 This statute created both the office of
Attorney General and individual "district attorneys" (predecessors of
modern U.S. Attorneys) for each federal judicial district. 193 Yet the
creation of a unified Department of Justice lay far in the future.194 At
the time, the Attorney General's duty was not to formulate national
litigation policies, nor even to supervise the district attorneys. Instead,
the statute charged the Attorney General with advising the President
and representing the United States in the Supreme Court.195 Congress
did not even adequately compensate the Attorney General for full-time
192. Judiciary Act of 1974, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73.
193. Id. § 35, 1 Stat. at 92-93.

194.. See generally Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our
Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 567
(discussing the history and development of the Office of the Attorney General).
195. Judiciary Act § 35, 1 Stat. at 92-93.
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work; legislators evidently presumed he would supplement his
government income with work for paying clients. 196
For their part, the district attorneys had the "duty" by statute
"to prosecute in [their] district[s] all delinquents for crimes and
offences, cognizable under the authority of the United States, and all
civil actions in which the United States shall be concerned." 97 The
district attorneys nevertheless had enormous practical independence,
as they were spread throughout the country, subject to no statutorily
defined chain of command within the executive branch, and often
lacked efficient means of communication with national officials. 198 But
in contrast to the modern system of U.S. Attorneys, the system's
decentralization did not necessarily mean that Congress or the
President expected district attorneys to make independent,
discretionary judgments about which federal legal violations to
pursue. On the contrary, Congress seems to have designed the federal
enforcement system in a manner that minimized such discretion.
Not only did the Judiciary Act, by its terms, mandate
prosecution of all offenders, 199 but the compensation system for district
attorneys encouraged them to bring forward any plausible case for
judicial resolution. As was typical of many American governmental
offices during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, district
attorneys were compensated with fees rather than salary. From the
1790s until 1853, their fees tracked those of their state
counterparts. 200 Initially, nearly all states awarded fees to public
prosecutors simply for bringing a case forward-a system that
encouraged prosecutors to bring all citizen complaints to court for
adjudication. 201 Over the course of the nineteenth century, many
jurisdictions switched to awarding fees based on convictions rather
than prosecutions. In 1853, the federal government adopted this
system across the board by enacting a uniform fee system that

196. Bloch, supra note 194, at 567 & n.21.
197. Judiciary Act § 35, 1 Stat. at 92-93.
198. See Bloch, supra note 194, at 567-68 (discussing the position of early district attorneys
relative to the Attorney General and the courts); Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over
Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons from History, 38 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 286-87 (1989)
(discussing the absence of formal centralized control over early federal criminal law
enforcement).
199. Judiciary Act § 35, 1 Stat. at 92-93 (establishing "duty" to prosecute all criminal
offenses and civil actions).
200. Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 3, 1 Stat. 275, 277; see also H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 32-93, at
20-26 (1852) (discussing effect of statute on compensation in 1850s).
201. See NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE 42 (2013).
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principally compensated federal prosecutors for achieving jury
convictions. 202
As one scholar has argued, the shift in compensation from casebased fees to conviction-based "bounties" encouraged greater official
control over prosecutions; rather than encouraging prosecutors to
bring every case forward, the new system rewarded them for vetting
cases based on strength and concentrating resources on cases most
likely to result in conviction. 203 Whether based on cases or convictions,
however, these fee-based compensation arrangements-in contrast to
modern salaries-encouraged maximum enforcement (at least of
provable cases) rather than discretionary nonenforcement. 20 4 Thus,
throughout the antebellum period, Congress arranged compensation
for federal attorneys in a manner that ostensibly presumed all
provable legal violations should be punished. Incentives for other
federal law-enforcement officials, such as customs collectors and
revenue officers, were often at least as strong. Such officials often
derived compensation from successful collections and forfeitures,
although admittedly they also often faced personal liability for
unlawful actions or dereliction of duty. 205
The early federal law-enforcement system also included
opportunities for nonfederal actors-either private parties or state
officials-to pursue, or at least initiate, certain federal cases. One
scholar reports that, at least during the Republic's first few decades,
"private citizens could appear before a federal or state judicial official
and swear out a complaint against a suspected criminal." 206 Such a
complaint could lead to the suspect's arrest and indictment. 207 An
early Attorney General opinion also indicates that private parties
could independently appear before grand juries to advocate the
indictment of alleged offenders. 208 The Attorney General, indeed,
suggested that this procedure could be used to "put [a case] in train for

202. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 1, 10 Stat. 161, 161-62.
203. See PARRILLO, supra note 201, at 43.
204. See id. Tort law in this period did provide countervailing incentives for caution by
subjecting federal officers to personal liability for any action deemed ultra vires by a court. See

generally Jerry L. Mashaw, Reluctant Nationalists:FederalAdministration and Administrative
Law in the Republican Era, 1801-1829, 116 YALE L.J. 1636, 1684 (2007) ("[Officers] were
compensated wholly or in part by fees and commissions. This system incentivized diligence and
promoted action. The prospect of damages for malfeasance, by promoting caution, made the
incentives symmetrical-more or less.").
205. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. XV, § 41, 1 Stat. 199, 208-09.
206. Krent, supra note 198, at 294.
207. Id. at 294-95.
208. Respect Due Consuls, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 41, 42-43 (1794).
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judicial determination" even if the district attorney had determined
not to press charges. 209
Early federal grand jury instructions charged jurors with the
duty of investigating and presenting "all offenses" against the United
States committed within the judicial district. 210 In May 1798, Circuit
Justice James Iredell expressly instructed a federal grand jury, "You
certainly are not confined to prosecutions commenced by the attorney
of the United States, or to such evidence as he may lay before you." 211
Judges, what is more, independently lobbied grand juries to
investigate alleged crimes regardless of whether executive officials
had requested an indictment. 212 Individual grand jurors also
apparently brought cases to the attention of their peers. 213
Some federal statutes even permitted private parties to pursue
certain cases without official involvement. These qui tam statutes
typically allowed the claimant to sue on behalf of the federal
government for certain penalties or forfeitures, and to claim a portion
of the recovery in the event the suit was successful. 214 Qui tam
statutes remain to this day an important means of uncovering
violations such as fraud against the government. 215 But while qui tam

209. Id. at 43.
210. See, e.g., 3 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, at 40, 41 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1990) (May 4, 1795
instruction by Justice William Patterson as Circuit Justice for the District of Pennsylvania,
stating: "The duties, gentlemen, designated and enjoined upon you by law, extend to the
investigation and presentment of all offences, which have been perpetrated against the United
States, within this district, or on the high seas by persons in it."); id. at 28, 30 (Apr. 25, 1795
instruction by Justice James Iredell as Circuit Justice for the District of Connecticut, stating:
"your duty is to present offences committed against the United States"); id. at 31, 31 (Apr. 27,
1795 instruction by Justice John Blair as Circuit Justice for the District of Georgia, stating: "the
good of the community, Gentlemen, requires all your activity and zeal in bringing forward to
justice real guilt"); id. at 158, 159 (Apr. 1, 1797 instruction by Justice Oliver Ellsworth as Circuit
Justice for the District of New York, stating: "You will diligently enquire after all offences
cognizable by this court, and due presentment make.").
211. Id. at 258, 260-61 (May 7, 1798 instruction by Justice Iredell as Circuit Justice for the
District of South Carolina).
212. Krent, supra note 198, at 293.
213. Id.
214. See, e.g., Act of July 6, 1797, ch. XI, § 20, 1 Stat. 527, 532 (allowing private informers to
recover half the fines, penalties, and forfeitures for violations of parchment duty laws); Act of
Mar. 22, 1794, ch. XI, § 4, 1 Stat. 347, 349 (allowing recovery of moiety of fines for illegal slave
trading by "such person or persons, who shall sue for and prosecute the same"); Act of Mar. 1,
1793, ch. XIX, § 12, 1 Stat. 329, 331 (allowing informants to recover half of all fines and
forfeitures in prosecutions for violation of restrictions on trade and intercourse with Indians,
unless the suit is first brought by the United States). See generally Krent, supra note 198, at
296-97 & n.104.
215. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-33 (2012). For general background on the
statute and the recent "rapid growth" in suits under it, see David Freeman Engstrom,
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provisions today typically permit federal officials to take over a case or
terminate its prosecution, 216 at least one early qui tam statute did the
reverse: it imposed a "duty" on the district attorney "to institute or
bring" a suit under the statute "upon application to him" from the
private party.217 Other statutes did not expressly contemplate public
enforcement at all, although the district attorneys could presumably
serve as the qui tam relator and collect the relator's share of the
recovery as their compensation (much as they would ordinarily
recover a fee as compensation for a public prosecution). 2 1 8 In addition,
as a means of ferreting out violations, some statutes afforded rewards
to informers who provided evidence that led to a successful civil or
criminal enforcement action.
Another form of nonfederal enforcement of federal laws
occurred in state court. In some early statutes, Congress granted state
courts jurisdiction to hear certain penal suits or criminal cases, as well
as jurisdiction to perform certain ancillary law-enforcement tasks
such as ordering certain federal arrests. 219 In at least some cases,
federal prosecutions in state court appear to have been conducted by
state prosecutors, rather than federal attorneys. 220
Scholars have debated at length the implications of these early
law-enforcement practices for the constitutionality of modern-day
criminal prosecution by officials outside the presidential chain of
command. Some argue that early nonfederal enforcement shows that
the Framers did not consider federal law enforcement to be an
essential function of the executive branch. 221 Others assert that the
Take Care Clause requires presidential supervision of law
enforcement; they argue that, in practice, early Presidents and

Harnessingthe Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1244, 1246-47 (2012).

216. 31 U.S.C. § 3730.
217. Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. XV, § 44, 1 Stat. 199, 209. See generally Krent, supra note 198,
at 297.
218. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 22, 1793; Act of Feb. 20, 1792, § 25, 1 Stat. 232, 239 (covering
certain postal violations); cf. Act of Mar. 1, 1793 § 12 (allowing informant to recover half of all
fines and forfeitures "except where the prosecution shall be first instituted on behalf of the
United States").
219. See Krent, supra note 198, at 304-08 (collecting examples).
220. Id. at 306-07 (collecting examples).
221. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 70-72 (discussing the original intent of
the framers when designing the executive branch of government); Krent, supra note 198, at 281;
Bloch, supra note 194, at 563; William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers
and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 491-94 (1989); Stephanie A.J. Dangel, Is
Prosecutiona Core Executive Function?Morrison v. Olson and the Framers'Intent,99 YALE L.J.
1069, 1070 (1990).

2014]

ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION

723

executive
officials
did maintain
control over nonfederal
prosecutions. 222
This debate-to which I return below 223 -largely misses a key
implication of early nonfederal enforcement of federal laws. By
supplementing federal prosecutors'
authority with private
enforcement, particularly in cases such as customs violations and
frauds against the government where involvement of private
informants may be essential to bringing cases to light, Congress added
assurance that provable violations would be punished. On some level,
to be sure, these qui tam provisions reflect an effort to oust the
discretion of public prosecutors by providing mechanisms for
enforcement even if federal officials decline to pursue a case. As such,
they might imply an expectation that public officials would otherwise
exercise discretion (or perhaps be derelict in their duties). More
importantly, though, these laws confirm Congress's authority to strip
prosecutorial discretion and calibrate the intensity of federal law
enforcement. 224 By adding belt to suspenders, these statutes reinforced
the law-enforcement architecture's overall presumption of complete
enforcement.
In sum, multiple features of the early federal law-enforcement
architecture either mandated or encouraged complete enforcement of
federal laws. Far from being organized around an expectation of
official prosecutorial discretion, as is true today, the early system
ostensibly presumed that all offenses should be prosecuted. This
antebellum legal architecture is revealing in itself insofar as it
illustrates the degree to which Congress may shape enforcement
arrangements to achieve results quite different from those we
intuitively expect today. But it becomes even more revealing when
combined with evidence of how the system actually operated in
practice.
2. Discretionary Nonenforcement
Notwithstanding the overall structure of early federal law
enforcement and its many inducements for complete enforcement,
early Presidents and executive officials did exercise discretion. Yet
they appear to have done so more sparingly than today. Early federal
enforcement officials seem to have routinely dropped cases when they
determined that either the offense was unprovable or the offender had
222. See, e.g., Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor,73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 526-27
(2005) (commenting on early presidential powers).
223. See infra Part V.C.3.
224. See supraPart III.D.2.
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already been punished. Then, as now, they also often attempted
(particularly in the criminal context) to select defendants in a
judicious manner calculated to achieve convictions and favorable legal
precedents while avoiding acquittals or adverse rulings that might
embolden disregard for federal laws. 225 There are important
indications, however, that key early federal officials did not
understand their exercises of discretion as executive officials may do
today-as a form of policymaking, tailoring wide-ranging prohibitions
to appropriate public expectations. The early practice thus appears to
fit the framework advocated here: federal officials presumed they had
discretion to decline enforcement on a case-by-case basis, but this
discretion did not extend to suspending all enforcement or licensing
violations. 226
a. Evidence of Discretion
To begin with, writs of nolle prosequi (or "nol pros") filed by
federal prosecutors to dismiss previously filed criminal charges
provide substantial evidence of prosecutorial discretion during the
early decades of the Republic. According to an 1829 report to Congress
by the John Quincy Adams Administration, federal district attorneys
terminated roughly a third of federal prosecutions between 1801 and
1828 by this method. 227 Federal courts seem to have approved of this
practice; the sheer volume of case terminations alone (roughly 400 out
of 1200 prosecutions) suggests as much. The Supreme Court,
225. For examples of this type of reasoning, see Letter from William Ellery to Alexander
Hamilton (Aug. 1-6), in 17 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 6-7 (Harold C. Syrett ed.,
1962). A report from a customs collector stated:
The District Attorney is clear that the cause is a good law cause, but is under some
apprehensions that the Jury may be disposed to favour the defend. as there doth not
appear to have been any intention to defraud the Revenue, and that if the United
States should loose the Cause it may encourage others to transgress the Law ....
Id.; MARY K. BONSTEEL TACHAU, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 118-19 (1978)
(describing Kentucky district attorney's careful selection of test prosecution for assault on
revenue officer).
226. In addition to other primary and secondary sources cited in the notes, the historical
research presented here is based on searches of published correspondence relating to law
enforcement, customs and tax collection, and the federal district attorneys from the first three
presidential administrations included in the following sources: THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE
WASHINGTON (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1931-1944); THEODORE J. CRACKEL, THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON (2007); THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS (Charles Francis Adams ed., 18501856); THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Paul L. Ford ed., 1892-1899); THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON (Barbara B. Oberg & J. Jefferson Looney eds., 2002-2009); PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225; THE WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN (Henry Adams ed.,
1960).

227. Statement of Convictions, Executions, and Pardons, H.R. Doc. No. 20-146 (Feb. 26,
1829); see also HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 46, 213 (summarizing report).
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moreover, dismissed one case in 1832 because the President had
directed entry of a nol pros in the federal district court. 228 An 1821
Attorney General opinion likewise declared, "There can be no doubt of
the power of the President to order a nolle prosequi in any stage of a
criminal proceeding in the name of the United States." 229 And in one
opinion as Circuit Justice, Chief Justice Marshall observed that "[t]he
usage of this country has been, to pass over, unnoticed, presentments
on which the attorney does not think it proper to institute
proceedings." 230
Judicial acceptance of these dismissals provides important
evidence of the understanding of separation of powers during this
period. By accepting, apparently without question, federal prosecutors'
decision to dismiss charges even after they had placed them before the
court, federal judges indicated an understanding that deciding
whether to pursue charges against a particular offender was at least
presumptively an executive function. In England, writs of nol pros
enabled the Crown to terminate prosecutions initiated by private
parties that appeared vexatious or threatened Crown interests. 231
Although public prosecution was becoming more common, private
parties typically initiated criminal prosecutions in eighteenth-century
England. 232 In this context, the nol pros was essential to protecting
governmental interests. 233
For reasons that remain unclear, colonial and state
governments in North America typically employed public prosecutors
in criminal cases. 234 To be sure, as discussed earlier, private parties,
judges, grand jurors, and other nonofficial prosecutors could
sometimes put cases in train for resolution, and in such cases the writ
228. United States v. Phillips, 31 U.S. 776, 777 (1832).
229. Power to Order a Nolle Prosequi, 5 Op. Att'y Gen. 729, 729 (1821). Contemporary state
court cases reflect the same view of prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Wheeler,
2 Mass. 172, 174 (1806) (Parsons, C.J.). So do early treatises. See, e.g., AUGUSTUS A. BOYCE,
MANUAL OF THE PRACTICE IN THE CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 100 (1869); HENRY
FLANDERS, AN EXPOSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DESIGNED AS A
MANUAL OF INSTRUCTION 183 (1860); 2 THOMAS W. WATERMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES
OF LAW AND EQUITY WHICH GOVERN COURTS IN THE GRANTING OF NEW TRIALS IN CASES CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL 134 (1855).
230. United States v. Hill, 26 F. Cas. 315, 316 (C.C. Va. 1809).

231. See Krauss, supra note 19, at 16 (examining the historical evolution of prosecutorial
discretion); see also ABRAHAM S. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 12 (1981).

232. See generally J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND 1660-1800, at 35-41
(1986) (exploring early developments in English criminal courts); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE
ORIGINS OF THE ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 11-12 (2003) (discussing the history of adversarial
criminal proceedings).
233. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 231, at 12.
234. See PARRILLO, supra note 201, at 1.
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of nol pros provided an important mechanism of official control. But
insofar as most prosecutions were initiated by executive officials in the
first place, the writ of nol pros was arguably unnecessary to protect
government interests. The writ, however, was nonetheless absorbed
into American practice, at both the state and federal levels, as a
means of terminating cases. The ready adoption of the writ thus
provides an important indication that a normative expectation of
executive control over criminal cases was widely shared at the time. 23 5
That said, most case dismissals pursuant to writs of nol pros
seem to have been oriented toward abandoning unprovable cases,
averting duplicative punishment, and avoiding acquittals or legal
precedents that might undermine law-enforcement efforts. The
dismissals generally seem not to have been oriented towards
advancing any particular executive-branch policy independent of
enforcement of federal statutes. Although the 1829 Adams
Administration report rarely identifies a reason for the nol pros
dispositions it documents, where it does so, the reasons relate to the
strength of the evidence or the defendant's amenability to
punishment. 236 Such reasons included absence of a key witness, want
of jurisdiction, or conviction and execution of the defendant in another
jurisdiction. 237 In addition, in one case, the 1829 report suggests that
the district attorney discharged cases against three offenders in a
given year so that the three offenders could be "used as witnesses."238
But while this statement may indicate that a form of plea bargaining
in exchange for testimony took place, such an action would likely have
been consistent with an overall objective of enforcing the law by
punishing the most serious violators. The report also indicates that
certain "penal laws against the cutting of live oak timber and cedar"
were a "dead letter" in the then-territory of Florida, "owing to the
difficulty of enforcing it [sic]."239 To the extent this statement indicates
that timber laws were not enforced in Florida, the reason for such
nonenforcement again appears to relate principally to the
235. See generally Krauss, supranote 19, at 19-20 (collecting cases).
236. See H.R. Doc. No. 20-146 (Feb. 26, 1829).
237. Id.; see also United States v. Amy, 24 F. Cas. 792, 811 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (encouraging
use of nol pros where federal defendant has been prosecuted for same offense in state court).
238. See H.R. Doc. No. 20-146, at 189 (indicating in "observations" column for 1819 "3 of the
number discharged by U.S. Attorney; used as witnesses").
239. See id. at 188. The report similarly indicates that in Kentucky, "[flor breaches of the
Revenue Laws anterior to [the War of 1812], numerous suits were brought, but in not one of
them is it believed that judgment was recovered against the defendant, owing, in all probability,
to the very strong prejudices that prevailed here against these laws." Id. at 170. For further
discussion of the situation in Kentucky and other examples of federal laws that proved
unenforceable in certain jurisdictions, see infra Part IV.A.2.
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impossibility of bringing successful cases, not broader considerations
of policy or equity. Nonprosecution in such circumstances reflected a
judgment that practical obstacles to prosecution made cases
unprovable, not an executive decision to supersede or ignore
congressional policy.
Thus, in many cases, perhaps most, where federal prosecutors
in the early decades of the Republic declined prosecution through use
of a nol pros or other means, they appear to have exercised their
discretion principally to avert punishment in cases where prosecutors
concluded that sanctions were factually or legally unwarranted. Such
exercises of discretion reinforce the conclusion that the executive
function was never understood to be robotic. Executive officials have
always exercised judgment regarding which cases are strong enough
to pursue. Consistent with this view, published correspondence from
the first few presidential administrations includes frequent examples
of directives to federal district attorneys to investigate particular
offenders or offenses, but only if the facts and law showed a provable
offense. 240 Likewise, the President or other senior officials in some
cases directed district attorneys to consider prosecution and base their
decision whether to prosecute on their judgments of the offender's
factual or legal guilt. 24 1 Yet such exercises of discretion are still
240. See, e.g., Letter from Sec'y James Madison, U.S. Dep't of State, to Nathan Sanford,
Dist. Att'y for N.Y. (June 21, 1804), in 7 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 346 (J.C.A. Stagg ed.,

2010) (requesting "that you make enquiry into the truth and particular nature of the facts
[stated in a newspaper report], and if in your opinion they constitute an offence subjecting [any
individual] to legal prosecution, that you commence the same accordingly"); Letter from Sec'y
Timothy Pickering, U.S. Dep't of State, to President John Adams (July 24, 1799), in 9 WORKS OF
JOHN ADAMS, supra note 226, at 3 (indicating that "I shall give the paper to [the district
attorney], and, if he thinks it libelous, desire him to prosecute the editor"); Letter from President
John Adams to Sec'y Timothy Pickering, U.S. Dep't of State (July 20, 1799), in 8 WORKS OF JOHN
ADAMS, supra note 226, at 668 (regarding disclosure of secret British diplomatic correspondence,
stating: "I pray you ... to refer this business to the attorney of the district . . . with instructions

to make a diligent inquiry, and strictly to prosecute the persons he may find guilty of any breach
of the law of nations, or the land."); Letter from Sec'y Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Ambassador George Hammond, Gr. Brit. (June, 13, 1973), in 26 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,

supra note 226, at 270 (noting prior instruction to district attorney "to put [a case] into a proper
channel for decision").
241. See, e.g., Letter from Sec'y James Madison, U.S. Dep't of State, to Zebulon
Hollingsworth, Dist. Att'y for Md. (Aug. 28, 1804), in 7 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note

240, at 644 (requesting a "scrupulous inquiry into the truth of [certain] allegations" and a report
on options for prosecution); Letter from Sec'y Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Dep't of State, to the U.S.
Attorney of Massachusetts (Sept. 2, 1793), in 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note

226, at 15 (indicating that "[t]he President ... desires that you will immediately institute such a
prosecution against [a specified French consul], as the laws will warrant"); Letter from Sec'y
Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Dep't of State, to William Rawle, Dist. Att'y for Pa. (May 15, 1793), in 26
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 40 (directing that "[b]y the inclosed papers

you will perceive there is reason to believe that certain citizens of the United States have
engaged in continuing depredations on the property and commerce of some of the nations at
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broadly consistent with a system premised on total enforcement, as
they ultimately spare from prosecution only those who are effectively
innocent of any provable offense or who have already received
punishment in another jurisdiction.
There are, however, at least a few early examples of discretion
based on broader considerations of justice or equity. President
Washington, for example, encountered the difficulty of how to respond
to efforts by French consuls to outfit vessels in U.S. ports for
privateering in France's war with Great Britain.242 The
Administration eventually settled on a policy of criminally prosecuting
such breaches of U.S. neutrality.243 Nevertheless, correspondence
between then-Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and the U.S.
Attorney for New York indicates that the Washington Administration
initially directed prosecutors to ignore noncitizen offenders, based on
concerns that such offenders lacked appropriate notice that their
conduct was unlawful. 244 Similarly, although President Washington
directed that participants in illegal military attacks on Native
American tribes in Kentucky "be prosecuted with the utmost rigor of
the law," 245 a letter from Jefferson to the District Attorney in
Kentucky instructed that "[i]t is not the wish to extend the
prosecution to other individuals [apart from the group's leader] who
peace with the United States" and indicating "the desire of the Government that you would take
such measures for apprehending and prosecuting them as shall be according to law").
242. See generally GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY 185-87 (2009) (providing
background on this controversy).
243. See Circular to French Consuls and Vice-Consuls (Sept. 7, 1793), in 8 WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 417 (indicating that French consuls seeking to enlist
privateers in the United States will "be submitted to such prosecutions and punishments as the
laws may prescribe for the case"). Although Congress later enacted neutrality statutes with
criminal provisions, see, e.g., Act of June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 381, such prosecutions initially
depended on the controversial theory that certain violations of federal neutrality or the law of
nations were common-law crimes cognizable in federal court. For contemporaneous articulation
of this legal theory, see 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 210, at
106 (providing an April 12, 1796 grand jury instruction by Justice James Iredell as Circuit
Justice for the District of Pennsylvania).
244. Letter from Sec'y Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Dep't of State, to the U.S. Attorney for New
York (June, 12, 1793), in 7 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 296-97:
In the first instance like the present which happened here, the Government, desirous
of acting with moderation and of animadverting, through the channel of the laws on
as few persons as possible while it was supposed they might have acted without due
information, directed prosecutions against such only as were citizens of the U.S.; but
the present being a repetition of offence after due notice that it would be proceeded
against, you will be pleased to institute such prosecutions before the proper Courts as
you shall find most likely to punish according to law all persons, Citizens or Aliens,
who had taken such a part in the enterprise commenced as above mentioned, as may
be punishable by law.
245. Proclamation by President George Washington (Mar. 19, 1791), in 31 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 250.
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may have given thoughtlessly into this unlawful proceeding."246
Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton likewise directed
nonenforcement of a customs statute in one case where he concluded
the offense was minor and no fraud was intended. 247
Later, President John Adams directed federal prosecutors to
terminate by nol pros two cases for seditious libel, not because he
believed no violation of the Sedition Act had occurred, but because one
of these defendants had ceased publishing the offending newspaper 248
and the other had agreed to leave the country. 249 Adams's direction to
dismiss the case against one of Jonathan Robbins's fellow mutineers
(discussed earlier in connection with future Chief Justice Marshall's
speech as a member of Congress) 250 also may have been rooted in casespecific considerations of equity. One scholar speculates that Adams
believed prosecution for mutiny was unwarranted in light of evidence
that the British had forced the defendant to serve on the ship in
question. 251
In correspondence with the U.S. Attorney for Virginia during
the (ultimately unsuccessful) trial of Aaron Burr, President Thomas
Jefferson demonstrated a similar understanding of the scope of his
discretion. He directed that, following Burr's anticipated conviction,
"you should immediately have committed all those persons against
whom you should find evidence sufficient, whose agency has been so
prominent as to mark them as proper objects of punishment, &
especially where their boldness has betrayed an inveteracy of criminal
disposition." 252 Jefferson distinguished, however, "obscure offenders &
246. Letter from Sec'y Thomas Jefferson, U.S. Dep't of State, to William Murray, Dist. Att'y
for Ky. (Mar. 22, 1791), in 19 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 598.
247. Letter from Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to Jeremiah Olney
(Sept. 24, 1791), in 9 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 236. Hamilton stated
in this letter to a customs collector:
There appears to be reasonable ground for a presumption that the importation of the
Brandy in kegs proceeded from ignorance of the law, and if no legal process is yet
instituted with regard to the forfeiture, it is my wish that you will forbear to proceed
further against it.
Id. In addition, one customs collector reported to Hamilton that he had declined, while
awaiting further instruction, to institute a prosecution where "the vessel sailed before the
Law took place, the master was ignorant of it, and there did not appear to be the least
intention of fraud." Id. at 403.
248. Letter from President John Adams to the Attorney General and the District Attorney of
Pennsylvania (May 16, 1800), in 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 226, at 56.
249. Letter from President John Adams to the Young Men of Richmond, Virginia, in 9
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note 226, at 217-18.
250. See supra Part III.B.
251. See Wedgwood, supra note 118, at 281-83.
252. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to George Hay, U.S. District Attorney for
Virginia (June 19, 1807), in 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 58.
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repenting ones," whom he instructed the U.S. Attorney to "let . . . lie

for consideration." 253
As a final example-in a list that is not necessarily
exhaustive-the Attorney General in 1821 recommended case-by-case
moderation for certain slave traders traveling by sea to New Orleans
from the newly acquired territory of Florida. An 1807 law banning the
importation of slaves after 1808 required sailors shipping slaves
coastwise to file manifests showing that their port of departure was
within the United States. 254 In one case, a Florida sailor violated this
provision, yet "[t]he United States attorney and the collector express
their belief that there was no intentional guilt" on the sailor's part,
and the evidence indicated that the slaves had not been imported from
outside the United States. 255 Under these circumstances, the Attorney
General recommended that the President discontinue the
prosecution. 256 In two similar cases, the Attorney General likewise
recommended that the President grant the "act of grace" of
discontinuing the prosecution, so long as the evidence showed that the
"slaves were not imported into Florida, on the eve of the cession, with
a view to an ulterior destination to the market of the United States, in
violation of the policy of our slave laws."257
Early practice, then, entailed widespread exercises of discretion
to decline enforcement in cases where a violation appeared unprovable
to responsible executive officials. Early practice also includes at least a
few examples of exercises of enforcement discretion oriented towards
avoiding prosecution of offenders considered undeserving of
punishment for reasons of justice or equity. This evidence-neglected
in Yoo and Delahunty's recent analysiS258-powerfully confirms that
the executive function has long been understood to entail some degree
of discretion with respect to enforcement of statutory prohibitions.
b. Evidence of Limitations
At the same time, early practice also provides at least limited
support for the second presumption-the presumption against

253. Id.
254. Act of Mar. 2, 1807, § 10, 2 Stat. 426, 430 (prohibiting the importation of slaves).
255. Letter from Att'y Gen. William Writ, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the President of the
United States (Nov. 7, 1821), in ATTORNEYS GENERAL-CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC LAWS, H.R.
Doc. No. 26-123, at 380-81 (1841).
256. Id.
257. Id. at 381.
258. See Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 13, at 769-835 (surveying history of executive
prerogative).
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allowing complete suspension of enforcement or prospective licensing
of violations. My conclusions on this point are necessarily more
provisional and tentative given the limited available evidence, the
volume of specific enforcement decisions to account for, and the
difficulty of proving a negative hypothesis. 259 Definite conclusions
regarding the early understanding of federal prosecutors' enforcement
duties are further complicated by the intense conflicts during the first
decades of the Republic over the proper role and authority of the
federal government and the federal judiciary. 260 Moreover, as already
indicated and as discussed further below, early federal officials did
encounter significant impediments to enforcing certain laws. In at
least a few instances, these obstacles yielded relatively categorical
nonenforcement decisions, albeit more for reasons of prudence and
practicality than policy. Those caveats aside, however, published
correspondence from the first three presidential administrations
includes significant indications that key officials in both Federalist
and Republican administrations did not understand their
prosecutorial discretion to entail wide-ranging authority to remake
the law or supplant the policy reflected in statutes through
nonenforcement.
To begin with, given the historic repudiation of royal
suspending and dispensing powers and the importance of the Glorious
Revolution of 1689 to early American thinking, it seems unlikely that
early executive officials would have believed they held broad authority
to decline enforcement of federal statutes. The English Bill of Rights,
after all, provided that "the pretended power of suspending of laws, or
the execution of laws, by regal authority, without consent of
parliament is illegal." 261 President Washington articulated precisely
this view in his 1792 Proclamation in response to the so-called
Whiskey Rebellion (discussed further below). Though noting that "the
government" had shown "moderation" in collecting excise taxes that
were deeply unpopular in frontier areas, and that Congress had
sought "to obviate causes of objection, to render the laws as acceptable
as possible," he pointedly observed that the legislature "alone ha[s]
authority to suspend the operation of laws." 262
259. For discussion of sources consulted, see supra note 214.
260. See generally WOOD, supra note 242, at 400-32 (describing tension between
Republican-controlled Congress and White House and the Federalist-controlled judiciary).
261. An Act Declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject, and Settling the Succession of
the Crown (Bill of Rights), 1 W. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2 (1689).
262. Draft of a Proclamation Concerning Opposition to the Excise Laws (Sept. 7, 1792), in 12
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 330-31 n.1; see also From the
Commissioners sent to Western Pennsylvania (Sept. 24, 1794), in 16 PAPERS OF GEORGE
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In addition, the overall architecture of federal law enforcement,
as described earlier, suggests an understanding that federal statutory
law constituted a real code of conduct, to be obeyed in all its
particulars and not merely to the extent prosecution could be avoided.
Early federal grand jury instructions by Supreme Court Justices
riding circuit expressly articulated this understanding. As Justice
James Iredell put it,
[I]t is of the utmost consequence that every man should sacredly obey the laws of the
country actually in being. They cannot be altered, nor the observance of them in any
instance dispensed with, without the authority of the congress of the United States, in
any exigence, however great, in any situation, however alarming. 263

There are also more specific indications that executive officials
considered themselves obligated to enforce federal statutes. To a
degree that seems almost quaint today, early executive officials
described enforcement of statutory prohibitions as a duty. President
Washington referred to his "duty to see the Laws executed." 264
President John Adams observed that a federal district attorney would
"not do his duty" if he failed to prosecute a legal violation that the
President considered clear.265 A district attorney indicated in 1795
WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 702, 706 (report from commissioners sent to negotiate end to
rebellion indicating their rejection of the suggestion that the President might "suspend the
execution of the excise acts until the meeting of Congress").
263. James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Maryland (May 8, 1797), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 210,
at 173, 178 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1990); see also, e.g., id. at 176 ("[T]he plainest dictates of duty,
and the principles of republicanism itself, . . . require of us all to obey the laws of our
country . . . ."); James Iredell's Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of
Connecticut (Apr. 25, 1795), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note

210, at 28, 28 ("Common sense, as well as common justice and the lowest notions of republican
government, revolt against the absurd idea that when once a majority constitutionally
authorised has passed a law, which all are bound to obey, any may disobey with impunity.");
Oliver Ellsworth's Charge to the Grand Jury for the Circuit Court of the District of Georgia (Apr.
25, 1796), in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT, supra note 210, at 119 ("No
transgression is too small, nor any transgressor too great, for animadversion. Happily for our
laws they are not written in blood, that we should blush to read, or hesitate to execute them.
They breathe the spirit of a parent; and expect the benefits of correction, not from severity, but
from certainty.").
264. Letter from President George Washington to Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of
the Treasury (Sept. 7, 1792), in 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 143,
144; see also President George Washington, Fourth Annual Address to Congress (Nov. 6, 1792),
in 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 205, 209 ("Congress may be
assured, that nothing within Constitutional and legal limits, which may depend on me, shall be
wanting to assert and maintain the just authority of the laws."); Proclamation (Mar. 24, 1794), in
33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 304-05 ("[]t is the duty of the
Executive to take care that such criminal proceedings should be suppressed[] [and] the offenders
brought to justice . . . .").
265. Letter from President John Adams to Sec'y Timothy Pickering, U.S. Dep't of State
(Aug. 1, 1799), in 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supranote 226, at 5, 5.
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that he "judged it [his] duty" to proceed with prosecution where he
believed there was probable cause. 266 "I should have esteemed myself
culpable if I had neglected to do so," he observed. 267 An 1832 Attorney
General opinion similarly described it as "the duty of the district
attorneys to attend to the prosecution of all" violations of federal
law.2 6 8 To be sure, these statements may refer to duty only in the
general sense of the executive obligation to maintain law and order.
Yet the attitude they suggest toward enforcement of statutory
prohibitions contrasts sharply with modern assumptions. 269 The
current U.S. Attorney's manual, for example--in what is itself most
266. Letter from Richard Harrison, Dist. Att'y for N.Y., to Sec'y Timothy Pickering, U.S.
War Dep't (Oct. 3, 1795), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS 626, 626 (Walter Lowrie ed., 1834).
267. Id. The letter responded to objections by a foreign government regarding the
prosecution.
268. Letter from Att'y Gen. Benjamin F. Butler, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to the Secretary of
War (Mar. 7, 1836), in OPINIONS OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, H.R. DOC. 31-44, at 995-96 (1851).
Several early Attorney General Opinions suggest that it would in fact be improper to terminate a
prosecution before courts have considered its merit. See Interference with the Judiciary, 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 366, 366 (1820):
The case is now before that department of the government whose appropriate function
it is to expound our laws; and, in my opinion, it would be improper, on the part of the
Executive, to step in for the purpose of arresting and putting an end to the
prosecution, after a respectable court of the United States has pronounced it wellfounded.
See also Letter to the President of the United States from William Wirt, Attorney General (Jan.
31, 1821), in ATTORNEYS GENERAL-CONSTRUCTION OF PUBLIC LAWS, supra note 243, at 336 ("I

am extremely averse to smothering prosecutions in their birth; and, unless the course be
recommended either by the judges or the United States attorney for the District-and this, too,
officially-I cannot reconcile it to my sense of official duty to advise you to it.").
269. For further examples, see Treasury Department Circular to the Captains of the
Revenue Cutters (June 4, 1791), in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 426,
428 (advising officers of revenue cutters that "it will be your duty to seize Vessels & Goods in the
cases in which they are liable to seizure for breaches of the Revenue Laws, when they come
under your notice"); Circular Letter from the Secretary of War to the Governors (Jan. 17, 1809),
in 11 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 87, 88 (referring to President's "duty
to take the measures necessary to meet" resistance to embargo laws); Letter from President
Thomas Jefferson to Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Aug. 15, 1806), in 10
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 281 (observing that "[w]e have done our
duty" by pursuing prosecution); Letter from Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to
President Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 20, 1801), in 35 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
226, at 711, 711 (describing correspondence from Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin informing
customs collector that "it is your duty to apply to the proper Officer and forcibly represent the
circumstances of the case" if there were "strong suspicions of any act of piracy having been
committed" in violation of federal law); Letter from Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, to President Thomas Jefferson (Nov. 29, 1801), in 35 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 226, at 741 (describing letter from Gallatin to collector advising that evidence that a
particular ship was being used for illegal slave trading made it "the duty of the Executive to have
a prosecution instituted"); Letter from Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to
President Thomas Jefferson (Feb. 29, 1808), in 1 WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 226,
at 373-74 (indicating that customs collector's "duty" was "to enforce the penalties against the
owners of every vessel that sailed with knowledge of the first [embargo] law").
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likely an understatement of actual practice-advises that "[m]erely
because the attorney for the government believes that a person's
conduct constitutes a Federal offense and that the admissible evidence
will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, does not mean
that he/she necessarily should initiate or recommend prosecution." 270
Alexander
Hamilton
articulated
the
Framing-era
understanding even more directly. As Secretary of the Treasury from
1789 to 1795, Hamilton oversaw the enforcement of federal customs
and revenue laws. In many respects, these laws approached modern
regulatory regimes in their degree of detail and technicality. Yet
Hamilton did not treat these statutes as a mere baseline to be
moderated in application through executive enforcement policies. On
the contrary, he advised customs and revenue officials that, absent a
specific statutory basis for leniency, they had only narrow, case-bycase authority to excuse violations. 271
One exchange in particular highlights this understanding. Late
in 1791, a new statute requiring certain ship captains to keep
manifests of their cargo took effect. 272 Three months later, the customs
collector in Alexandria advised Hamilton that, because these
provisions "are not accurately observed in scarcely any one instance,"
he had "conceived that where there was no reason to suspect fraud the
forfeiture ought not to be sought." 273 The Secretary reacted negatively:
"Sufficient time having been given to the owners and commanders of
vessels to provide regular manifests, according to the last collection
law, I am of opinion that the clauses [of the statute] should now be
enforced." 274
Hamilton followed up with a circular letter to all customs
collectors. After first highlighting provisions for leniency included in
the statute itself, he further observed that "[tihe terms of every legal
270. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS' MANUAL § 9-27.220 (1997).
271. Hamilton claimed authority as Secretary to make binding legal determinations for
executive officials regarding interpretation of customs and revenue laws. See Treasury
Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs (July 20, 1792), in 12 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 57-58 (stating "the power of the head of the
[Treasury] department 'to superintend the Collection of the Revenue' "). At least until he
obtained statutory authority to delegate supervision of these officials to the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, see Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Customs (Oct. 25,
1792), in 12 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 620-21 (describing discretion
vested in the Treasury Secretary), he engaged in extensive correspondence with customs
collectors and revenue officers regarding the proper performance of their duties.
272. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, 1 Stat. 145, 155-56.
273. Letter from Charles Lee to Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Jan.
11, 1792), in 10 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 509, 509-10.
274. Letter from Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, Dep't of the Treasury to Charles Lee (Jan. 18,
1792), in 10 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supranote 225, at 522, 522.
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provision are to be taken in a reasonable and practicable sense, and so
as not to involve impossibility or absurdity." 275 Yet he recognized only
narrow, case-by-case authority to make exceptions beyond the
statute's particular provisions:
[T]here are cases, in which a provision, though not strictly impracticable, may be so
inconvenient as to demand some degree of relaxation. And where the question relates to
collateral precautions in Revenue laws, for the security of the Revenue, small deviations
from literal strictness may, with due circumspection, be admitted. I will only observe
that such deviations ought to be really necessary ones-such, without which the essential
course of business might be disturbed, and oppression ensue-andought to be as seldom,
and as little as possible.276

In another letter, in response to a beleaguered collector facing
complaints from merchants about his "rigorous and severe execution
of the Revenue Laws; contrary ... to the True Intent, & meaning of
them," Hamilton advised, "I have considered it as possible that your
ideas of precise conformity to the laws, may have kept you from
venturing upon relaxations in cases in which, from very special
circumstances, they may have been proper.... [C]ases do sometimes
occur in which a little [discretion] may be indispensable." 2 77 At the
same time, Hamilton emphasized that such "relaxations" should be
reserved for "special cases" and "urgent occasion[s]." 278 "I should be
cautious," he observed, in even "making such a remark to many
officers-because I should fear an abuse."279
On occasion, it is true, Hamilton did counsel "moderation" or
"caution" in enforcing novel legal requirements. 280 In a particularly
strong example of such guidance, Hamilton advised that "a great
relaxation appears unavoidable" with respect to provisions for seizure
of distilled spirits lacking certain certificates. 281 Determining when
certification had truly been required proved difficult because the law
275. Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of the Custom (June 11, 1792), in 11
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 507, 509.
276. Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Treasury Department Circular to the Collectors of

the Customs, supra note 275, at 57, 60 (recognizing the "admission of exceptions in extraordinary
cases" in the "operation of laws").
277. Letter from Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to Jeremiah Olney
(Apr. 2, 1793), in 14 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 276, 277.

278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See, e.g., Treasury Department Circular to the Captains of the Revenue Cutters, supra
note 269, at 426, 432 (urging "activity, vigilance & firmness," but also "prudence, moderation &

good temper").
281. Treasury Department Circular to the Supervisors of the Revenue (Sept. 30, 1791), in 9
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 248-49; see also Treasury Department
Circular to the Supervisors of the Revenue (June 27, 1791), in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 510, 510-11 (urging "great prudence" in enforcement of these
same provisions).
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had provided for marking and certification of pre-enactment stock
held by distillers or importers but not by distributors or other holders
of such "Old Stock." In these circumstances, Hamilton "deemed [it]
preferable to weaken the efficacy of the provision respecting
certificates than to give just cause of complaint of the rigorous
execution of the law in a particular in which it is improvident in its
provisions." 282 Yet even here Hamilton's "great relaxation" consisted
only in a form of case-by-case "circumspection." "It is therefore my
wish," Hamilton instructed revenue officers, "that the want of
Certificates may in general rather be considered as a ground for
careful enquiry and examination than of itself a sufficient cause for
seizures." 283 Moreover, with respect to many other provisions causing
unjustified "inconveniences" to the public, Hamilton sought (and
generally obtained) legislative revisions rather than simply curtailing
enforcement. 284
It is also true that Hamilton's aspiration to completely enforce
federal revenue laws proved impossible to realize in certain
particulars. The most significant problems arose along the new
nation's violent trans-Appalachian frontier. There, deep-seated
popular hostility to federal excise taxes on distilled spirits yielded the
most serious challenge to federal law enforcement in the Washington
Administration-the so-called Whiskey Rebellion of 1794.285 In
frontier areas extending from western Pennsylvania through
Kentucky to western North Carolina, distillers violently opposed
efforts to enforce the excise law. In one exemplary incident reported to
Hamilton, a distiller
opened the Door, let [an excise inspector] in, turned the Key and kept him confined
three Days on water only. He then very humanely, assured him that his life Shou'd not
be in any danger, but he must submit to the mild punishment of having his Nose ground

282. Treasury Department Circular to the Supervisors of the Revenue (Sept. 30, 1791),
supra note 281, at 248, 249.
283. Id. Hamilton also described circumstances in which "the presumption of fraud from
want of certificates will be strong enough to justify a seizure." Id.
284. See generally Report on Defects in the Existing Laws of Revenue (Apr. 22, 1790), in 6
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 373 (suggesting changes to the power of
the Treasury to enforce revenue laws); Report on the Difficulties in the Execution of the Act
Laying Duties on Distilled Spirits (Mar. 6, 1792), in 11 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra
note 225, at 77 (describing implementation of the whiskey tax).
285. Frontier residents' hostility to the whiskey excise derived in part from historic AngloAmerican aversion to excise taxes and in part to whiskey's vital importance in the region as a
medium of exchange and nonperishable export commodity. See generally THOMAS P. SLAUGHTER,
THE WHISKEY REBELLION 11-27, 93-95 (1986) (noting that the whiskey excise was seen by
settlers as "an ideologically, culturally, and economically repulsive tax").
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off at the Grindstone & the execution was prevented only by one of the Parties, whose
286
heart happened fortunately, to possess a particle of humanity.

Even when enforcement cases were brought, hostile juries refused to
impose liability or even issue indictments. 287 Enforcement thus was
often a practical impossibility in these jurisdictions; even filling key
revenue collection offices proved difficult or impossible. 288
Under such conditions, as noted earlier, executive
nonenforcement does not necessarily imply a broad understanding of
prosecutorial discretion. Nonenforcement under conditions of
impossibility may be consistent with an aspiration to treat statutory
prohibitions as a real code of conduct by enforcing them as fully as
possible. Overall, in fact, the Washington Administration's response to
the whiskey crisis highlights the degree to which the President and
other key officials felt that enforcing statutes was their constitutional
duty.289 Rather than simply moderating the law through
nonenforcement policies, the Administration repeatedly proposed
statutory changes to address grievances they considered legitimate. 290
In 1792, President Washington issued a proclamation invoking "the
particular duty of the executive 'to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed"' and warning that "all lawful ways and means
will be strictly put in execution for bringing to justice the infractors
thereof and securing obedience thereto." 291 Finally, in 1794, after
efforts to serve legal process on distillers in western Pennsylvania
were met with violence, President Washington gathered a military

286. Letter from Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to Rep. Daniel
Huger (June 22-25, 1792), in 11 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 541, 42;
see also SLAUGHTER, supra note 285, at 117 (describing the excise law as a "dead letter" in
western states).
287. See TACHAU, supra note 225, at 73, 100-01, 105-09.
288. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 285, at 117-18, 151-52 (describing harassment of tax
collectors in Pennsylvania and on the frontier); TACHAU, supra note 225, at 70-73. For an
internal government report on compliance problems, see Letter from Tench Coxe to Sec'y
Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Oct. 19, 1792), in 12 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 592.
289. See, e.g., Letter from President Washington to Sec'y Hamilton, supra note 267, at 33132 ("It is my duty to see the Laws executed-to permit them to be trampled upon with impunity
would be repugnant to it; nor can the Government longer remain a passive spectator of the
contempt with which they are treated."); President George Washington, Sixth Annual Address to
Congress (Nov. 19, 1794), in 34 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 28-33
(describing efforts to enforce the excise law in Western Pennsylvania).
290. See supra note 288.
291. Draft of a Proclamation Concerning Opposition to the Excise Laws, supra note 262, at
330-31 n.1.
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force exceeding in size the Continental Army that fought the
Revolutionary War to restore order in western Pennsylvania. 292
Even after this operation, tax resistance continued in certain
frontier areas, and executive officials struggled to develop realistic
enforcement practices. 293 President Washington ultimately exercised
his constitutional pardon power and granted the Whiskey Rebels in
Pennsylvania a broad amnesty for past crimes, albeit on the condition
that the rebels pledge to obey the law in the future. He also pardoned
two defendants convicted of crimes following the crisis. 294 In Kentucky,
revenue officials had earlier apparently offered (unsuccessfully) to
"forbear" from seeking penalties for past violations in exchange for
prospective compliance with excise laws. 29 5 In addition, the Treasury
Department, concerned in part about "legal difficulties" with claiming
excise arrears after the Whiskey Rebellion in areas where collection
offices had "not been regularly opened," adopted an internal practice of
generally seeking to collect arrears for only one year before
establishment of law and order. 296 But even if one views these
examples as categorical exercises of nonenforcement power, they arose
in extreme circumstances and formed part of a broader effort to
292. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 285, at 177-82 (describing organized resistance in western
Pennsylvania to officials attempting to serve process); WOOD, supra note 242, at 138 (describing
military response).
293. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 285, at 226 (acknowledging the continued difficulty the
federal government faced in administering taxes).
294. See id. at 218-20 (discussing amnesty and pardons).
295. See TACHAU, supra note 225, at 70. There is also evidence that the government
regularly stayed prosecutions and remitted forfeitures against distillers who agreed to "enter"
their stills and comply going forward. See SLAUGHTER, supra note 285, at 182 (quoting Attorney
General William Bradford). A statute, however, authorized remissions, thus providing a
statutory basis for this practice independent of inherent executive nonenforcement power. See
Act of May 26, 1790, ch. XII, 1 Stat. 122.
296. 17 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 376, 376-77. When the

Department extended the same "rule" to Kentucky (where offices had often been vacant),
Hamilton emphasized that the policy should be "confidential" and that it should be applied on a
case-by-case basis, "leaving [the collection officer] at liberty however to apply or limit the extent
of the rule according to local circumstances and the past course of business." 18 PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 196. Hamilton may have had concerns that the

statute only required payment of the excise when a revenue collection office was open in the
district. Hamilton apparently advised the Commissioner of the Revenue that "prudence and
judgment" called for leniency collecting excises that accrued "before officers were appointed or
knowledge of the law became widely dispersed." 26 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note

214, at 507. In contrast, where he considered it a "clear point" that certain customs duties under
a different statute accrued even before collection houses were established, Hamilton instructed
customs officials to seek to collect arrears. 6 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225,
at 373, 373-74; see also 6 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 39 (ordering the
Collectors of Customs to maintain one suit to collect arrears); 5 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER

HAMILTON, supra note 225, at 478 (opining that duties should be collected on importations after
August 1, 1789).
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achieve full compliance with congressional statutes on a prospective
basis.
Nor was this enforcement effort limited to the Washington and
Adams Administrations. President Jefferson and his Treasury
Secretary, Albert Gallatin-himself a settler from western
Pennsylvania and a leader in early opposition to the whiskey exciseopposed internal taxes on principle and obtained their repeal in
1802.297 Nevertheless, they continued to enforce the excises while they
remained in effect, even taking certain administrative steps to
improve efficiency of internal revenue collections. 298 In Kentucky, in
fact, distillers finally came into substantial compliance with the law
during the Jefferson Administration as a result of vigorous
enforcement efforts by the local U.S. Attorney. 299
The Jefferson Administration's own experiment with achieving
the impossible-the embargo of 1807-1809-appears to fit a similar
pattern. Over the course of the embargo, Secretary Gallatin issued
extensive guidance to customs collectors regarding proper enforcement
of the law. Yet this policy guidance had a statutory basis: the embargo
statutes by their terms conferred substantial discretion on federal
officials. 300 One key provision, for example, authorized individual
customs collectors to detain cargo whenever "in their opinions the
intention is to violate or evade any of the provisions of the acts laying
an embargo, until the decision of the President of the United States be
had thereon."30 President Jefferson described the breadth of these
laws as designed to eliminate any possible evasion by leaving to
executive discretion the task of sorting the guilty from the innocent.
He wrote to South Carolina Governor Charles Pinckney that
297. Act of Apr. 6, 1802, ch. XIX, 2 Stat. 148; see TACHAU, supra note 225, at 119 & n.99,
196.

298. See Letter from Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, to Governor Mifflin
(Sept. 17, 1794), in 1 WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 226, at 27 (encouraging the
governor to take greater efforts to enforce the laws and avoid civic uprisings).
299. See TACHAU, supra note 225, at 118-26. The Adams Administration's response to the
so-called Fries Rebellion of 1799 followed a similar pattern to the Whiskey Rebellion. Faced with
resistance to collection of certain federal direct taxes promulgated to fund the Quasi-War,
President Adams ordered a military response to restore order, conducted exemplary
prosecutions, and then granted pardons to convicted defendants and a general amnesty for other
offenders. For background on the Fries Rebellion, see PAUL DOUGLAS NEWMAN, FRIES'S
REBELLION: THE ENDURING STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, at ix-xii, 142-49, 15667, 182-85 (2004).

300. See generally Mashaw, supra note 204, at 1646-47 (providing an overview of federal
officers' leeway in enforcing embargo laws). See also, e.g., Letter from Sec'y Albert Gallatin to
President Thomas Jefferson, 1 WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra 226, at 483 (explaining
that earlier directive to customs collectors would have been "illegal" if applied as a hard-and-fast
rule as opposed to a guideline for identifying suspicious shipments).
301. Third Supplementary Act, ch. 66, § 11, 2 Stat. 499 (1808).
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Congress, "having found, after repeated trials, that no general rules
could be formed which fraud and avarice would not elude, concluded to
leave, in those who were to execute the power, a discretionary power
paramount to all their general rules."302 Nevertheless, the
Administration generally did not seek to limit enforcement of embargo
violations. On the contrary, Jefferson's Treasury Secretary urged
customs collectors to "detain, investigate and refer in all doubtful
cases."3 03 Executive officials appear to have attempted to enforce the
law as best they could, even in the face of popular opposition. 304
The Jefferson Administration also provides examples of
nonenforcement for constitutional reasons, but these cases too are
distinguishable from policy-based
nonenforcement. President
Jefferson and the Republicans bitterly opposed Federalist assertions
that federal courts held inherent authority to punish common-law
crimes against the federal government. 305 Jefferson apparently
intended to use his control over executive enforcement to block
prosecutions on this basis, but his reason for doing so was his view
that there were in fact no federal common-law crimes and thus no
valid "law" to enforce. 306 Likewise, when Jefferson took office in 1801,
he famously discontinued prosecutions under the Sedition Act. Again,
however, he did so only because he considered this statute
unconstitutional and thus a "nullity."307 As Jefferson explained in
302. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Governor Charles Pinckney (July 18, 1808),
in 12 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 102-03.
303. Albert Gallatin, Circular of Apr. 28, 1808, quoted in Mashaw, supra note 204, at 1662.
See also Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury (May 6, 1808), in 1 WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 226, at 464, ("The great
leading object of the Legislature was, and ours in the execution of it ought to be, to give complete
effect to the embargo laws."); Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Sec'y Albert Gallatin,
U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Aug. 11, 1808), in 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note
226, at 202 ("I am clearly of the opinion this law ought to be enforced at any expense, which may

not exceed our appropriation.").See generally Douglas Lamar Jones, "The Capriceof Juries" The
Enforcement of the Jeffersonian Embargo in Massachusetts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 307, 311
(1980) (discussing efforts to enforce the embargo in Massachusetts and observing that Jefferson
and his allies in Congress were "[a]nimated by the goal of strict enforcement").
304. See HENDERSON, supra note 22, at 91-93; Mashaw, supranote 204, at 1663.
305. See WOOD, supra note 242, at 416-18 (describing Federalist efforts to enforce commonlaw federal offenses).
306. See id. at 420 (describing plan to avoid enforcement of common-law crimes through
appointment power over prosecutors).
307. 8 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 57. See also Letter from Sec'y
James Madison, U.S. Dep't of State, to Alexander J. Dallas, Dist. Att'y for Pa. (July 20, 1801), 1
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 240, at 402 (relaying President's instruction to enter
nolle prosequi in prosecution). Jefferson later expressed the same view with respect to federal
libel prosecutions, which he also considered unconstitutional. 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 253-54. But cf. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Att'y
Gen. Levi Lincoln, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Mar. 24, 1802), in 9 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
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correspondence, he believed that his duty to the Constitution
superseded his obligation to enforce invalid enactments: 308 "My
obligation to execute what was law, involved that of not suffering
rights secured by valid laws, to be prostrated by what was no law."309
As this statement makes plain, even Jefferson-despite
claiming authority not to enforce laws he considered invalidrecognized a presidential obligation "to execute what was law."
Accordingly, in his directive to the district attorney to nol pros one
Sedition Act case, the President stipulated,
You will observe that this interposition of the President is restricted solely to the
proceedings under [the Sedition Act], and will please to understand the instruction to
prosecute the said [defendant] . .. as still in force, as far as a prosecution in any other
310
form or in any other Court may consist with the Constitution of the United States.

In another case, Jefferson directed a prosecution to proceed to trial,
out of deference to the court, even though he considered the
prosecution unlawful. 311 "The Executive," he explained, "ought not to
sit in previous judgment on every case & to say whether it shall or
shall not go before the judges." 312 Jefferson, indeed, seems even to
have viewed his pardon power as properly limited to cases in which
the alleged conduct "is not that which the law meant to make
criminal, and yet happens to be within its letter."313
supra note 226, at 277 (indicating, without mentioning constitutional issue, that "I would wish
much to see the experiment tried of getting along without public prosecutions for libels").
308. Id.
309. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Wilson Cary Nicholas (June 13, 1809), in 11
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supranote 226, at 88.
310. Jefferson relayed this command through Secretary of State James Madison. See Letter
from Sec'y Madison to Alexander Dallas, supra note 307, at 442.
311. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Sec'y James Madison, U.S. Dep't of State
(July 19, 1801), in 1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supranote 240, at 442.
312. Id. Jefferson did hold out the possibility of executive intervention, as in the sedition
cases, once "the judges shall actually have done wrong." Id.
313. Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Sec'y Albert Gallatin, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury (Aug. 14, 1801), in 1 WRITINGS OF ALBERT GALLATIN, supra note 226, at 50; see also
Letter from President Thomas Jefferson to Sen. Christopher Ellery (May 19, 1803), in 9
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 351 (indicating that pardon power is not
"abus[ed]" when "used in cases, which tho' within the words, are not within the intention of the
law"). In fact, pardons from this period often seem based on considerations that today would
more likely result in nonenforcement or a favorable plea agreement. See, e.g., Letter from Tobias
Lear to Sec'y Alexander Hamilton, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury (Mar. 14, 1793), in 12 PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, supra note 226, at 318 & n.3 (indicating that Washington pardon granted
to smugglers who "suffered by the loss of their goods, and expences attending the suit, enough to
answer the intention of the law"); Letter from President John Adams to John Marshall (Aug. 7,
1800), in 9 WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS, supranote 226, at 72 (granting pardon to convicted privateer
on French ship based on "[tihe man's generosity to American prisoners, his refusal to act, and
resigning his command, when he was ordered to capture American vessels, his present poverty
and great distress"); 34 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 226, at 240 note (indicating
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In sum, while the evidence is not completely tidy, there are
significant indications that early Presidents and key executive officials
focused on achieving complete enforcement of federal laws, with
discretionary nonenforcement reserved for exceptional cases. Such a
mindset appears consistent with the second presumption advocated
here: a presumption against treating enforcement discretion as a
vehicle for remaking statutory policy.
B. The Rise of Discretion
Modern criminal justice and administrative enforcement, in
contrast to early federal practice, appear to defy the proper
constitutional framework. Prosecutors and administrative agencies
today routinely make policy by prioritizing certain offenses over
others, effectively exempting categories of offenders from sanctions,
and even in some cases prospectively authorizing violations. Federal
officials have even adopted public nonenforcement policies in some
circumstances; notable recent examples include the Obama
Administration's stated policies of immigration nonenforcement and
suspension of the employer health insurance mandate. 314 In light of
the presumption against executive suspending and dispensing powers,
such executive actions should be permissible only with statutory
authorization. How, then, can we account for this rise in discretion?
Should the change in practice alter our constitutional understanding,
or is modern practice itself constitutionally suspect?
1. Origins of Modern Practice
As every law student learns, the modern administrative state
emerged in fits and starts in the Progressive Era and then took hold
dramatically in President Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal.3 1 5 In
criminal justice, through a process less widely appreciated, the
that Jefferson granted pardon because of weaknesses in evidence in case and because convict had
"already been confined one year before & since his sentence"); 34 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON,
supra note 226, at 460 note (indicating that Jefferson granted pardon where offense was "not
within the intentions tho' embraced by the letter of the law").
314. See supra notes 45-51 and accompanying text and infra Parts V.A and V.B for
discussion of these examples.
315. See, e.g., Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence
of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 413-19 (2007) (tracing the evolution of

New Deal programs); Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in HistoricalPerspective, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1189, 1189-91 (1986) (describing the growth in federal regulations which accompanied the
New Deal). For a revisionist view, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative

Law: FederalistFoundations, 1787-1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1260 (2006) (identifying earlier
antecedents to modern administrative law).
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modern system of plea bargaining and prosecutorial charging
discretion emerged in the nineteenth century and became entrenched
in the early twentieth century. 316 Meanwhile, the expectation of
enforcement discretion taken for granted today in the criminal context
often seems to feed back into the modern understanding of agencies'
administrative authority. In Heckler v. Chaney, for example, the
Supreme Court justified its presumption of agency enforcement
discretion based on the resemblance between agency nonenforcement
and "the decision of a prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to
indict-a decision which has long been regarded as the special
province of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who
is charged by the Constitution to 'take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.' "317

On some level, the discretion exercised by executive officials
today is simply an extension of earlier practices. From the beginning,
federal prosecutors and other law-enforcement officials exercised some
discretion to decline enforcement in particular cases. This practice
suggests they presumed that the Constitution gave them such
discretion unless Congress specified otherwise. 318 Yet if prosecutorial
discretion today is an old wine in new bottles, it has been soured by
the transition.
Over the course of the nineteenth century, a combination of
factors, including population growth, immigration, urbanization,
increasing civil litigation and resulting docket pressure on courts, and
an increase in malum prohibitum regulatory offenses, made crime
relatively more common and the prosecutorial and judicial resources
to combat it relatively more scarce. 319 Prosecutorial discretion
emerged, at both the federal and state levels, as a solution to this
mismatch. With respect to malum in se crimes such as murder, rape,
and theft, plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion provided a
mechanism for prosecutors to control crime while reserving resource-

316. For the classic study of plea bargaining's emergence, see GEORGE FISHER, PLEA
BARGAINING'S TRIUMPH (2004). For discussion of the emergence of prosecutorial discretion as an

organizing principle of criminal justice, see Stuntz, supra note 23, at 511, and PARRILLO, supra
note 203.
317. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
318. See supra Part IV.A.2.
319. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 316, at 2, 111-14; STUNTZ, supra note 29, at 257-67;
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice, Local Democracy, and ConstitutionalRights, 111 1ICH.
L. REV. 1045, 1050-56 (2013) (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 29). Malum prohibitum crimes are
offenses that are criminal only because they are proscribed by positive law. Malum in se crimes,
in contrast, are those thought to be "wrong in themselves," meaning that they are intuitively
criminal as a matter of ordinary morality.
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intensive trials for the most difficult or significant cases. 320 At the
same time, with respect to malum prohibitum crimes, discretion
provided a means for enforcers to "sand off the hard edges of modern
state power," as one scholar puts it.321 Prosecutors could avoid
unpopular or unjust prosecutions while still giving effect to new
prohibitions by bringing exemplary cases. 322
Even some astute contemporary observers recognized that the
quantitative increase in the use of discretion amounted to a
qualitative change. A national commission in 1931 observed that "the
general duty of enforcing the law in the locality .. . has in many
jurisdictions grown into something like a royal dispensing power." 323
In the federal context, moreover, it is even possible to identify a key
moment of transition.
In 1896, Congress abruptly terminated the system of casebased compensation for federal prosecutors, replacing it with a system
of fixed salaries. 324 Congressional debates make clear that Congress
intended the change to moderate the perceived overenforcement of
stringent or unpopular prohibitions that the prior system of
conviction-based bounties had encouraged. 325 As one scholar
summarizes, "The core complaint about U.S. Attorneys' fees, repeated
over and over in the 1896 debate, was that they resulted in an excess
of prosecutions, which congressmen denounced as 'frivolous,' 'petty,'
'technical,' 'vexatious,' 'trivial,' 'unnecessary,' 'useless,' and the like."32 6
The concern, moreover, was not that "U.S. Attorneys were convicting
the innocent."327 Congressmen complained, rather, that fee-based
compensation "incentivized the officers to convict as many people as
possible," whereas they "increasingly felt that not everybody who was
guilty and lawfully convictable ought to be punished as a matter of
policy."328 Salaries, many hoped, would solve this problem by removing
320. See, e.g., STUNTZ, supra note 29, at 257-67.
321. PARRILLO, supra note 203, at 4.
322. This general long-term progression towards greater reliance on enforcement discretion
may not have been entirely linear or uniform. See, e.g., id. at 231-52 (recounting mid-nineteenthcentury increase in incentives for customs enforcement followed by efforts to promote greater
discretion). As noted earlier, see supra introduction to Part IV, this Article aims to describe the
general long-term trajectory without purporting to offer a detailed history of the transition.
323. Nat'l Comm'n on Law Observance and Enforcement, Report on Prosecution, 4 U.S.
Wickersham Comm'n Reports 20 (1931); see also, e.g., Raymond Moley, The Vanishing Jury,
2 S. CAL. L. REV. 97, 98-99, 124-25 (1928) (complaining that the nol pros, though intended "only
to prevent grave injustice," was being used with "utmost freedom" by prosecutors).
324. Act of May 28, 1896, ch. 252, § 7, 29 Stat. 140, 180-81.
325. See PARRILLO, supra note 203, at 276-77.
326. Id. (quoting congressional record statements).
327. Id.
328. Id.
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incentives for overenforcement and by granting prosecutors freedom to
evaluate each case on its own merits. Congress thus responded to a
problem of its own making-the proliferation of strict and often highly
technical federal offenses-not by moderating its substantive
enactments but rather by adjusting prosecutors' compensation to
encourage "discretionary non-enforcement and forbearance." 329
As this debate illustrates, the other two branches have hardly
been passive in the accretion of executive authority reflected in the
modern practice of enforcement discretion. Prosecutors' ability to
negotiate charges with defendants depends on judicial enforcement of
plea bargains, despite the loss in judicial authority resulting from the
infrequency of trials. 330 That ability also depends on Congress
providing sufficient prosecutorial control over sentences-principally
by enacting overlapping offenses with graded severity-to enable
prosecutors to threaten severe sanctions at trial and offer a
comparatively good deal if defendants choose to plead guilty
instead. 331 Moreover, once this arrangement took hold, the
"pathological" political dynamics of criminal law discussed earlier
compounded the problem, producing the wide-ranging prohibitions,
and associated wide-ranging prosecutorial
discretion, that
characterize criminal justice at both the state and federal levels
today.332
Given these political dynamics, the proliferation of detailed
criminal and civil prohibitions does not necessarily mean that
Congress expects detailed compliance by the citizenry. Ironically, the
breadth and depth of substantive law instead presumes a regime in
which executive officials exercise discretion to moderate the rigors of
statutory prohibitions, thereby creating a law on the ground that more
closely approximates popular preferences than the law on the books.
In criminal justice and at least some areas of administrative law,
federal officials thus have received what two scholars have aptly
described as a "de facto delegation" of broadened discretion. 333
Although no statute expressly authorizes executive officials to ignore
provable violations of federal law, widespread nonenforcement in
329. Id. The reform worked. As Parrillo shows, the number of federal prosecutions dropped
dramatically immediately following salarization, though the conviction rate remained constanta result indicating that prosecutors stopped bringing many cases in which convictions were
obtainable. See id. at 38-42.
330. See FISHER, supra note 316, at 114.
331. See Stuntz, supra note 23, at 598-99.
332. See supra Part II.A.
333. Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE
L.J. 458, 463, 513-14 (2009).
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many areas of federal law is so inevitable that Congress must be
understood to have acquiesced in it.
2. Dubious Foundations
Nevertheless, congressional acquiescence in substantial
nonenforcement in some contexts should not dictate a changed
understanding of the President's constitutional duty. Recent
scholarship has emphasized the need to assess with care
constitutional arguments based on executive practice. 334 Here, several
considerations support continued adherence to the baseline
constitutional understanding that categorical and prospective
nonenforcement of statutes is impermissible without statutory
authorization.
For one thing, while early practice fits a normatively attractive
understanding of the division of responsibility between the legislative
and executive branches, modern practice does not. Substantial
nonenforcement of federal statutes clouds public perception of what
conduct is unlawful, thus impairing rule-of-law values and
diminishing Congress's political accountability for the range of
conduct it has proscribed. Such unrestricted nonenforcement,
moreover,
enables
the
"pathological"
political
cycle
of
overcriminalization and increasing discretion in the first place. The
view that Congress's de facto delegation of discretion to prosecutors
cures all constitutional concerns thus lets both Congress and the
executive branch too easily off the hook. Perhaps continued adherence
to the mindset reflected in the New York District Attorney's 1795
letter to George Washington-that enforcement of federal laws was
his "duty" and that he "should have esteemed [him]self culpable if [he]
had neglected to do so"335-would have maintained a stronger link
between the law on the ground and the law on the books. In the long
run, such a mindset thus might have preserved greater political
accountability for substantive prohibitions while also enhancing the
rule of law.
In any event, interbranch acquiescence in unrestricted
executive nonenforcement may not be as strong as it appears.
Congress, to be sure, has made enforcement discretion inevitable by
enacting overly broad prohibitions and by failing to appropriate
adequate resources for full enforcement. The congressional debate in
1896 over prosecutorial compensation suggests that legislators
334. Bradley & Morrison, supra note 190.
335. Letter from Richard Harrison to Sec'y Pickering, supra note 266, at 626.
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expected prosecutors to moderate statutory laws through selective
enforcement. Even so, the degree to which Congress has ceded
authority to the executive branch to ignore laws altogether is unclear.
Recent scholarship has emphasized Congress's relative weakness in
defending its interests relative to the Executive. 336 Although the
Executive has interpreted Congress's de facto delegation in this
context broadly, Congress might well have meant to cede only a
greatly enhanced case-specific nonenforcement power. At the least,
assessing the degree of Congress's acquiescence in policy-based
nonenforcement requires a sensitive examination of the particular
statutory context.
Nor is it clear that current institutional arrangements are
necessarily an imperative of modernity, as some have suggested. By
some accounts, the modern industrial (or postindustrial) world is
simply too complicated to be adequately regulated by predefined
statutory restrictions. 337 Yet a criminal code that prohibits, for
example, interstate transportation of water hyacinth plantS338 and
false reports regarding materials used in highway projectS3 3 9 seems
not to have great trouble with granular refinement. We should not
assume that Congress could not have make statutory law a real code
of conduct rather than a grant of punitive authority to the executive
branch. At a minimum, Congress might have prescribed the scope of
prohibitions through explicit delegations of rulemaking power subject
to administrative procedure. De facto delegation may not have been
inevitable; on the contrary, a mistaken view of executive duty may
have been an original sin that made our current system of unbounded
discretion possible.
For their part, courts have characterized the task of deciding
whether or not to prosecute as a fundamentally executive function, but
their statements do not necessarily reflect normative acceptance of
unrestricted executive discretion over enforcement. The questions of
executive duty and judicial review may well be distinct. By assigning
specifically to the President the responsibility to ensure that the laws
are executed, the Take Care Clause implies that this function is not a
proper task of the other two branches. And with good reason. Within
336. See Bradley & Morrison, supra note 190, at 414-15 ("Although Congress and the
President may disagree about particular policies, Congress as a body does not systematically
seek to protect its prerogatives against presidential encroachment.").
337. See, e.g., Schulhofer, supra note 319, at 1062 (reviewing STUNTZ, supra note 29)
(describing growth of regulatory crimes as "an inherent consequence of modernity"); PARRILLO,
supranote 203, at 16, 19 (emphasizing centrality of discretion to modern administration).

338. 18 U.S.C. § 46(a) (2012).
339. Id. § 1020.
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our adversarial system of justice, the core function of courts is to serve
as neutral referees between warring parties on questions of law and
fact. Insofar as involvement in the initial decision to bring a case
might bias the court in favor of the defendant's guilt (or at least create
a perception of bias for the defendant and the public), courts' ability to
perform that critical refereeing function might well be impaired.
Moreover, as the Court emphasized in Heckler, decisions about
whether to prosecute, particularly when questions of resource
allocation are involved, are generally not amenable to precise,
judicially administrable standards. These decisions instead depend on
a complex judgment about the case's strength and importance relative
to other enforcement priorities. For all these reasons, judicial
decisions recognizing the executive branch's "exclusive authority and
absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case" should not
stand for the proposition that nonenforcement is always consistent
with executive duty.340 Quite the opposite is true, as earlier cases like
Morgan and Kendall, and the D.C. Circuit's recent decision in Cook v.
FDA, make clear: execution of the law may well be an executive duty,
even if that duty in many cases is not judicially enforceable.
Executive officials, then, should continue to understand that
their constitutional duty is to execute the law, not make it.
Nevertheless, the received structure of substantive law, with its
overbreadth and structural presumption of discretion, does create
practical difficulties. The cat today is very much out of the bag; in
many contexts complete enforcement of modern federal law is neither
possible nor desirable. How, then, should federal officials understand
their duty? The next part of this Article turns to these practical issues.
V. MODERN IMPLICATIONS

What implications does the proper understanding of
enforcement discretion and executive duty carry for modern practice?
Notwithstanding the rise of discretion, the baseline constitutional
understanding reflected in the dual-presumption framework should
inform how modern executive officials discharge their responsibilities.
It may also clarify the proper resolution of a number of recurrent
problems.
The framework developed here has two key implications for
modern executive functions. First, executive officials should not
presume unbounded discretion to decline enforcement of statutes
when the statutory context does not suggest that Congress anticipated
340. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974).
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such discretion. For this reason, as described below, the recent
temporary suspensions of the ACA's insurance requirements and
employer mandate appear legally dubious and should not serve as a
precedent for similar executive action in the future. Second, even in
areas like criminal law, where substantial nonenforcement of statutes
is inevitable, executive officials should understand their task as a
matter of priority setting within the parameters of statutory policy,
not one of crafting policy-based exceptions to statutory coverage. In
addition to these core implications, a proper understanding of
executive enforcement discretion illuminates a number of recurrent
separation of powers issues. By way of illustration, the discussion
below addresses three key examples: (1) the permissibility of statutory
waiver provisions, (2) proper construction of criminal statutes, and (3)
the constitutionality of independent federal prosecutors.
A. ConstrainingDiscretion
Given resource constraints and the scope of statutory
mandates, substantial nonenforcement of statutes and regulations is
inevitable in many modern regulatory contexts. But that is not true in
all contexts. Where neither an explicit congressional delegation nor
contextual factors suggesting a de facto delegation supports broader
exercises of discretion, the President's constitutional duty is to enforce
the law, making at most only case-specific exceptions.
Here, two enforcement policies regarding the ACA provide
useful illustrations. The executive branch has effectively suspended
for specified periods the enforcement of two key ACA provisions-the
minimum coverage requirement and the so-called employer mandate.
Yet in neither case does the statute provide clear reasons to presume
such suspension authority.
I intend the discussion of these recent ACA examples to be
illustrative; other similar examples from recent administrations could
likely be found. Given the close identification of the ACA with
President Obama and the partisan opposition to the law in Congress,
executive officials responsible for these policies surely understand
themselves to be seeking in good faith to get the law on its feet and
achieve its central objectives. No doubt, implementing complex new
legislation like the ACA is a challenging task that may be expected to
require a certain degree of administrative ingenuity.
Yet the conception of the executive role reflected in these two
policies carries dangers. A broad conception of executive
nonenforcement power could be a powerful tool for Presidents with
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deregulatory goals that conflict with statutory mandates. 34 1 Indeed, to
the extent future Presidents may be less committed to the ACA than
President Obama, proponents of the law might have been better
served by policies establishing a practice of literal compliance with the
law's terms. In any event, the examples set by these two policies
should not be understood to reflect an appropriate norm with respect
to executive enforcement of statutes in general.
1. Suspension of Insurance Requirements
The Administration's first ACA nonenforcement policy grants
existing health insurance plans an additional nine months beyond the
statutory deadline to comply with new minimum coverage
requirements. 342 The ACA generally requires private health insurance
plans with plan years beginning after January 1, 2014 to meet
specified minimum coverage requirements; such plans, for example,
may no longer deny coverage for preexisting medical conditions. 343
Even before the statutory deadline, however, insurers began canceling
noncompliant plans, often citing the ACA as their reason for doing so.
In some cases, moreover, plan beneficiaries found that purchasing
new, compliant plans would be substantially more expensive. In
November 2013, in an apparent effort to prevent such cost increases
(and to honor a pledge by the President during pre-enactment debates
that "if you like your plan you can keep it"), the Department of Health
and Human Services announced that, as a "transitional policy,"
certain existing noncompliant plans renewed between January 1 and
October 1, 2013 "will not be considered to be out of compliance" with
the statute. 344
The legal basis for this "transitional policy" is not entirely
clear. To date it has been articulated only in a brief letter to state
insurance commissioners. Under the statute, the states, as primary
regulators of insurance markets, hold first-line responsibility under
the statute for enforcing these requirements. 345 As a backstop,
341. See, e.g., Love & Garg, supra note 16, at 41 (noting that an unchecked presidential
nonenforcement power "results in bias toward smaller government").
342. See Letter from Gary Cohen, supra note 4 (granting "transitional relief' to such
existing plans).
343. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg to 300gg-21 (limiting instances in which issuers may impose
preexisting condition exclusions); id. § 300gg note.
344. Letter from Gary Cohen, supranote 4, at 1.
345. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(1) ("Subject to [a separate provision preempting certain
state laws], each State may require that health insurance issuers that issue, sell, renew, or offer
health insurance coverage in the State in the individual or group market meet the requirements
of this part .. . with respect to such insurers.").
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however, the statute also requires the Secretary of Health and Human
Services to enforce the ACA's provisions through civil penalties if the
Secretary determines "that a State has failed to substantially enforce
a provision (or provisions) in [the law] with respect to health
insurance issuers in the State." 346 The policy thus appears to be based
on an exercise of enforcement discretion. In effect, the policy
announces that the Secretary will not assess civil penalties on
noncompliant plans within the terms of the policy, even in states that
have "failed to substantially enforce" the law's requirements. Indeed,
in recognition of the states' primary enforcement role, the letter
"encourage[s]" state regulators "to adopt the same transitional
347
policy."
To the extent the policy has no other statutory basis, it defies
the proper understanding of executive duty. This exercise of
enforcement discretion extends far beyond the case-specific
enforcement discretion that may be presumed with respect to any
particular statutory requirement. It amounts, rather, to a prospective
suspension of the law for a specified category of insurance plansprecisely the form of executive nonenforcement that is presumptively
impermissible. Far from authorizing such categorical nonenforcement, however, the statute appears designed to prevent it. By
imposing a duty of enforcement on the Secretary as a backstop in
cases of state nonenforcement, the law adds belt to suspenders: it
guarantees federal enforcement when state enforcement falls short.
What is more, the statute expressly authorizes the Secretary to
exercise discretion over the amount of the penalty based on specified
factors. 348 The statute thus implies that mitigating factors should be
considered when determining the amount of the penalty, not whether
to assess some penalty in the first place. Finally, even as a matter of
policy, nonenforcement appears hard to square with the statute. As
some analysts have observed, the success or failure of the new,
compliant plans may well depend on enrollment by the sort of
relatively healthy people who would have been satisfied with more
minimal, noncompliant plans. By allowing such individuals to retain
noncompliant plans, the Department's action may undermine the
statute's apparent overall objective of making compliant plans more
prevalent and affordable.

346. Id. § 300gg-22(a)(2), (b).
347. Letter from Gary Cohen, supra note 4, at 3.
348. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(b)(2)(C).
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2. Suspension of the Employer Mandate
The Administration's second nonenforcement policy, the
decision not to enforce the ACA's employer mandate for an additional
year beyond the statutory effective date, also appears flawed.
Beginning on January 1, 2014, employers with more than fifty
employees generally must offer certain minimum health insurance
coverage to their employees. 349 If they fail to do so, and if one or more
of their employees claim certain tax credits or other relief for
purchasing health insurance on their own, then the statute imposes
an "assessable payment" (i.e., a tax penalty) on the employer. 350 In
July 2013, however, the Treasury Department announced that it
would not enforce these penalties until 2015.351 (As this Article was
going to press, the Department further extended nonenforcement of
the penalties for certain employers, but the legality of this further
policy is not specifically addressed here.)3 5 2 The Department justified
the one-year delay until 2015 by referring to its own failure to
promulgate rules implementing a separate compliance-reporting
requirement. 353 Without these reports, Treasury reasoned, it would be
"impractical to determine which employers owe" the penalties. 354
Hence, "no [such] payments will be assessed for 2014."355
Treasury's reasoning betrays too lax a conception of the
executive branch's duty to execute enacted statutes. In effect,
Treasury's logic is that it cannot collect penalties because Treasury
itself failed to require employers to report information necessary to
detect violations-notwithstanding a statutory mandate to do so. It is
true that agencies often miss statutory deadlines for promulgation of
rules. In some cases, the complexity of regulatory problems may make
such deadlines unrealistic given available agency resources and the
required administrative procedures for rulemaking. It is also true that
executive officials going back to the Framing have presumed authority
to decline enforcement in circumstances where doing so is

349. I.R.C. § 4980H.
350. Id.
351. See I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, supra note 4 (providing transition relief to allow employers
and insurers additional time to adapt their coverage and reporting systems).
352. See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg.
8543, 8569 (Feb. 12, 2014) (providing additional transition relief in new regulations).
353. I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, supra note 4.
354. Id.
355. Id.
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impracticable.3 5 6 Modern agencies may well need some flexibility in
implementing complex new legislation like the ACA.
Nevertheless, given the important separation of powers values
at stake, more explicit statutory authorization should be required for
so sweeping and categorical a nonenforcement policy as the
Administration adopted here. In general, missing deadlines for
promulgation of rules is itself a breach of executive duty. In this case,
the Treasury Department claimed a general "administrative
authority," supposedly derived from the agency's organic rulemaking
authority, "to grant transition relief when implementing new
legislation like the ACA."357 Yet even assuming the IRS holds some
organic authority to tailor burdensome statutory requirements during
a transitional period, such authority should not permit a decision, six
months before a statutory deadline is even reached, to excuse
compliance with specific statutory reporting requirements for a full
year. If even the minimum reporting requirements under the ACA are
burdensome for employers, as Treasury claimed, these burdens are a
function of the statute, not Treasury policy. Treasury thus has no
power to remove them.
Furthermore, even if delaying implementation of the reporting
rules is justified, the blanket prospective exemption of all employers
from penalties is not. As a practical matter, without reports from
employers regarding their insurance coverage, identifying employers
who have provided inadequate coverage and thus forced employees
onto the individual insurance market may be difficult. Yet Treasury
might still have forced noncompliant employers to take their chances.
By going beyond passive nonenforcement and announcing
prospectively that it will not assess penalties-even if a violation is
called to its attention-the agency removed any deterrent effect that
the statutory penalties might otherwise have had, thus accomplishing
a de facto one-year suspension of the statute. Moreover, this policy,
too, appears to cut against the overall objectives of the statute. As the
conditioning of employer penalties on employee tax credits indicates,
the penalties on employers are one means of funding other measures
designed to ensure coverage for the uninsured.

356. See supra Part IV.A.2.
357. Letter from Mark J. Mazur, Assistant Sec'y for Tax Policy, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
to Fred Upton, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, at 2 (July 9, 2013), available at
http://perma.cc/6Z3L-Z4B9. The statute cited by Treasury as support for this "transition relief'
authority provides only that the Secretary must promulgate rules for enforcement of the Internal
Revenue Code. See I.R.C. § 7805(a) (2012) ("[The Secretary shall prescribe all needful rules and
regulations for the enforcement of this title . . . .").
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In short, the announced one-year suspension of penalties
cannot be squared with the text or policy of the statute, and neither
can it be justified by reference to presumptive constitutional
authorities of the President. It reflects a breach of executive duty and
should not be a precedent for future suspensions of statutory
enforcement without clear statutory authorization.
B. ExercisingDiscretion
In other areas like criminal justice, a substantial mismatch
between the scope of statutory prohibitions and the resources
available to enforce them makes significant enforcement discretion
inevitable. Even in such areas, however, a proper understanding of
executive duty should guide how executive officials approach their
responsibilities.
In light of the constitutional principle of legislative supremacy
in lawmaking, and the associated presumption against executive
suspending and dispensing powers, executive officials should not
understand Congress's de facto delegation of broad nonenforcement
power as a license to engage in unrestrained policymaking through
selective enforcement. Some degree of priority setting in enforcement
is inevitable in these contexts. Yet executive officials should
understand their task to be just that: a matter of setting priorities
within the confines of statutory policy, not an unrestrained authority
to adjust the law on the ground to match their preferences as to what
the law on the books ideally should be.
Some have argued, in contrast, that prosecutors should be
encouraged to adopt categorical public enforcement guidelines that
clarify for the public what conduct the government will truly treat as
criminal. 358 The practical viability of these proposals seems doubtful.
Recent examples of leniency notwithstanding, in general it seems
unlikely that prosecutors will cede power by adopting guidelines that
tie their hands in important cases by foreclosing otherwise available
charges. In fact, meaningful enforcement guidelines might well end up
being highly punitive, to the disadvantage of defendants who might
otherwise have obtained lenient treatment. 359 Even were they
realistic, moreover, calls for more explicit, policy-based enforcement
guidelines misunderstand the proper allocation of responsibility and

358. See, e.g., Luna, supra note 18, at 801 (advocating "overt prosecutorial
decriminalization").
359. For discussion of this point, see Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the
Policingof Prosecutors:Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869, 911-12 (2009).
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accountability within the federal constitutional scheme. In the short
run, nonenforcement might help to conform federal criminal justice to
public preferences. But in the long run, unrestrained executive
enforcement discretion will only exacerbate the pathological politics of
criminal law by removing political accountability for Congress's
enactment-and perpetuation-of unduly harsh criminal laws. 360
Drawing the distinction between priority setting and
policymaking may well be difficult in practice. It is more a matter of
mindset than any sort of bright-line rule. Nevertheless, it is critical to
preserving the constitutional principle of congressional primacy over
lawmaking. Here, too, some examples may help illuminate the issue.
1. General Guidelines
The Justice Department's general guidance on prosecutorial
discretion reflects an appropriate executive mindset. Both the U.S.
Attorneys' Manual and more specific recent guidance direct that
prosecutors generally should pursue criminal charges when there is
evidence of a provable violation.36 ' Under these guidelines, federal
prosecutors generally must pursue charges based on "the most serious
offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's conduct,
and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction." 362 At the same
time, the guidelines do advise prosecutors that "equal justice depends
on individualized justice," and that each prosecutorial decision must
be based on "the specific facts and circumstances of each particular

360. Focusing on administrative rather than criminal contexts, Professor Kate Andrias has
advocated broader "disclosure of enforcement policy decisions, accompanied by explanations
rooted in law," as a means of "disciplin[ing] exercises of presidential enforcement discretion."
Andrias, supra note 15, at 1117. This proposal largely sidesteps the question of whether
categorical nonenforcement policies should be permissible in the first place. While aiming to
promote public debate over "whether the President has a reasonable basis in statute for his
choice to emphasize one enforcement policy over another or to prioritize one agency's mission
over another's," Andrias recognizes that the President's "primary duty is to make real the

promise of the relevant statutes." Id. at 1113, 1115. In any event, Andrias's disclosure proposal
carries the drawback that nondisclosure of internal enforcement priorities may often be the best

means of effectuating statutory policies. While executive officials must set sensible priorities
when available resources do not permit complete enforcement, keeping their priorities secret
may preserve the deterrent effect of the statute on a piblic ignorant of actual executive
enforcement practices. For discussion of this issue in the context of marijuana enforcement, see
infra Part V.B.2.a.
361. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-27.220 (1997); Memorandum from

Att'y Gen. Eric H. Holder, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to All Federal Prosecutors 1 (May 19, 2010),
availableat http://perma.cc/42V6-TXNC.
362. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 361, § 9-27.300; see also Memorandum from Att'y
Gen. Holder, supra note 361, at 2 (quoting this language and describing it as a "long-standing

principle").
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case."363 According to the U.S. Attorney's Manual, "Merely because the
attorney for the government believes that a person's conduct
constitutes a [provable] Federal offense ... does not mean that he/she
necessarily should initiate or recommend prosecution." The manual
advises specifically that prosecutors may decline a case when
prosecution would serve "no substantial Federal interest," another
jurisdiction may effectively prosecute the offense, or "there exists an
adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution."3 6 4
Even these permissive standards no doubt understate how
much discretion prosecutors in fact exercise. Given the vast mismatch
between the scope of federal crimes and the available enforcement
resources, executive officials undoubtedly leave many federal crimes
effectively unpunished. Furthermore, in the vast majority of federal
criminal cases that end in guilty pleas, 365 prosecutors must offer
defendants some reduction in the charges or possible sentence to
induce the plea. In some cases, the discounted penalty may simply
control for the prosecutor's risks and uncertainties at trial. But many
other plea bargains reflect a conscious decision to drop certain
provable charges to conserve prosecutorial resources for other caseseffectively a decision to underenforce one law so as to better enforce
others.
Nevertheless, the guidelines as a whole reflect a mindset in
which enforcement-indeed, even maximum enforcement-is to be the
rule, not the exception. The guidelines thus reflect at least an
aspirational focus on individualizing justice without overriding
congressional policies. This focus is consistent with the Constitution's
underlying framework of general policymaking by Congress and
individualized enforcement by the executive branch.
2. Specific Cases
In contrast, recent policies in several specific areas depend on
broader claims of nonenforcement authority. Here, three recent
examples-marijuana and immigration enforcement policies from the
Obama Administration, and certain environmental enforcement
policies from the George W. Bush Administration-provide useful
illustrations.

363. Memorandum from Att'y Gen. Holder, supra note 361, at 1.
364. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 361, § 27.220(B).
365. In 2010, ninety-one percent of felons charged in U.S. District Courts entered guilty
pleas. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Justice Statistics, 2010, http://perma.cc/3X7B-BCR4 (bjs.gov,
archived Feb. 11, 2014).
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Under this Article's framework, the Justice Department's 2013
guidance on marijuana enforcement can just barely be reconciled with
an appropriate understanding of executive-branch responsibility. 366 In
contrast, the Homeland Security Department's immigration policy
appears difficult to square with a proper conception of executive duty.
The final example discussed below-the George W. Bush
Administration's enforcement of "New Source Review" requirements of
the Clean Air Act-highlights how categorical exercises of
nonenforcement power may permit executive officials to benefit
favored constituencies at the expense of broader public interests
supported by statutory policies.
a. Marijuana
The Justice Department developed its current marijuana policy
in response to referenda in several states that relaxed state-law
prohibitions on marijuana possession. Although possession of any
quantity of marijuana is a federal crime,367 the Justice Department
has traditionally given low priority to enforcement of this prohibition.
U.S. Attorneys thus have typically left to state authorities the job of
prosecuting low-level marijuana violations. 368 Nevertheless, marijuana
advocates and some state officials have pressured the Obama
Administration to adopt a formal policy of declining enforcement
against individuals who possess the drug in compliance with state
law. In 2009, after California and several other states legalized
medical marijuana, the Justice Department directed U.S. Attorneys
not to focus federal resources on prosecution of "individuals whose
actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance with existing state
laws providing for the medical use of marijuana."369 In 2011, however,
the Justice Department "clarifi[ed]" that the 2009 directive "was never
intended to shield" large-scale growing operations from federal

366. As this Article was going to press, the Department extended this policy to federal
crimes relating to financial transactions with marijuana businesses that are legal under state
law. See 2013 Cole Financial Crimes Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1-2. This Article does not
specifically analyze this extension of the policy beyond marijuana possession and distribution
offenses to other related crimes.

367. 21 U.S.C.

§ 844(a) (2012).

368. In the most recent years for which data are available (2010 and 2006, respectively), the
federal government prosecuted no more than ninety-three individuals for marijuana possession,
as compared to some 750,000 state prosecutions for that offense. Transcript of Oral Argument at
4, Moncrieffe v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 1678 (2013) (No. 11-702).
369. Memorandum from David W. Ogden, supranote 3, at 2.
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enforcement, and that U.S. Attorneys' Offices "should continue to
review marijuana cases for prosecution on a case-by-case basis."370
Finally, in 2013, after Colorado and Washington legalized
recreational marijuana use, the Justice Department announced a
policy of concentrating federal resources on cases implicating one of
eight enumerated federal enforcement priorities. 371 Noting that "the
Department of Justice has not historically devoted resources to
prosecuting individuals whose conduct is limited to possession of small
amounts of marijuana for personal use on private property," the 2013
memorandum strongly suggested-without specifically promisingthat federal officials would decline prosecution of even large-scale
growers if those growers complied with state law and if the states
maintained a "strong and effective state regulatory system."372 (In
2014, as this Article was going to press, the Department extended its
policy to federal crimes involving marijuana-related financial
transactions. 373 Because this extension of the policy was announced
too late to be thoroughly addressed here, the analysis that follows
considers only the policy with respect marijuana possession and
distribution offenses.)
At least the first two of these marijuana enforcement
memoranda reflect the appropriate executive mindset. While the 2013
memorandum creeps closer to an express promise of nonenforcement,
it too is defensible insofar as it promises only to focus resources on
particular types of cases, not to avoid prosecution altogether in other
circumstances. Given scarce resources for enforcement, federal
prosecutors must set priorities for enforcement, even if doing so means
effectively abandoning punishment of certain violations. Here,
individuals who possess marijuana in compliance with state law
(particularly if they are gravely ill and using the drug for medical
reasons) seem to be as good candidates as any for a low enforcement
priority. Some degree of top-down direction regarding this priority
seems appropriate, moreover, given that the President and senior
Justice Department officials carry more direct political accountability
for national law-enforcement priorities than do individual U.S.
Attorneys or Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 374
At the same time, a more definite nonenforcement policy, such
as state officials and marijuana advocates sought, would exceed the
370. 2011 Cole Memorandum, supra note 3, at 2.
371. 2013 Cole Memorandum, supra note 3, at 1-2.
372. Id. at 3.
373. See supra note 371.
374. For a sustained argument in favor of presidential direction of agency enforcement
practices, see Andrias, supra note 15.
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Executive's proper role by effectively suspending a federal statute and
thus usurping Congress's constitutional responsibility to set national
policy. However popular such action might be, it would remove any
political incentive for Congress to conform federal law to supposed
public preferences, effectively letting Congress off the hook for the
overbreadth of the criminal laws it has enacted. To be sure, aggressive
federal enforcement might better test the popularity of federal
marijuana laws by creating stronger political incentives for Congress
to revise federal law. Yet such executive action would come at the cost
of other, more urgent public priorities for federal enforcement, such as
preventing terrorism, financial fraud, and organized crime.
Furthermore, such aggressive enforcement could present substantial
fairness concerns for individuals targeted for enforcement not because
of the culpability of their conduct but rather as a means of testing the
violated law's continued popularity.
Of course, all these problems result from the underlying
pathological structure of modern federal criminal law-its excessive
coverage, enabled by prosecutorial discretion, of conduct that the
public likely does not consider worthy of punishments as severe as the
letter of the law allows.3 75 But the toothpaste cannot be put back in
the tube; aggressive enforcement of any one law will do little to correct
the underlying structural problem. Under the circumstances, then, the
best achievable balance between prudent policy and executive duty is
likely the sort of unsatisfactory two-step reflected in the Obama
Justice Department's statements: a directive to prosecutors that
certain offenses should be low priority, accompanied by a reminder
that federal laws remain in effect, that Congress is constitutionally
responsible for any legal change, and that all prosecutorial decisions
should be made case by case.
b. Immigration
If the Justice Department's marijuana policy is dubious but
defensible, the Department of Homeland Security's current
immigration enforcement policy appears to cross the line. In recent
directives establishing a program of Deferred Action for Childhood
Arrivals ("DACA"), the Secretary of Homeland Security has
announced a policy of exercising "prosecutorial discretion" to decline to
seek removal of undocumented immigrants under age thirty who
entered the United States as young children and meet certain other

375. See supra Part IV.B.2.
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criteria.376 Under the DACA program, such individuals may apply to
receive, for a renewable two-year period, not only a promise to decline
to initiate removal proceedings against them but also authorization to
work in the United States. 377
Within the framework developed here, this policy amounts to a
categorical, prospective suspension of both the statutes requiring
removal of unlawful immigrants and the statutory penalties for
employers who hire immigrants without proper work authorization.
The action thus is presumptively beyond the scope of executive
authority: to be valid, it requires a delegation from Congress. Yet no
statute specifically authorizes the status-"deferred action"conferred on immigrants under the policy; the program, rather,
depends on an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, in the form of a
promise not to enforce immigration laws for a specified period. 378
Immigration officials, to be sure, have exercised discretion to
abstain from immigration enforcement through deferred action since
at least the 1970s. 379 Congress, moreover, has recognized "deferred
action" as a possible legal status in some statutes, thus arguably
providing implicit authority for this executive practice. 380 In the past,
however, immigration officials have used deferred action principally to
avoid removing immigrants based on compelling individual
circumstances 381-a form of case-by-case nonenforcement discretion.
And while immigration authorities have granted deferred action to
entire groups of individuals in the past, 382 some unforeseen
humanitarian crisis or international incident typically has provided
the basis for group-based relief. As compared to such situations where
exceptional, unforeseen events justify relief from the full rigor of
immigration law, the DACA program appears harder to justify as an
implementation of policy objectives reflected in the statute. Even

376. Memorandum from Sec'y Napolitano, supra note 5, at 1.
377. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 5, at 3-4 (describing prosecutorial
discretion with respect to individuals who came to the United States as children).
378. See generally Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of ProsecutorialDiscretion in Immigration
Law, 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 244 (2010) (discussing the importance of prosecutorial discretion in
the immigration and naturalization process).
379. See id. at 246 (discussing the history of prosecutorial discretion).
380. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i).
381. See Wadhia, supra note 378, at 250, 261-62 (discussing how factors such as physical

infirmity, elderly age, family separation, and mental disability influence deferred-action
decisions).
382. See, e.g., Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Response: In Defense of DACA, Deferred Action,
and the DREAM Act, 91 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 59, 67-68 (2013) (explaining specific
discretionary decisions that the Attorney General and Department of Homeland Security have
applied to categories of noncitizens).
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taking account of past practice, then, the oblique references to
deferred action in the immigration code seem inadequate to justify so
sweeping a suspension of statutory law.
Other scholars have persuasively argued that immigration law
is an area, much like federal criminal law, in which a gross mismatch
between the scope of prohibitions and the resources available to
enforce them makes substantial nonenforcement of those laws
inevitable. 383 Even so, just as in the criminal context, executive
officials should properly understand their role in immigration
enforcement to be a matter of priority setting rather than
policymaking. Judged by this standard, the DACA program still seems
hard to square with a proper conception of executive duty.
To be sure, even without the program, law-abiding
undocumented immigrants, like those covered by the program, no
doubt would be low priorities for removal as compared to individuals
who have committed crimes or who otherwise pose some public safety
threat. The current administration, moreover, has hardly been lax in
pursuing removal of other categories of undocumented immigrants.
Yet declining to prioritize certain cases, as the executive branch might
properly have done, may have very different effects from an
announced, categorical policy like DACA. While the former preserves
the deterrent effect of federal statutes by leaving all individuals
covered by the statute in some jeopardy, the latter removes the risk of
enforcement altogether. It thus contradicts the statutory policy to a
degree that mere prioritization of enforcement resources does not.
Moreover, the contradiction here seems stark because the category of
individuals benefited by the DACA program is quite predictably and
foreseeably within the scope of the removal statutes.
However attractive it might be as a matter of policy, the DACA
program appears to violate the proper respect for congressional
primacy in lawmaking that should guide executive action, even when
substantial exercises of prosecutorial discretion are inevitable. To the
extent Congress has adopted overly broad and unduly harsh
immigration laws, Congress should remain accountable for its choice.
The executive branch should not presume the authority to let
Congress off the hook.

383. Cox & Rodriguez, supra note 333, at 511. The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged
the important role of prosecutorial discretion in immigration enforcement. See Arizona v. United
States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).
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c. New Source Review
A last illustrative example, this one from the George W. Bush
Administration, highlights the degree to which an unbounded
conception of executive enforcement discretion may permit executive
officials to frustrate statutory objectives.
Under the so-called New Source Review ("NSR") program
mandated by 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, certain new or
modified pollution sources must meet more stringent permitting
requirements than preexisting sources. 384 After vigorous enforcement
efforts against coal-fired electric plants by the Clinton Administration
prompted political opposition from industry, the Bush Administration
took steps to weaken the law's impact. 385 To begin with, the
Administration promulgated permissive regulations that would have
exempted many plant modifications from NSR requirements. 386 Yet
the D.C. Circuit invalidated one such rule, disparaging it as
permissible "[o]nly in a Humpty Dumpty world." 387 The
Administration then exercised prosecutorial discretion to decline
enforcement with respect to plant changes that the invalidated rule
would have permitted. Indeed, for a year and a half after the court's
ruling, the Environmental Protection Agency evidently maintained an
explicit internal policy that the law should be enforced only in
accordance with the invalidated rule (even with respect to past
violations that the regulation would not have covered). 388
Given limited resources, agencies necessarily must prioritize
certain enforcement actions over others. Internal agency directives
may be an appropriate way of doing so. As noted, moreover, the
difference between priority setting and policymaking is often a matter
of judgment and degree. 389 And even categorical suspension of
384. For a general description of statutory provisions and the program's history, see
Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L. Revesz, Grandfathering& Environmental Regulation: The
Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681-705 (2007); Thomas
0. McGarity, When Strong Enforcement Works Better than Weak Regulation: The EPA/DOJ New
Source Review Enforcement Initiative, 72 MD. L. REV. 1204 (2013).
385. See McGarity, supranote 384, at 1243-70.
386. See Nash & Revasz, supra note 384, at 1702-04.
387. New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006).

388. See EPA Places Low Priority on Newly Detected Violations of Rules for New Source
Review, U.S.L.W. (BNA) (Oct. 10, 2006); Andrew Childers, Annual Actual Emissions Standard
Test for New Source Review Reinstated by EPA, 39 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1045 (May 30, 2008).

Although the Bush Administration continued to litigate certain enforcement actions initiated by
the Clinton Administration, the only enforcement suit the Bush Administration brought after the
D.C. Circuit's decision involved a plant that would have fallen outside the invalidated rule's safe
harbor. McGarity, supra note 384, at 1269-70.
389. See supra introduction to Part V.B.
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enforcement may not provide the same legal security as a valid
regulation: a future administration might always overturn the
enforcement policy and pursue any cases for which the statutory
limitations period has not expired. 390
Yet this example illustrates how policy-based nonenforcement
may be insidious. After the D.C. Circuit's decision, industry
representatives expressed the hope that the Bush Administration
would exercise its discretion in precisely the manner in which it did.391
Nonenforcement thus enabled the Administration to provide a focused
benefit to a favored constituency while shortchanging the broader, but
more diffuse, public interest in clean air. A proper conception of the
executive role should pay greater deference to Congress. However
inevitable it may be to set priorities for enforcement within the
coverage of a statute, executive officials are not free to unilaterally
suspend enforcement for an entire category of cases based on
disagreement with statutory policy.
C. Three DoctrinalProblems
The examples so far discussed illustrate core applications of
this Article's framework. Yet a proper understanding of enforcement
discretion and executive duty may also have broader implications for
recurrent separation of powers questions. In particular, this
framework may inform debates over the validity of statutory waiver
provisions, the proper interpretation of criminal statutes, and the
constitutionality of independent federal prosecutors.
1. Statutory Waiver
The framework developed here has important implications for
a key modern practice-the growing use of administrative waivers. In
an increasing number of statutes, Congress has authorized agencies to
excuse particular parties from compliance with basic statutory
requirements. Two recent defenders of the practice have called it "big
waiver." 392 These provisions may even reflect an emerging new
paradigm of administrative law. During and after the New Deal,
Congress tended to paint with a broad brush, leaving the details of
national policy to administrators. In our own era of partisan distrust,
390. The Obama Administration in fact stepped up NSR enforcement. See McGarity, supra
note 384, at 1271-74.

391. See Steven D. Cook, Effect of New Source Review Decision Limited by EPA Policy,
ProposedRule, 37 Env't Rep. (BNA) 662 (Mar. 31, 2006).
392. Barron & Rakoff, supra note 14, at 267.
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however, Congress often may seek to retain greater control over the
details of administrative policy by using waiver provisions rather than
delegations to create administrative flexibility. 393
Under a proper conception of enforcement discretion and
executive duty, such waivers are not categorically impermissible. As
explained earlier, there is no general constitutional prohibition on
legislative delegation of executive authority to suspend or dispense
with statutory requirements. 394 Yet waivers are an even greater
affront to legislative supremacy than categorical or prospective
nonenforcement. Rather than simply turning a blind eye to violations,
administrative waivers purport to cancel statutory provisions
altogether. Indeed, in historic terms, they amount to an executive
suspending power. Accordingly, to comply with the presumption
against suspending and dispensing authority, such executive waivers
must have clear statutory authorization.3 95 They cannot be presumed
as part of the everyday administrative toolkit.
Two recent examples illustrate the necessary degree of
legislative clarity. First, provisions in the No Child Left Behind Act of
2001 allow the Secretary of Education to excuse state education
agencies from complying with key statutory benchmarks. 396 Although
the statute generally requires states to satisfy certain performance
standards by 2014, it includes one provision allowing the Secretary to
waive, with certain specified exceptions, "any statutory or regulatory
requirement of [the statute] for a State educational agency, local
educational agency, Indian tribe, or school through a local educational
agency" that receives funds under the statute and requests a
waiver. 397 The Secretary has employed this authority to excuse states
from compliance with much of the Act, on the condition that the states
receiving waivers implement other specified reforms. 398
This use of statutory waiver authority to impose an alternative
regulatory regime raises difficult questions. At the least, it seems
debatable whether Congress, in providing the safety valve of an
executive dispensing power, anticipated that the executive branch
would deploy this authority to impose alternative requirements of its

393. See id. at 292-95 (discussing reasons for increasing reliance on waiver provisions).
394. See supra Part III.D.1.
395. Accord Barron & Rakoff, supra note 14, at 322 (noting "there is much to be said" in
favor of "a clear statement rule for recognizing the existence of a big waiver authority).

396. 20 U.S.C. § 7861 (2012).
397. Id. § 7861(a).
398. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., ESEA FLEXIBILITY POLICY DOCUMENT (2012), available at
http://perma.cc/9B7L-ZRP2 (describing the conditions for such a waiver).
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own devising on parties otherwise subject to the law. 399 In this case,
however, the waiver authority itself does not depend on mere
assertions of prosecutorial or administrative discretion, but rather on
explicit statutory authorization. Given that the statute thus overrides
the presumption against executive suspending or dispensing
authority, as a general matter this program does not implicate the
constitutional limitations on enforcement discretion addressed in this
Article.
In contrast, the statutory basis for recent executive waivers of
certain federal welfare laws appears less certain. Key federal
legislation from the Clinton Administration sought both to transfer to
the states administration of federal welfare programs and to require
that welfare beneficiaries actively seek gainful employment as a
condition of receiving benefits. 400 In recent guidance, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services asserted that the statute provides
authority to waive state programs' compliance with certain work
requirements of the statute. 401 This conclusion, however, depends on
debatable inferences. While the statute allows waivers for certain
state pilot projects, it does not clearly authorize the Secretary's new,
broader reforms. 402 Given that an agency's general organic discretion
over enforcement of laws it administers is insufficient by itself to
justify an executive suspending or dispensing power, such thin textual
inferences should not support an executive authority to waive
statutory requirements.
2. Statutory Construction
The dual-presumption framework should also inform how
courts interpret criminal statutes. As I have argued elsewhere, the
criminal justice system's structural reliance on prosecutorial
discretion, and the associated pathological politics of criminal law,
support strong normative arguments for strictly construing criminal
statutes, as required by the traditional rule of lenity. 403 This Article's
399. For an analysis of this question, see Barron & Rakoff, supra note 14, at 325-27.
400. E.g., Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
401. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF FAMILY ASSISTANCE, TANF-ACFIM-2012-03, GUIDANCE CONCERNING WAIVER AND EXPENDITURE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION

1115 (July 12, 2012).
402. See id. (reasoning, among other things, that work requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 607 may
be waived under 42 U.S.C. § 1315 because that provision allows waiver of any requirement of 42
U.S.C. § 602, and § 602(a) requires compliance with § 607). See generally Barron & Rakoff, supra
note 14, at 285 (Secretary's "interpretation, even if correct, is by no means self-evident").
403. See Price, supranote 30, at 886.
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framework reinforces this conclusion by clarifying that the unbounded
nonenforcement power exercised by modern prosecutors ordinarily
requires affirmative statutory authorization. Construing criminal
statutes broadly, as federal courts have often done, expands the
charging options, and thus the discretion, of the executive branch. 404
Construing federal criminal statutes as narrowly as possible, by
contrast, would limit executive charging options, thus pushing the
structure of federal criminal law incrementally closer to one in which
all prohibitions may realistically be enforced.
The proper constitutional understanding of enforcement
discretion bears particularly directly on disputes over proper
interpretation of overlapping criminal statutes. In a number of
contexts, criminal statutes prohibit specific forms of conduct with only
limited penalties, even though other statutes cover broader forms of
the same conduct with more severe penalties. For example, the
statutory offense of credit card fraud generally must involve more

than $1,000,405 presumably because Congress did not wish to "mak[e]
a 'federal case' out of small-scale frauds involving credit cards." 4 0 6 Yet
current doctrine permits federal prosecutors to use mail and wire
fraud statutes-which potentially carry much higher penalties-to
prosecute credit card frauds, even if the fraud falls below the
thresholds of the credit card statute. 407
This interpretive approach is rooted in the mistaken
assumption that the executive branch necessarily possesses plenary
authority to select criminal charges. 408 Recognition that the baseline
executive duty is to prosecute all statutory violations, making
exceptions only for unusual cases, should produce a different
orientation. Specifically, it should prompt courts instead to view
overlapping statutes as reflecting a gradation of mutually exclusive
offenses-a real code of conduct, in other words, rather than a
delegation of authority to the executive branch to reshape the law on
the ground by selectively enforcing the law on the books.

404. See id.; Smith, supranote 18, at 554 ("All too frequently, courts have either created or
exacerbated redundancies across criminal statutes by broadly construing generic federal statutes
carrying higher penalties to encompass conduct that is subject to lower penalties under more
specific federal statutes.").

405. 15 U.S.C.

§ 1644(a) (2012).

406. Smith, supra note 18, at 555.

407. 18 U.S.C.

§§ 1341, 1343; United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 399-401 (1974).

408. See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 124-26 (1979) (relying on principle
that "[w]hether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions
that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion"). For arguments in favor of statutory
exclusivity, see Smith, supra note 18, at 582-85.
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3. Independent Prosecution
Finally, the proper constitutional framework for enforcement
discretion has important implications for the longstanding debate over
the constitutionality of independent prosecutors. In Morrison v. Olson,
the Supreme Court upheld a statute giving the President only limited
removal authority over certain prosecutors. 409 Some scholars have
followed Justice Scalia's celebrated lone dissent 410 in arguing that
prosecution is an essential executive function that must be conducted
by officers subject to plenary presidential oversight. 411 Others have
pointed to examples of nonfederal enforcement of federal laws in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to argue that federal law
enforcement is not an essential executive function and thus can be
taken outside the presidential chain of command. 412 Although the
independent-counsel statute at issue in Morrison has expired, the role
of an independent prosecutor's investigation in bringing about
President Clinton's impeachment highlights the significance of the
issue, making it one of the enduring questions of constitutional law.
Nevertheless, the debate as it has been conducted misses a
central point: that historical changes in the overall structure of
criminal justice may affect the relevance of historic examples. As we
have seen, Congress organized the early criminal justice system so as
to create incentives for total enforcement; prosecutorial discretion was
not a central feature of the criminal justice system to anywhere near
the same degree as it is now. 4 13 In contrast, Congress today enacts
prohibitions against a background expectation of prosecutorial
discretion, with the consequence that substantive prohibitions
standing alone do not necessarily reflect democratically sanctioned
standards of conduct.
Accordingly, in the modern context, the practical need for
presidential supervision of prosecutorial discretion is vastly
increased. 414 Indeed, although critics of Morrison typically frame their
position as a formalist argument that law enforcement is an inherent
executive function, 415 the practical reasons they give for the
409. 487 U.S. 654, 655-57 (1988).
410. Id. at 697-734 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
411. See, e.g., Prakash, supra 222, at 524-25 (discussing Scalia's dissent and other scholars
casting doubt on the characterization of prosecution as an executive function).
412. See sources cited in supra note 207.
413. See supra Part I.A.
414. Cf. Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 75, at 4.
415. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 222, at 526-27 (explaining the historical consensus that
executives could control official prosecutors); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing investigation and prosecution as a "quintessentially executive function").
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unconstitutionality of independent prosecutors often turn on
characteristically modern features of the criminal justice system.
Critics highlight, for example, that because independent prosecutors
often lack budget constraints and bear responsibility for investigating
only a single offender or offense, their exercises of prosecutorial
discretion may lack the discipline that resource constraints and docket
pressures impose on other prosecutors. 416 In other words, independent
prosecutors, unlike executive branch officials with other cases to
pursue, may face overwhelming pressure to "bag[] their prey," 417 even
if other federal prosecutors typically would not have committed
resources to prosecuting a similarly situated offender. The centrality
of accountable exercises of discretion to modern criminal justice makes
presidential supervision of prosecution constitutionally essential
today, even if it was not so at the Founding.
VI. CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: PRACTICE AND INTERPRETATION

Enforcement discretion is a hallmark of the modern American
justice system and administrative state. We live under a vast
accretion of civil and criminal prohibitions, softened in application by
(hopefully) benevolent enforcers who may produce a law on the ground
very different from the law on the books. But it was not always so. At
least in the federal system, although important exercises of
prosecutorial discretion stretch back to the Founding, such assertions
of discretion appear to have been more limited in scope than is
common today. The overall design of early federal enforcement, as well
as certain specific enactments, suggests an understanding that
Congress could oust executive discretion and bring about complete
enforcement of its laws. Early history, moreover, suggests an outer
limit on the Executive's presumptive discretion. Although Congress on
occasion authorized broader nonenforcement power, key early
executive officials appear not to have presumed that they held
authority to decline enforcement of federal statutes on a prospective or
categorical basis. Only later did criminal justice and civil and
administrative enforcement take on the forms we are familiar with
today, in which wide-ranging discretion to decline enforcement is
commonplace.

416. See, e.g., Morrison, 487 U.S. at 728-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (elaborating on the
executive's role in constraining prosecutions).
417. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel,
J., concurring).
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Historical practice, no less than judicial interpretation, can be
an important determinant of constitutional meaning. At least if it is
rooted in satisfactory normative principles, the long-standing practice
of the political branches can place a gloss on ambiguous constitutional
text that should limit the range of interpretations available to all
three branches in the future. But here, a normatively attractive
interpretation of the constitutional text can account at most for early
practice, not more recent developments. Accounting for modern
practices in constitutional terms, as some judicial and executivebranch opinions have attempted to do, strains both the constitutional
text and its proper normative underpinnings. Moreover, it distorts the
understanding of urgent contemporary controversies, making the
growing policymaking authority of the executive branch appear
constitutionally inevitable when it is in fact a usurpation. Absent a
congressional delegation of lawmaking power, Presidents must
execute the law, not make it. A proper conception of executive duty
requires them to respect that limit on their power.
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